











Safety critical software development is an extremely costly endeavour;
software developers must forever target efficient processes that reduce
software cost, while allowing significant increases in system size. The
key challenge being how to reduce software cost, without compromising
safety or quality.
The focus of this thesis is to research the development and temporal
proof of a mixed criticality system. The thesis, which attempts to define
an end to end process, begins by studying appropriate and efficient meth-
ods for assessing the timing performance of system components. The key
being an approach that can be applied automatically at an early point
in the design lifecycle.
The thesis then progresses to study how existing mixed criticality
research needs to be advanced and matured in order to support an
industrial safety critical application. This includes the definition of a
scheduling model designed to provide the necessary protections advised
by international aviation guidelines. In the final part of this thesis the
timing process and mixed criticality system model are brought together
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One of the greatest problems facing safety critical software developers
is that of software cost [1]. This is a problem that has plagued the
software development industry for a number of years. However, the ever
greater reliance on software controlled systems, coupled with the need for
constantly increasing software features means this ever present problem
must be continually addressed.
The ever advancing march towards increased efficiency and feature
base ultimately guides software systems down a path of ever greater
complexity and ever finer control. However, this increase in software scale
can only be achieved if software costs on a per line basis are reduced. For
instance, in the last thirty years the amount of software on board Boeing
aircraft has roughly doubled every two years [2][3]. For a commercial
company to remain competitive it cannot simply be assumed that the
total cost of the software system will increase at the same rate.
Therefore, the desire for ever more complex system features must be
met by equivalent reductions in software development costs. The prob-
lem is exemplified by the fact that safety criticality software is relied
upon to perform in accordance with its requirements. Therefore, it is es-
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sential that corners are not cut and that software quality is not adversely
affected. Indeed, cost reduction must not be allowed to impact on the
safety of the developed system [4], [5].
One of the principal reasons that safety critical components are so
expensive to develop, is that they must be developed against robust pro-
cesses designed to provide safety assurance against all use cases. Such
components can be found in a multitude of industries and products; such
as Defence, Nuclear, Marine, Rail and Avionics, amongst others. Typi-
cally, development of such components follows the guidance or standards
set out in one of the many global guideline documents such as ISO26262,
EN50128 and DO-178C; used for the automotive, rail and aerospace in-
dustries respectively. There are a significant number of parallels across
each standard, particularly in the use of ‘Integrity’ or ‘Assurance’ levels,
which represent a classification used to define each software component
based on its impact to wider system safety should said component fail to
execute in accordance with its requirements. In this thesis, the term is
considered synonymous with a component’s ‘criticality’.
The focus of this thesis is on the development of avionics systems,
according to DO-178C [6]. Therefore the term used to describe a software
component’s criticality is the Development Assurance Level, or DAL, as
originally defined by ARP4754 [7] and used throughout DO-178C.
The software aspects of the aircraft and engine certification process
assures that the software systems and components are ready for deploy-
ment in service. DO-178C contains a comprehensive set of objectives that
should be fulfilled to certify each component, thus providing confidence
in its operation. The greater the DAL (the higher the DAL) assigned to
each software component, the greater the level of confidence should be
achieved, and therefore the more certification objectives that need to be
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accomplished. In other words the greater the consequence of failure of
the software component, the greater the effort required to develop and
assure said component.
Ensuring conformance to high DAL software certification objectives
can be a laborious and expensive process. It involves confirming that
each high level requirement traces through architecture and design to
the code that implements it, and vice versa. The software must then
be reviewed and analysed to confirm conformance to standard as well as
confirming the accuracy and consistency of the software. Tests should be
derived according to each requirement, which in turn should be shown
to test the entire code base. The rigour and the process followed should
be dictated by the DAL of the system.
The methods employed to facilitate the reduction of software cost in
an industrial scale project is a topic large enough to fill several theses.
Instead, in this thesis, as set out in the remainder of the introduction,
software cost reduction is targeted by focusing on real time system as-
pects of software development. Firstly, appropriately automated and
efficient methods of gaining confidence in a software component’s tem-
poral operation, its Worst Case Execution Time (WCET), are researched.
Secondly, this thesis studies how these WCET results can be used along
with new processes, techniques and architectures, to allow components
of different criticalities to co-exist on the same processing platform; thus
allowing system developers to better target their certification effort. The
research undertaken identified a number of significant issues that needed
to be addressed with the existing published literature in academia, this
thesis provides extensions to address said shortfalls.
This introduction now steps through some of the issues that this thesis
aims to address.
3
1.1 Software Development Life-cycle
Figure 1.1: Typical Software Development ‘V’ lifecycle.
A typical software design lifecycle, known as the V-model, is illus-
trated in Figure 1.1. The lifecycle follows a process on the left hand
side of progressively more detailed requirements and design definition,
ultimately reaching code development. On the right hand side a corre-
sponding set of verification and validation steps confirm the code com-
plies with each layer of design. The lifecycle allows the development of
a structured approach to software engineering, well suited to large scale
industrial production.
The principal issue with this approach is the delay of verification
activities to the so called ‘right hand side’ of the ‘V’. The later in the
software development life-cycle a problem, issue or bug is identified in a
software system, the more costly it is to fix. This was illustrated by the
Constructive Cost Model, COCOMO [8], which showed it typically costs
20-100 times more to fix an error identified after delivery than during
requirements definition.
An improvement to the V model is that of the ‘W’ model, originally
introduced by Herzlich [9] as illustrated in Figure 1.2. This model fol-
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lows a principal of verifying each step of the software design as soon as
the requirements or design have been produced. This allows issues to
be identified as close to development as possible, with a view to fixing
problems before they propagate through the software design.
Figure 1.2: Typical Software Development ‘W’ lifecycle.
The key to this early verification process is not necessarily to produce
certification evidence, as this is arguably only produced on the right hand
side of the ‘W’. The key instead is to identify bugs and issues as early as
possible, ideally as soon as a developer has produced a requirement or
design. This focus on quickly and iteratively developing quality software
is a cornerstone of agile software development techniques[10]. However,
in order to facilitate this developers require the right tools, processes and
infrastructure to perform software analysis.
Being able to perform software analyses early in a design lifecycle
forms a key requirement for the work researched in this thesis. Issues are
identified with existing techniques for measurement based timing analy-
sis; which are built on the assumption that the data to drive the analysis
methods already exists. Chapter 3 explores the development of auto-
mated techniques to aid these processes.
5
1.2 Assessing a Component’s Timing Be-
haviour
One of the key properties of a software system that must be analysed for
certification is the worst case timing performance of the system. Typical
avionics applications will be designed according to a number of timing
related requirements, for example a response to a specific event shall be
completed within a set time. In order to prove compliance to such re-
quirements the timing performance at the system level must be assessed.
This assessment uses schedulability analysis, which requires as a key in-
put an understanding of the Worst Case Execution Time (WCET) of
every component within the system.
There are two principal methods for analysing a software component’s
WCET; static and measurement based.
Static analysis takes the code of the System Under Test (SUT), analy-
ses the possible paths through the code, and by modelling the target hard-
ware; calculates which path through the SUT will produce the WCET.
The analysis gains from being able to fully examine the full set of paths
through the SUT. However, the primary drawback of static analysis is
the technique’s reliance on accurate processor models. As developers
look to use ever more complex processors; the complexity, portability
and potentially pessimism of these models increases accordingly [11].
Measurement Based Timing Analysis (MBTA) approaches rely on
measuring the execution of the SUT to provide measured times which
are then used to derive WCET bounds. The advantage of this approach
is that times can be derived from the actual target hardware, with no
reliance on complex timing models. However, the technique suffers from
the fact that the software must be executed on the target hardware (or
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equivalent cycle accurate simulator) with a sufficient level of coverage to
provide accurate results.
In practise, if robust and accurate processor timing models can be
developed then the use of purely static analysis methods should provide
safe results. However, it is arguably not cost effective to generate accurate
timing models of even the simplest processors in use today [12]; including
in the industrial system used throughout this thesis [13]. Therefore,
the focus of this thesis is purely on measurement based WCET analysis
techniques and how they may be improved and automated for use by
complex industrial programmes.
Traditionally one measurement technique used in industry has sim-
ply been to time the SUT as it is executed as part of standard software
verification tests. The maximum observed execution time (MOET, or
High Water Mark - HWM) is then taken forward with the addition of
a safety bound (defined through engineering judgement) to produce an
acceptably sound WCET [14]. Were a system developer able to obtain
full path coverage across a system under test, then this approach could
potentially provide a reliable WCET. However, obtaining full path cov-
erage quickly becomes infeasible as system complexity increases, and so
the biggest risk with this approach is that the testing may not drive the
worst case path, producing an optimistic result. Ultimately, even the ap-
plication of an engineering judgement inflation factor may not produce
a safe result [12].
More recently hybrid measurement tools have been applied within
industry [15], [16] which aim to address potential optimism in MBTA
approaches by combining timing measurements taken during software
execution with statically analysed source code information. This reduces
the amount of coverage required when producing the timing measure-
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ments over exhaustive HWM testing, however the process still requires
an extensive amount of coverage [12], [16], [17].
Across the academic literature a number of measurement based WCET
tools or processes have been proposed [17], [18]. Again these all sim-
plify the problem, removing the need for obtaining full path coverage.
However, they all still assume the method and process for driving the
SUT is robust, reliable and sound. In an industrial project this may be
generated through software verification activites. Crucially though, this
requirement for extensive coverage pushes WCET analysis using a hybrid
measurement technique to a late stage in the software design lifecycle.
This is less than ideal as it strips system developers of the ability to anal-
yse to provide guidance for optimisation at design time. Furthermore, it
delays software timing analysis to a point in the design lifecycle where it
is significantly more expensive to resolve issues that arise.
Alternatively, in academia a number of techniques have looked at
using the power of automatic test generation to automatically execute
an SUT [14], [19], [20]. However, these techniques are assumed to be
able to drive the worst case path, which potentially if executed for long
enough they will. Unfortunately, when applied to a complex industrial
scale system, being developed against tight project timescales, expecting
such a tool to obtain a safe WCET in reasonable time is unreasonable.
Furthermore, the techniques do not offer support, evidence or validation
that the produced results can be relied upon.
Instead this thesis focuses on how automatic test case generation tech-
niques can be tailored to support industrial scale hybrid measurement
based timing analysis with a scaleable, portable and efficient approach.
Thus allowing system developers to obtain the information they need
both to optimise their designs and to facilitate de-risking of software cer-
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tification as soon as the software code has been developed. The approach
is analysed against a representative set of software components provided
by a real avionics system use case, as well as a set of publicly available
WCET benchmarks.
1.3 Process Proportionate to System
The higher a software component’s criticality; the greater the effort in-
volved in the development and verification of the component. In practise,
all software components are verified to a certain level; if not for safety crit-
ical purposes, then for business or mission critical reasons. This means
that even lower criticality components should perform as expected. How-
ever, the critical point is that these components have not been proven
to a high criticality confidence level to execute as required. It should
therefore be assumed that the information, validation, proof or verifica-
tion evidence produced for lower criticality components may not provide
a full understanding of the component [21].
It is perfectly common for safety critical systems to contain software
components with differing safety requirements, and therefore different
criticality levels. A good example in most control system architectures is
the dual integration of high criticality control and lower criticality moni-
toring systems. Given that these lower criticality systems have not been
proven to the same level as the higher criticality components, it is essen-
tial for software certification to prove that if a low criticality component
fails, it cannot impact the behaviour, operation or performance of the
high criticality component. Arguably it is important to assume the low
criticality component will fail at some point in time, with an appropriate
safety case put in place to protect the wider system.
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Traditional software architectures treat each individual processor in
a system as belonging to a single DAL, meaning all components execut-
ing within that processor must be verified to the highest criticality of
the processor. This would lead to an example architecture where one
processor may support control software, and one processor may support
monitoring components.
This inflexible architecture approach can lead to the introduction
of additional processors, even though processor utilisation levels could
feasibly allow software co-location. Furthermore, this can also lead to
the introduction of significant cross-system communication requirements,
potentially adding unnecessary complexity to the system. This approach
therefore has the potential to lead to higher development and production
costs, as well as increased overall size, weight, and power use.
In the literature a Mixed Criticality System (MCS) is a system which
combines software of multiple DALs on the same processor. The techni-
cal objective of which is to provide sufficient evidence that a low DAL
component cannot jeopardise any high DAL component’s temporal or
functional requirements, while still providing a level of service to the low
DAL component. One approach to MCS development is to deploy the
partitioned architecture defined by the ARINC 653 standard [22]. This
standard defines a partitioned model principally aimed at the develop-
ment of Integrated Modular Avionics (IMA), but is capable of supporting
partitions developed against different DALs. The issue with the ARINC
653 approach is that the solution defined for temporal partitioning, es-
sentially a two-level scheduler with time division, makes the approach
difficult to apply to a complex control system [23]. This is because it can
lead to the introduction of higher release jitter, longer end-to-end trans-
action response times and in general it can be difficult to accommodate
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a complex task schedule, including aperiodic operations, into fixed time
partitions [23].
Since Vestal’s seminal work [24] on the topic of an MCS scheduling
a significant number of academic works have been published on the de-
velopment of MCSs. In particular, much of this work has focused on the
temporal partitioning aspects of mixed criticality scheduling [25]–[30].
However, while addressing temporal partitioning, these methodologies
do not progress far enough to allow integration of an MCS into a high
criticality system. Crucially, the literature does not address how such
a system should be designed, analysed, validated and certified. This
includes the appropriate handling of overheads, and how to assess the
service afforded to low criticality tasks. This is particularly important
as in order to deliver a credible product, system integrators may need
to provide guarantees on the minimum level of service provided to low
criticality functionality.
This thesis aims to address these issues by contributing a design for a
MCS, justified against the certification guidelines provided in DO-178C
[6]. This includes how such a system should be designed and analysed.
Secondly, the thesis describes the application of this MCS to a large com-
plex industrial application, and introduces a process that could be used
to study and understand the service afforded to a set of low criticality
tasks. The developed system is assessed against the avionics system re-
quirements, certification evidence and performance at the system level.
In addition, several publicly available system examples are used to assess
and review the approach.
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1.4 Coping With WCET Pessimism
In order to provide sound WCET results to the appropriate level of con-
fidence it is logical, and almost expected, that timing analysis processes
will induce pessimism [31]. This can be induced at the task level due
to system designs that incorporate infeasible paths, or through analysis
deficiencies when viewing code constructs such as loops. This pessimism
is extrapolated as schedulability analysis expects each task to execute to
its WCET, all on the same iteration. For instance, in a complex control
system a reaction to two opposite events (such as reacting to an over-
speed and an underspeed) may appear on the worst case path, and be
assumed to happen on the same iteration.
Identifying such forms of pessimism when viewed at the macro level
is easy. However, when viewed at the system level featuring thousands of
functions such identification quickly becomes infeasible in a cost effective
time-frame. The system, and key safety critical functionality, must be
confirmed to comply with its requirements, even if executed against the
worst case. However, if the system is not executing to the worst case, then
is it possible to use the spare utilisation generated by WCET pessimism
for useful execution?
One possible solution for this would be to execute less time critical
operations within an idle task, or as the lowest priority tasks within
the system, on the assumption that key safety critical operations will
interrupt their execution when required. This offers an easy method for
utilising spare execution time, however, the process provides no ability
to add timing constraints against the software executed in the idle time.
Where it is desirable for less critical components to be developed against
temporal requirements, a more advantageous approach would be to utilise
some of the techniques introduced by MCS schedulers.
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Such approaches, for instance [25]–[27] allow less critical components
to execute within a system, provided that high criticality components ex-
ecute within certain, less pessimistic, possibly optimistic, timing budgets.
The techniques introduced in these papers provide the facilities to prove
adherence of high criticality tasks against their timing requirements, this
is based on the assumption that when necessary all low criticality tasks
will be disabled. Extensions to these models, such as [32]–[34], employ
methods such as elastic scheduling or graceful degradation to attempt
to extend service provided to low criticality components. However, at
present all of these techniques lack mechanisms to assess the service pro-
vided to low criticality tasks within such a system. These low criticality
tasks will still have some system function, even if not a safety critical
function, and therefore understanding how they execute in practise is
still important from a system verification point of view.
This thesis aims to address this by identifying an iterative process,
based around a system simulator, that aims to provide a mechanism for
assessing the service afforded to a low critical task. The process is broken
down using a Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) [35], before being applied
to a real industrial case study.
1.5 Difficulties of Applying Academic Re-
search to Industry
Sections 1.1, 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4 have introduced some of the real-time soft-
ware development problems facing industry today. There are processes
and methods in the published academic literature that have the potential
to aid industry; these include the application of automatic test generation
and preemptive mixed criticality scheduling. However, these techniques
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have yet to be tested and analysed in large scale industrial projects,
and as noted by Quinton [36] and Davis et al. [15] there are significant
difficulties that face the application of academic research in industry.
These difficulties in part come from the fact that there are few robust
industrial scale examples that can be used to develop and test techniques
and processes at the scale required for industry [36]. This has in some
cases led to academic research that focuses on solving problems not found
in industry, or alternatively research that focuses on new problems, as-
suming the problems of yesterday have been solved.
This thesis aims to advance and extend the academic research al-
ready available in the literature and to examine how it can be applied to
real industrial applications. The key contribution that encompasses all
of the work in this thesis is in the application of the reviewed and up-
dated approaches to a real industrial mixed criticality application, with
no assumptions or simplifications made to the system being studied. The
system used for this analysis is introduced in Chapter 2; consisting of a
control system taken directly from a Rolls-Royce aircraft engine.
1.6 Thesis Proposition
The central proposition of this thesis is:
Automatic test case generation techniques can be extended to reli-
ably target hybrid measurement based timing analysis to produce sound
WCET profiles. These produced WCET profiles can then be used to aid
the development and validation of mixed criticality schedulers, provided
the certification objectives, overheads of the scheduler, and the service
provided to low criticality tasks are not neglected.
The key strands to this thesis are as follows:
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• To study the application of automatic software execution towards
industrial scale hybrid measurement based WCET analysis. The
key contributions being an algorithm designed to provide the tim-
ing measurements required by a hybrid measurement based WCET
analysis tool, as well as results from applying the technique to an
industrial scale case study.
• To identify how a mixed criticality system may be developed and
certified. The key contribution being a design for a mixed critical-
ity scheduler, overhead analysis and run-time monitoring system
defined according to certification standards.
• To show how an existing industrial scale project may be ported
to a mixed criticality system. The key contribution being a process
for automatically porting an existing system to a preemptive system
while minimising system overheads.
• To present a coherent system development process that uses the
defined automated WCET analysis techniques to develop and val-
idate the mixed criticality system. The key contribution being a
process for validating the service afforded to a low criticality task
within a mixed criticality system.
1.7 Thesis Structure
Chapter 2 introduces the current industrial system that is used through-
out this thesis. The tooling, techniques and processes researched in this
thesis have all been adapted and applied to the DAL-A aircraft engine
control system introduced. Several different variants of the control sys-
tem are used throughout this thesis, in all cases without modification,
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and in some cases as part of a live development project. This forms one
of the central themes of this thesis - the processes, techniques and tooling
studied are tested and applied to a real certified system in order to test
their effectiveness and applicability.
Chapter 3 considers how the timing performance of the system may
be analysed automatically using measurement based approaches. The
chapter assesses possible options for automatic software execution from
the available literature on automatic test case generation. It discusses
the development of a set of algorithms designed to automatically drive a
software component to produce the required timing information; before
applying each algorithm, as part of a comprehensive statistical evalua-
tion, to a set of components provided by the system defined in Chapter
2.
Chapter 4 studies the definition of an industrially appropriate, cer-
tifiable, Mixed Criticality System. The chapter begins with a review of
the existing literature. It then advances to identify the key requirements
from a certification point of the view for the system, before researching
and assessing how such a system can be designed and verified. It then
progresses to assess the most efficient way of porting the system described
in Chapter 2 to the new scheduler. In particular, this involves the porting
of the non-preemptive system to the fully preemptive mixed criticality
scheduler. The system’s static schedulability is analysed, along with an
exploration of the benefits of the new system.
Chapter 5 extends the system developed in Chapter 4, and defines
a process that would allow the produced system to be validated. This
includes the development of a new process to examine how the service
provided to low criticality tasks within the system can be assessed; a
process which utilises the timing analysis tooling researched in Chapter
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3. Finally, this process is applied to a set of case studies for the system
in question in order to assess the process’ applicability and effectiveness.
Chapter 6 summarises the work conducted in this thesis, and pro-




The Industrial Context: A
Current FADEC System
This thesis focuses on the industrial application and extension of ad-
vanced real time systems research. As such it discusses the develop-
ment of a single industrial target: a high criticality Rolls-Royce air-
craft engine control system, or Full Authority Digital Engine Controller
(FADEC). The system used throughout this research is analysed directly
from project, with no simplification or modification.
As introduced by [15]:
FADECs are responsible for the control and monitoring of aircraft en-
gines. They play a vital role in not only the reduction of hazardous events
related to the aircraft engine, but also the overall safety and certification
of the aircraft. FADECs do much more than inject fuel and control the
engine. They help keep both the aircraft’s cabin and fuel at the right tem-
perature, receive information and commands from the cockpit and send
back information, they also log information about the engine for future
maintenance, and play other vital roles such as helping the aircraft brake
on landing via the use of thrust reversers. Over time, this has led to an
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increase in the amount of software in the system, most of which is hard
real-time.
The Rolls-Royce FADEC architecture is currently going through the
most ambitious redesign in over 30 years. The new FADEC architecture
is being updated in order to support the Rolls-Royce UltraFanTM en-
gine architecture, in itself the greatest aircraft engine core architecture
change in 60 years. The UltraFanTM engine will introduce a powered
gear box into the centre of the jet engine, and will require a significant
step increase in software system size, with the new control system esti-
mated to be several times larger than existing FADEC systems. This is
within a climate where software development cost is already considered
a significant problem [1].
The following sections now explore the current system’s WCET pro-
cess, target processor, scheduling methodology and architecture.
2.1 Current Approach to WCET
The FADEC aircraft engine control software, which is written predom-
inantly in the SPARK 95 subset of Ada; consists of several hundred
individual tasks formed by several hundred thousand lines of code. Each
software component is analysed using the hybrid measurement based tool
RapiTime, from Rapita Systems Ltd.
RapiTime automatically instruments the system source code and anal-
yses the structure of the code. When the instrumented code runs on the
target; the instrumentation produces a timing trace that is then analysed
off-line and together with a high-level structural analysis to produce a
timing profile for the software.
The Rolls-Royce approach to software certification using RapiTime,
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as described in [13], is to integrate the tooling with the low-level software
verification process. This allows timing measurements to be taken as
software verification is performed, delivering sound results in time for
certification.
This process, however, while being used successfully to certify several
projects since 2015, is far from ideal from a cost effective point of view.
The principal issue being that the generation of accurate timing data
is left to a point in the design lifecycle which is too late for cost effec-
tive optimisation. This has had the consequence of separating system
developers from the optimality of the code they produce.
One approach to improve this may be to require each engineer to
manually execute the code they have just produced. However, this ap-
proach is less than ideal for two reasons. Firstly, as the WCET of each
function must take account of each function it calls, in a complex con-
trol system, this approach quickly becomes infeasible as the size of the
test space increases. Secondly, each tester would have to derive a test
that provides the appropriate coverage of the whole system-under-test
that is required by the hybrid measurement based analysis tool. On the
one hand this is a process that could also allow the early identification
of software bugs. However on the other; a software developer would be
expected to develop a greater number of test drivers to generate enough
system coverage, than they would have to produce purely to debug their
code.
2.2 Target Processor
The target processor used throughout this thesis is the Rolls-Royce in-
house processor. The Rolls-Royce processor is a packaged device that
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integrates a core, memory, IO and tracepoint interfaces. Being targeted
at the safety-critical embedded sector, the device is DO-254 – Level A
compliant. It has extensive single-event-upset protection and is suitable
for harsh environments. The processor does not incorporate a data or
instruction cache due to their impact on timing predictability.
The processor has been carefully designed to ensure that each instruc-
tion’s execution is time-invariant. In other words each instruction will
take the same time to execute, regardless of the data its operation is
performed upon. These design features further ensure that previous pro-
cessor state has no effect on the current operation of the device. The use
of such a deterministic processor allows worst case timing measurements
of software components, including the scheduler, to be taken during nor-
mal operation, without the need for special builds [13], [37]. Finally,
the processor provides the facility for implementing user and supervisor
mode memory partitioning.
This processor is targeted throughout this thesis as it provides a real
example of a processor in use in both current and future avionics appli-
cations. However, an implicit requirement of this research is to keep the
developed techniques platform independent, although such independence
is not explored further within this thesis and is saved for future work.
2.3 Current Scheduling Approach and Ar-
chitecture
The current scheduler used within the FADEC software system is a fixed
priority non-preemptive scheduler; the initial development of which is
discussed in [38]. The system, and each component within it, must be
carefully developed in order to avoid long blocking terms and excessive
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scheduler overheads. The scheduler was developed to the highest critical-
ity standards, against DO-178C, and has been in use on all Rolls-Royce
FADEC systems for almost 20 years.
An important aspect of the system, and its associated schedulabil-
ity analysis tooling, is the use of a repeatable algorithm (i.e. one that
always produces the same results) that takes all the temporal require-
ments of each task and uses them to calculate a deadline for each task.
Task priorities are then assigned using the Deadline Monotonic Priority
Ordering (DMPO) algorithm where the task with the shortest deadline
is given the highest priority. If all deadlines are met, then all the timing
requirements are met; the method ensures the schedule is correct by con-
struction. This approach has a further advantage, key to industry, that
by incorporating the timing requirements for each task into its design-
time calculated deadline; the system can easily be proved, reviewed and
understood by engineers and system integrators [39].
The current FADECs designs consist of a large number (> 200) of
tasks. Because of the real-time, hardware controlling nature of the con-
trol system, a number of tasks (in the order of 5% of the total number
of tasks) have completion jitter requirements. To comply with their re-
quirements, these tasks must execute within the jitter requirement of
their period. Typically these tasks tend to take on the highest priority
(lowest deadline) across the system.
Furthermore, in order to prove adherence to system level temporal re-
quirements, such as the system’s response time to certain engine events,
the control system task set has been designed to incorporate a large
number of transactions. A transaction is a sequence of tasks that must
execute in a defined order. Transactions can contain sets of tasks with
different periods, and tasks that are defined against a jitter requirement.
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Together a task’s jitter requirement, transaction requirements, and pe-
riod form the set of temporal requirements which are used to define the
deadline of the task.
At present all tasks within the system are defined as high criticality
DAL-A tasks, and so all tasks are designed and proven against the most
stringent development standards. Furthermore, all tasks are treated as
hard real time tasks. In practise, some tasks, assuming a carefully or-
chestrated safety argument could be made, could be treated as lower
criticality tasks, or indeed as soft real time tasks. This however is not
currently possible without an appropriately designed mixed criticality
scheduler, appropriate system level partitioning and a robust validation
of the service provided to any tasks treated as soft real time and/or
lower criticality tasks. The available literature does not yet provide such
guarantees and validation processes.
This is important because it is not simply acceptable to assume that
soft real time tasks and/or low criticality tasks can be disabled for ex-
tended periods of time. The tasks still have a business critical operation;
even if they do not have a safety critical one. In essence, a task’s criti-
cality is not necessarily related to its ‘importance’. Therefore, it is only
possible to consider mixed criticality operation, if as part of a system
certification, or mission validation effort, the service provided to low
criticality tasks is understood.
2.4 System Model
A task, or partition, is a schedulable entity which consists of a number
of components. This task completes a system functionality which carries
a failure condition. This failure condition reflects the system-level effect
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that a failure of this task may cause and leads to the derivation of a DAL,
also referred to as a criticality level. The criticality level of the task is
denoted by Li where (as defined by DO-178C [40]) Li ∈ {A,B,C,D,E}.
Level A indicates the highest level, E indicates the lowest level such that
A ≥ B ≥ C ≥ D ≥ E.
A system is defined as a collection of tasks denoted by τi where 1 ≤
i ≤ N . Each task τi is denoted by a deadline Di, a period Ti, a
criticality level Li, and one or many WCETs Ci. A task is said to
have a hard deadline if the task must complete before said deadline;
whereas a soft deadline allows deadlines to be missed without having an
adverse impact on the safe operation of the component. The current
system model assumes if a task exceeds its deadline it is permitted to
continue to completion.
Other parameters which describe a task include the completion jitter
Ji which denotes the maximum permissible variation of the period Ti for
the completion of the task. Once a task has been scheduled it may be
assigned a priority Pi where 1 ≤ Pi ≤ N . It is possible for the execution
of one task τi to be reliant on the completion of another task τj. Such
an interaction is described as a transaction. Transactions are formed in
order to aid the proof of system-level timing requirements, where it may
need to be proven that the system performs a set sequence of activities
in order, and within a set interval of time. The maximum response time
of a task Ri is calculated as the sum of the WCET Ci, the interference
suffered by the task Ii and the blocking suffered by the task Bi; where
the Interference Ii is the sum of the time delay between release of the
task, and execution as caused by higher priority tasks. The blocking time
Bi is the time delay between release of the task and when the task begins
to execute, as caused by lower priority tasks.
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Finally, a hard deadline task τi is said to be schedulable if its worst
case response time (WCRT) Ri, is less than or equal to its deadline
Di.
2.5 Summary
This chapter has introduced the industrial context, from the point of
view of a real aircraft engine control system, or FADEC. The system
is introduced in order to provide a sound base to assess the research
conducted in the following chapters.
Introduction of the system has already presented a number of research
challenges that are revisited in the following chapters, these include:
• How to efficiently assess the timing properties of a complex sys-
tem encompassing thousands of different functions developed over
a multi-year programme.
• How to appropriately schedule complex task sets, including the
appropriate handling of transactional and jitter requirements.
• How to provide assurances that all tasks (including low criticality





The understanding of, and confidence in, a software component’s WCET
is a key validation step that must be completed during the verification
and certification of a safety critical system. DO-178C dictates that a sys-
tem developer should understand the worst case timing behaviour of the
system, and be able to provide confidence that any timing requirements
in the software design have been complied with in the implemented sys-
tem. One principal method for ensuring compliance to timing require-
ments is to analyse the WCRT of each task, which in turn requires a
bound on the WCET for each task to be identified. This WCET analysis
should take account of any performance effects introduced by either the
compiler, or any advanced hardware features. The analysis should also
provide an understanding of the timing behaviour of the task within the
integrated system with all inter-system timing impacts taken into con-
sideration. Ultimately, this worst case behaviour must accurately reflect
the performance of the system in service.
In practise, even on a simple processor analysis of a program’s WCET
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can become an extremely difficult and expensive process to perform to an
industrial scale, frequently requiring significant engineering effort. This
chapter explores how data to support hybrid measurement-based WCET
analysis can be reliably generated automatically to help mitigate this
problem.
Section 3.1 now explores the available literature on both measurement
based timing analysis, and on automatic test case generation. Section
3.2 examines the target application for timing analysis, before Sections
3.3 and 3.4 explore an automated timing analysis approach built upon
optimisation algorithms. The approach followed in Section 3.4 begins by
examining the effectiveness of a purely random optimisation algorithm
(or search), as well as the application of the current approach found in
the literature. The section then progresses to examine how this algorithm
can be improved and refined using a series of examples taken both from
industry and from openly available benchmarks.
3.1 Literature Survey
Throughout the literature survey discussed in this section the actual-
WCET is assumed to be unknown. The term accuracy is used to denote a
WCET approaching the actual-WCET of the system in question, whereas
a sound WCET is used to denote a WCET which rests above the actual-
WCET. The aim of a timing analysis process should be to provide a sound
WCET, with acceptable accuracy to firstly avoid undue pessimism and
secondly to provide a real representation of the final target system timing
performance. Finally, any industrial scale process must be efficient and
repeatable to allow affordable large scale application.
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3.1.1 Measurement-Based WCET Techniques
Industrial techniques in the past have centred on the simple process of
taking High Water Mark (HWM) timings from software test executions
[14]. This approach is easy to implement and guarantees to provide mea-
surements of the real system; and provided the System Under Test (SUT)
executes full path coverage it should provide a sound result. However,
should the testing not provide full path coverage then this approach risks
producing optimistic results as the software may not execute the worst
case path. As a system expands, the number of possible paths increases
accordingly, and the number of tests required to obtain this coverage can
be assumed to grow at a similar rate. In essence, in a complex software
program the possible search space, which includes the worst case path,
increases to such a size that this kind of analysis becomes unsound and
infeasible.
Research targeting sound and affordable measurement-based timing
analysis has taken two main paths; hybrid approaches, and probabilis-
tic approaches. Hybrid approaches combine structural information ob-
tained through static analysis, to measurements taken during execution.
In contrast, probabilistic approaches apply statistical theorems over a
large number of execution time measurements to produce a probabilis-
tic distribution of execution times; ultimately producing a WCET value
against an expected exceedance probability.
Hybrid measurement techniques aim to simplify the execution time
measurement search space to an affordable, achievable and practical level;
while improving the safety of general measurement-based approaches.
Deverge & Puaut [17] for instance use structural analysis to condense
the SUT into a number of clusters. Each cluster is then analysed indi-
vidually, the aim being to achieve full path coverage through the cluster.
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Each path is then timed to produce an observed WCET for the cluster.
These cluster-WCETs are then combined using data extracted from the
structural analysis phase to produce a final WCET.
The method relies on the assumption that each cluster is context
independent from all other clusters. The authors suggest three areas
where this assumption is broken - Global Mechanisms (cache, branch
predictors, etc), Variable Latency Instructions (instructions with variable
timing behaviour, e.g. integer multiplication, or FPU operations) and
Statistical Execution Interference phenomenon (due to delayed memory
accesses or memory operations) [17]. It is suggested that in order for
clusters to be handled independently, these three causes of processor
unpredictability must be mitigated.
Stattelmann & Martin [18] present a measurement-based tool that
also breaks the SUT into a number of easily traceable segments. How-
ever, they overcome the requirement that each segment be independent
by formulating the WCET as a product of its execution history, or con-
text. The SUT is divided into a number of program segments, which
are executed on hardware and analysed by trace hardware. The context-
sensitive evaluation relies on the tracing hardware being able to consider
the execution history prior to a run of the segment. This execution his-
tory is extracted as the first part of the code segment is executed and
added to the Control Flow Graph (CFG) of the program segment under
test [18].
Once all the trace data and execution history has been extracted, the
execution times for each basic block are annotated onto each node of
the CFG, but only where the node’s execution context matches. This
produces a context dependent set of times for each basic block. The
execution history is then traced through the CFG to identify the path
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containing the largest execution time [18].
The tool developed as part of [18], was tested on the Mälardalen
WCET Benchmark Suite [41] and the DEBIE-1 benchmark. It showed
how the context dependent measurements were able to obtain results
higher that the maximum end to end observed times of a longer run, but
also lower than results obtained through non-context dependent analysis.
Petters [42] proposes a process that uses source code instrumentation
to target analysis, measurement and specific paths through the code in
order to produce context sensitive manageable blocks for analysis. These
block times are then rolled up to produce a system level result. One risk
with this approach is that the instrumentation and measurement control
is inserted into the code, which can be expected to affect code execution
and compiler optimisations, meaning the analysed system may not reflect
the final un-instrumented system.
Ultimately though, the risks with each of these solutions is their scal-
ability; because as the complexity of the system increases the number of
sections the code is broken down into would also increase accordingly.
For a large industrial scale project this could lead to tens of thousands of
functions all being analysed to provide path coverage, or all producing a
context-sensitive WCET equation, and so the processing, or engineering
effort required would be significant. For instance; the current Rolls-Royce
control system introduced in Section 2 consists of over 5000 functions,
executing over 250,000 lines of code.
The RapiTime tool from Rapita Systems is a commercially available
hybrid measurement-based timing analysis tool, which is already in use in
industry [13], [15], [16]. RapiTime statically analyses the source code of
the SUT to obtain a tree based representation of the code. The tool then
observes the execution of the software as it executes on target hardware
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and appends this timing information to the tree based representation
[43]. This provides a time profile for each basic block through the code,
which is then combined in a final calculation stage to provide a WCET
estimate. The key is that this breakdown to basic block level is hidden
from the user of the tool.
As the analysis is built around measuring the actual execution time
of the target hardware, the tool is easily ported to new hardware and
software architectures. However, this also means the tool requires a
pre-defined comprehensive test set to properly drive the SUT, ensur-
ing enough coverage is obtained to generate accurate results [44]. This
means that the tool cannot be applied to a system until a point where
verification activities have matured, therefore the analysis is delayed until
a later, more costly, point in the design lifecycle.
Finally, Measurement-Based Probabilistic Timing Analysis (MBPTA)
was first proposed by Stewart & Burns [45]. This was later extended by
Hansen et al. [46] and Cucu-Grosjean et al. [47]. The basis of these
techniques is the use of Extreme Value Theory to fit an appropriate dis-
tribution to the observations captured. The WCET is then extracted
from the distribution for a chosen level of probability that it has ex-
ceeded. The problem is that in order to provide reliable results the input
data fed into the tool must be independent and identically distributed,
which in practice is hard to achieve. Secondly, the level of code measure-
ments required, in some cases branch, decision and state coverage, makes
the problem of obtaining reliable measurements to support this type of
analysis even harder to solve [48].
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3.1.2 Garbage in, Garbage out
Accurate and sound measurement-based timing analysis tooling, regard-
less of the approach utilised to simplify the problem, is wholly reliant on
the data input into the analysis [11]. If insufficient or inadequate timing
information is input into the process, then the results that are produced
by the tooling may not provide a sound, let alone accurate, result. Addi-
tionally, as more complex processor architecture features such as caches
are considered, the amount of timing information and data required to
provide a sound WCET can be expected to increase even further [12].
Particularly, due to the introduction of timing anomalies [49].
Colin and Petters present an investigation into the effects that differ-
ent advanced processor features have on the WCET and on its probabilis-
tic analysis [50]. The features investigated include data and instruction
cache, branch prediction units and out of order execution units. The pa-
per’s aim is to show that benefits in performance offered by the advanced
features can be seen in the WCET analysed on these architectures.
The analyses performed, over five complex algorithms, tested ten con-
figurations with and without the advanced processor features under test.
Tests were performed using randomly generated test vectors. The inves-
tigation in [50] utilised the pWCET tool [51]; the results of which show an
interesting correlation between advanced processor features and timing
improvements. However, it also highlights how the advanced processor
features tested significantly increase the complexity of achieving enough
test coverage to obtain accurate results.
Betts et al. attempt to address issues concerning coverage by intro-
ducing a new concept for measuring WCET coverage for measurement-
based approaches [44]. Their coverage metric is based on an amalga-
mation of three approaches which, when combined, form the basis for
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approving that enough test data has been produced to support dynamic
analysis.
The principle of building an instrumentation point graph (IPG) is
introduced. The graph splits the SUT into a number of execution units,
divided between instrumentation points. The IPG details the execution
unit’s interactions between these points, and this forms the basis for the
metric’s algorithm. The three metrics introduced in [44] are firstly Sim-
ple Pipeline Coverage, which measures that every execution unit between
instrumentation points has been executed. Secondly, Pairwise Pipeline
Coverage, which measures that every node into each instrumentation
point, and every node out of each point has been tested. And finally
Pipeline Hazard Path Coverage (PHPC) which measures that every stat-
ically defined pipeline hazard has been observed at least once during
testing.
This final metric PHPC is perhaps the most difficult to define and
indeed fulfil. The metric is reliant on static analysis of the SUT to
identify potential structural and data dependent pipeline hazards, which
of course requires detailed knowledge of the pipeline the SUT targets,
therefore affecting the portability of the tool. The process of identifying
the SUT’s pipeline hazards through static analysis is also not a trivial
task. To fully achieve this would not only require knowledge of the
current instruction’s effect on the pipeline, but also on the current and
previous state of the pipeline. Arguably this level of analysis would
quickly prove infeasible if applied to a large industrial system.
Ultimately, the previous work discussed in this section has explored
how confidence can be built that sound WCETs have been obtained
through measurement based coverage. However, each method assumes
that the measurements required to drive analysis already exist, without
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addressing how the measurements can be produced. With respect to the
requirements placed on these measurements; techniques that try to break
down the SUT into sets of sections to be analysed exhaustively, such as
[17], [18], risk scalability or in the case of [42], correctness. In some cases
it is unclear what coverage is required to obtain a sound result, such as
in the case of probabilistic timing analysis techniques [46], [47]. Finally,
extended coverage metrics have been proposed by [44], [52], however these
risk requiring infeasible levels of coverage.
3.1.3 Producing Measurement Data to Support
WCET Analysis
Optimisation algorithms, specifically search algorithms, are designed to
iteratively and efficiently improve on a defined solution through extensive
trial and error. Wegener [19] and Tracey [14] both illustrate how search
algorithms could be used for test data generation.
Wegener’s early work [19] built off Jones et al. [20] and presented
an investigation into how genetic algorithms can be used to estimate the
minimum and maximum execution times of software targeting embedded
systems. Tracey introduced a framework of tools designed to automat-
ically generate test data to perform dynamic analysis on an SUT. One
of the targeted analyses being the analysis of the WCET. The work has
been targeted toward safety-critical systems using strongly typed Ada
[14]. The framework introduced is primarily based on search algorithms,
which produced good results when compared to system HWM observa-
tions. However, the drawback was that the tool had to achieve path
coverage to obtain a sound and accurate WCET.
Khan and Bate [53] introduce the idea of incorporating multi-criteria
optimisations into a search based WCET analysis tool. The method
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adopted used a number of fitness function parameters in order to at-
tempt to drive the worst case path. These included advanced processor
features known to cause larger WCET values, such as cache misses, but
also focused in on low level software coverage such as loop iterations.
The paper concluded that no one fitness function provided better results
across all test code items, and that the fitness function chosen should be
dependent on the target environment. However, the paper focused on a
number of processor or software features that are not necessarily present
in safety-critical systems and also failed to consider coverage which is
of importance to certification. Nevertheless, the work did indicate that
using optimisation algorithms focused on the features that contribute to
higher-WCET figures could produce more reliable results.
Williams [54] proposes a static analysis tool which aims to identify
a test vector to exercise every path through the code under test. The
WCET can then be read off as the HWM observed during testing. This
was extended by Williams and Muriel [55] with an analysis into possible
simplifications that can be made to avoid the analysis requiring full path
coverage. This includes maximising loop counts and assuming branches
are always taken. The paper recognises that further investigation and
justification is required, however it does indicate possible areas where
MBTA coverage requirements could be simplified.
Wenzel [56] introduces an MBTA tool designed to calculate sound
WCET bounds of safety-critical software. The tool uses a combination of
static analysis and dynamic measurement of the SUT in order to compute
sound WCET bounds. It statically analyses the feasible paths through
the code and then uses search algorithms to identify test vectors to exe-
cute each path. This is achieved through a combination of test data reuse,
random search, genetic algorithms and finally model checking [56]. Un-
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fortunately the tool places a number of restrictions and assumptions on
the code under test; for example the tool is only capable of analysing
acyclic code and does not allow function calls. This means that unfor-
tunately the compromises required to use the tool are significant, and
would not be acceptable in an industrial environment.
Building off this Bünte et al. [52] examined the effectiveness of using
model checking [57] to produce test suites with enough coverage to pro-
vide reliable WCET estimates once combined using Implicit Path Enu-
meration Technique (IPET). Their research focuses on identifying effec-
tive coverage metrics to drive a model checking test suite generator - the
so called FORTAS framework. This was extended by Bünte et al. [12]
where the research combines the results produced with a genetic algo-
rithm, which then aims to identify larger execution times. One drawback
is that the tool analyses software that has been simplified to ensure each
decision point relies on only a single variable. Furthermore, some of the
benchmark tests utilised had to be simplified to allow analysis using the
bounded model checker [52]. This may not be appropriate to an indus-
trial program where the cost of simplifying hundred of thousands of lines
of code could make this process infeasible.
This work was further extended by Kirner et al. in [58], [59]. Their
initial work [58] examines how compiler optimisations affect source to
object code traceability, and therefore which optimisations affect the test
vectors produced by the model checking test suite generator tool. It
defines which optimisations need to be turned off in order to guarantee
source to object traceability for various code constructs. The paper also
examines the effect that turning these optimisations off has on a test
processor (Intel Core 2 Duo) for a limited set of Mälardalen benchmarks
[41]. Finally, their later work [59] expands on the FORTAS toolset with
37
the implementation of context-sensitive-IPET.
The FORTAS framework represents some of the most advanced work
in the field of generating traces for measurement-based timing analysis
tooling in the available research. However, its scalability remains limited
by its bounded model checking tooling. Furthermore, the restrictions
placed on the source code being analysed, including code simplification
and compiler optimisations, may limit its usability. However, if these can
be addressed then the tooling and techniques offer potentially analogous
tooling to those discussed in this thesis.
3.1.4 Summary of the Literature Surrounding
WCET Analysis
A review of the available literature has illustrated some of the key issues
surrounding WCET analysis. As discussed in the introduction to this
section, an industrial WCET tool should be expected to provide sound,
accurate results efficiently. These results should be able to be produced
and reproduced as part of an affordable process that ultimately provides
a system designer with confidence in the result.
Techniques that have focused on soundness and accuracy, risk unac-
ceptable scalability and inefficiency. Conversely, techniques that focus
on efficiency, risk poor accuracy and incorrectness. Whereas techniques
that restrict the target application to improve WCET tooling efficiency,
risk leading to unacceptably expensive product restrictions. Ultimately,
a compromise of these different requirements must be sought.
This thesis chapter is concerned with using search algorithms to gen-
erate good data for input into Measurement Based Timing Analysis
(MBTA) tools. The general proposition is that a search algorithm, or
indeed any test data generation technique, cannot be expected to stum-
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ble across the WCET of a software component if that is its only target.
Instead the optimisation algorithm should be focused on generating the
right coverage to support sound measurement-based WCET analysis.
This allows the search algorithm to be focused on a smaller, more
manageable search space that delivers the ‘good input data’ required by
the timing analysis method adopted. The work differs from previous
approaches, such as the work of Wenzel [56] and Bünte [12] as firstly
the fitness functions used have been specifically tailored to target the
type of data needed by the MBTA tool. Secondly, while the approach
has been designed to analyse industrial software developed and reviewed
against strict standards, the analysis places no further restrictions on the
software under test (unlike approaches such as the FORTAS framework
[12], [52], [58], [59]). Finally, the approach has been investigated on a
processor, and software set taken directly from an industrial system. This
includes software that incorporates a large amount of previous software
state, which significantly increases the search space.
3.2 Target Application
In order to study the application of automatic test generation techniques
to the derivation of measurement-based timing data, a set of test code
items was compiled. Aiming to provide a broad subset of examples cov-
ering the principal architectural components found in real systems, the
test code items were derived from both the Rolls-Royce system defined
in Chapter 2 and from the Mälardalen WCET benchmarks [41].
The Rolls-Royce test code items introduced in Table 3.11 consist of
a set of complex ‘high level’ software components with a considerable
1The acronyms used for the Rolls-Royce test code items are not expanded as their
full name may reveal commercially sensitive information.
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Table 3.1: Test Code Items Used for the Analysis.
Name Source Loops LOC MCC
Inputs
I/F/B/SI/SF/SB
QSort Mälardalen Y 121 21 0/20/0/0/0/0
Qurt Mälardalen Y 166 19 0/3/0/0/0/0
Select Mälardalen Y 114 20 1/100/0/0/0/0
InsertSort Mälardalen Y 7 5 100/0/0/0/0/0
F Rolls-Royce Y 1101 154 0/17/12/194/32/24
ACDF Rolls-Royce N 85 9 0/7/4/16/0/6
ACDN Rolls-Royce N 167 14 0/6/6/15/2/8
ACDP Rolls-Royce Y 254 27 0/8/5/16/0/6
ACDT Rolls-Royce Y 395 55 0/26/13/48/0/18
VCA Rolls-Royce Y 590 68 1/40/17/9/6/6
VCP Rolls-Royce Y 922 94 1/44/43/10/11/9
VCS Rolls-Royce N 205 21 0/6/2/0/0/0
number of inputs, which collectively control the operation of the code.
Table 3.1 denotes whether a test code item includes Loops and the to-
tal number of executable lines of code for each item (LOC). The Mc-
Cabe Cyclometic Complexity (MCC) metric [60] is shown to provide a
range of how many independent paths there are through the code. Fi-
nally, the number of inputs that drive the test code item are shown as
I/F/B/SI/SF/SB; denoting each input variables type as I = Integers,
F = Floats, B = Booleans, SI = State Integer, SF = State Float and
SB = State Boolean. Where State variables are parameters that are
both read from, and written to by the test code item, for instance, these
variables could hold a previous system parameter for comparison on the
next iteration of the control code.
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The four standard benchmarks used for the analysis were taken from
the Mälardalen WCET Benchmarks [41]. A large number of the bench-
marks were not included as they provided constant execution times when
executed on the target processor and hence were not sufficiently inter-
esting. The benchmarks used were chosen as the execution time of each
varies significantly as the input search space is traversed, and because
they contain input data dependent loops. Finally, two of the chosen
Mälardalen benchmarks (InsertSort and Select) were extended to create
a larger search space. In both cases the number of input variables was
increased from 10 to 100.
3.3 Optimisation Algorithms
The search algorithm used for the analysis is a derivative of the simulated
annealing algorithm, originally presented in [61]. The basic algorithm is
shown in Algorithm 1.
The simulated annealing algorithm was chosen over other algorithms,
such as a genetic algorithm, because of its ability to narrow down on a
good solution, while also searching over a large part of the search space.
Although the key to this work is the fitness functions proposed; there is
no reason why these fitness functions could not be used to drive a genetic
algorithm.
On each iteration the GenNewSolution function pseudo-randomly
selects a new input solution to the function under test. This solution
is generated from the previous solution, with only a minor change to a
single randomly selected variable. FitFunc is then used to assess the new
solution’s fitness, which is accepted by the if statement on line 5, if an
improvement, or pseudo-randomly selected or rejected if a degradation.
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As the test progresses the pseudo-random selection of worse solutions
will reduce, as controlled by Temp. Finally, StoppingCriteria assesses
whether to stop the search.
ALGORITHM 1: Simulated Annealing.
1: Temp = [0.01, 0.1]
2: while NOT StoppingCriteria() do
3: NewSolution = GenNewSolution(CurrSolution)
4: Fitness = FitFunc(TestCode(NewSolution))
5: if random(0..1) <exp(Fitness / Temp) then
6: CurrSolution = NewSolution
7: else
8: ignore new solution
9: end if
10: Temp = CalculateNewTemp(Temp)
11: end while
The initial algorithm parameters were defined using an extensive trial
and error approach against the following criteria:
• Sufficient exploration of the search space, initially allowing regu-
lar solution degradation while ensuring solution improvements are
always accepted and pursued.
• Execute for a sufficient length of time, with the initial evaluation
target being to execute for significantly longer than necessary.
• Each fitness function should use the same algorithm parameters to
ensure fairness and control across experiments.
The search algorithm parameters discussed in the following sections
were derived through this approach, and are not discussed extensively
as they do not form a key contribution of this work. The key for the
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fitness function improvement, discussed later in the following section, is
that the parameters aim to provide a fair playing field for studying the
different fitness functions that do form one of the principal contributions
of this work.
The following sub-sections now discuss the key parameters of the
simulated annealing algorithm used throughout this analysis. This is
with the exception of discussion on a specific fitness function, which is
addressed and discussed in the following section.
3.3.1 Solution Generation
The software architectural model provides information on each input
into the test code item. This includes the range and type of the input,
thus allowing the search algorithm to narrow down the search space for
analysis. The initial set of inputs is pseudo-randomly chosen, using a
time-seeded random function at system initialisation.
One of the principal aims for the algorithm should be to identify
and then focus in on a good solution. Therefore, the derivation of a
new solution on each iteration of the algorithm is based on a minor
modification to the previous set of input vectors. This is introduced in
Algorithm 2.
As the simulated annealing algorithm begins each iteration one input
variable is randomly chosen. Depending on whether this variable can
be represented as an integer, a float or a boolean; the value is either
changed by 10% (integers), changed by 10 or 20% (floats) or inverted
(booleans). For integers and floats the actual change performed, and
whether it represents an increase or decrease, is pseudo-randomly chosen.
This creates a new solution with just one variable altered. The algorithm
includes a check to ensure the minimum amount integers and floats are
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ALGORITHM 2: Solution Generation.
Input CurrSolution
Output CurrSolution
1: I = random(0..NumInputs)
2:
3: if type(I) == Integer then
4: δ = dAbs(CurrSolution[I]/10)e
5: if CurrSolution[I] - δ < CurrSolution[I].Min then
6: CurrSolution[I] = random(CurrSolution[I] + δ or CurrSolution[I].Min)
7: else if CurrSolution[I] + δ > CurrSolution[I].Max then
8: CurrSolution[I] = random(CurrSolution[I] - δ or CurrSolution[I].Max)
9: else
10: CurrSolution[I] = CurrSolution[I] + random(−δ or δ)
11: end if
12:
13: else if type(I) == Float then
14: ChangeRatio = Random(10.0 or 20.0)
15: δ = Max(MinPrecision, Abs(CurrSolution[I])/ChangeRatio)
16: if CurrSolution[I] - δ < CurrSolution[I].Min then
17: CurrSolution[I] = random(CurrSolution[I] + δ or CurrSolution[I].Min)
18: else if CurrSolution[I] + δ > CurrSolution[I].Max then
19: CurrSolution[I] = random(CurrSolution[I] - δ or CurrSolution[I].Max)
20: else









altered by does not tend to zero. This ensures integers and floats can
traverse the zero positive/negative boundary.
If the target system model provides type ranges, as is the case with
the Rolls-Royce control system, then these type ranges are taken into
account when making the decision as to whether to increase or decrease
the variable.
3.3.2 Temperature Control
The temperature (Temp) is the key parameter that controls the operation
of the algorithm. As shown by line 5 of Algorithm 1, while solution
improvements are always accepted, the Temperature weights whether or
not a solution degradation is accepted or not. A higher temperature
means the solution is more likely to be accepted.
The temperature is designed to slowly decrease over time; therefore
ensuring that as the test progresses the algorithm becomes less accepting
of worse solutions. Ultimately, the temperature decreases to such a point
that the algorithm becomes a standard hill climbing algorithm.
The temperature was designed to decrease slowly from a starting
point where all solutions are accepted, to a point where no worse solutions
are accepted, over a period of roughly 10,000 iterations. This was shown
through trial and error to provide an acceptably slow cooling period
across each fitness function.
One modification from the original algorithm suggested by Kirk-
patrick et al. [61] has been made. That is, if no solutions are accepted
after 200 iterations, then the temperature is increased to reheat the search
[62]. This reheating schedule was shown to avoid the simulated annealing
algorithm being caught in a local minimum, which is regarded as one of
the risks with the algorithm.
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3.3.3 Stopping Criteria
It is generally not known when the WCET, or the worst case path, has
been observed; and so the derivation of a stopping criteria is extremely
difficult. Therefore, the stopping criteria used in this algorithm follows
a similar approach successfully used by Tracey [63] in that it aims to
execute for a sufficiently long period of time, before identifying when no
further improvements are being made. The stopping criteria is ultimately
balanced to allow the algorithm to execute for significantly longer than
felt necessary, only stopping when no solutions have been accepted in the
previous 33% of total test iterations. This is on the basis of a minimum
of 1000 iterations.
This stopping criteria was defined following a process of trial and
error, crucially the same criteria is used throughout the following sections
to ensure a level playing field for all tests.
3.3.4 Derivation of a WCET
The derivation of a WCET using the search based algorithm described
in this chapter follows the standard qualified Rolls-Royce process for
obtaining WCET figures for software certification, as described in [13].
The process, which uses RapiTime from Rapita Systems Ltd, instruments
the software under test with a series of low overhead tracepoints (called
iPoints). As each iPoint is executed the processor outputs a timing trace
which is captured by monitoring hardware. These timing tracepoints are
input into the RapiTime tool which merges them with the source code
structure in order to produce a WCET result.
The approach is qualified as a Tool Qualification Level 5 tool (Verifi-
cation tool) according to DO-330 [64]. This qualification is based on the
following key assumptions:
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• A software architecture amenable to analysis; including defined
component and hardware boundaries.
• A processing architecture that supports analysis and provides accu-
rate non-intrusive tracing and time-stamping of software execution.
• Comparison between the code tested and the delivered code to
ensure the results are representative of the final system.
The minimum requirement for the approach when targeting the Rolls-
Royce processor (introduced in Chapter 2) is for the software traces to
demonstrate full branch coverage, with each loop being exercised to its
maximum. This requirement is derived from the tool qualification re-
quirements for the process, as discussed further in [13].
In the context of this work, the search algorithm is used to auto-
matically execute the software under test. As the software under test
executes, iPoints (iPoints/tracepoints) are output by the processor and
captured for input into the RapiTime tooling infrastructure. The aim
of this work, therefore, is to produce the right coverage to allow the
RapiTime tool to produce a sound WCET result.
3.4 Automatic Software Execution
This section focuses on the design and development of a search algorithm
to automatically drive hybrid measurement-based timing analysis. The
key contribution of the section is the derivation of a targeted fitness
function which focuses on deriving the right data to support the analysis
from across a feasible search space.
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3.4.1 System Setup
The process followed by the WCET analysis tooling is defined in Figure
3.1. The blocks highlighted in red show manual steps, which currently
form part of the formal software development process at Rolls-Royce.
The blocks highlighted in blue are the additional automated steps added
as part of this study. These are described below:
Figure 3.1: Timing Analysis Process.
• I/O Identification - Derivation of the inputs to each test code
item from the software architectural model.
• Test Vector Generation - Configuration of a simulated annealing
search algorithm to drive the inputs to the test code item.
• Timing Test Execution - Output of software timing information
for input into the hybrid measurement-based timing analysis tool.
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The current process, which follows the red workflow, requires engi-
neers to define functional tests (Test Development stage) which pro-
vide full code coverage from the highest level of a schedulable entity, right
through all sub-functions. This requirement means that timing informa-
tion is not available for development engineers until a very late stage in
the design lifecycle. This means engineers do not have the information
they need to easily optimise their code and delays identification of timing
issues until a late stage in the design lifecycle.
The ultimate aim of the process would be for the Timing Test Ex-
ecution stage to merge results from Test Development, and from the
Test Vector Generation stages for software certification. With the
automated Test Vector Generation stage providing indicative results
at an earlier stage in the software design lifecycle to the Test Develop-
ment stage. The results in this thesis focus on the results from the Test
Vector Generation stage.
3.4.2 Initial Algorithm Design
The initial search algorithm compares two different fitness functions. The
first is a purely random unguided search where all solutions are accepted;
this is denoted as Ran. The second fitness function used is the currently
accepted approach as used by Wegener [19], Tracey [14] and Jones [20];
denoted ET. This fitness function was shown by Khan [53] to generally
give the most appropiate WCET result.
ET is designed to attempt to identify the largest execution time possi-
ble. As each new solution is executed its operation is timed. The current
execution time is then assessed against the previously accepted execu-
tion time. This is shown in Equation (3.1), where CurrT ime is a signed
integer containing the time of the current solution, PrevT ime is the pre-
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viously accepted best solution and FitnessET is the fitness calculated.
The subtraction of one from the time difference ensures that an identical
execution time is not viewed as an improvement.
FitnessET =
CurrT ime− PrevT ime− 1
PrevT ime
(3.1)
The algorithm setup used is as defined in the previous section, with
the exception of the stopping criteria for the Ran fitness function. The
fitness function randomly accepts all solutions, and therefore measuring
time since the last solution acceptance is irrelevant. As a consequence
Ran is allowed to run for longer than any other fitness function. However,
when the results are post processed, only the first X are processed; where
X is set to the median of the other fitness functions.
3.4.3 Initial Results and Analysis
The simulated annealing algorithm introduced in Section 3.4.2 was ap-
plied to the test code items introduced in Section 3.2. The simulated
annealing algorithm was executed fifty times, each time with a different
initial seed fed into the pseudo random number generator. The fifty re-
sults from both the Ran and ET fitness functions were compared using a
χ2 statistical test [65][66]. A p-value of less than 0.05 was obtained which
showed that the comparison of the results were statistically significant.
This provided confidence that fifty tests provided sufficient results for
analysis.
The Rolls-Royce test code items used for this analysis are taken from
the highest system level of the aircraft engine control system. Each task
calls a number of sub-functions; the execution path followed through
these sub-functions being reliant on the input arguments provided by
their parent task, and so in some cases it is not possible to achieve full
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block coverage of each sub-function. Therefore, the analysis of the results
discussed throughout the following sections is concerned with reviewing
the coverage achieved in comparison to the coverage achieved across the
whole set of simulated annealing configurations.
The results presented in this section are considered to be the ini-
tial state results, based on processes for determining measurement-based
timing analysis coverage defined by Wegener [19] and Tracey [14].
The initial results are summarised in Table 3.2. These show the num-
ber of tests for each fitness function2 that managed to achieve coverage
greater than 90% of the possible instrumentaton point (iPoint) coverage
for each code item. The results indicated that the fitness functions ob-
tained reliable coverage of the Mälardalen benchmarks, with the Qurt
test code item receiving the lowest coverage. However, the coverage for
the industrial examples was extremely poor.
In order to review the results in more detail, the coverage obtained
for both fitness functions and the performance of the search algorithm
was reviewed in depth for each test code item. For brevity only the
analysis performed on the VCA test code item is discussed throughout
the following sections. The VCA test code item was chosen because it
contains a number of loops and hard to reach paths that together lead
directly to longer execution times.
Figure 3.23 shows the iPoint coverage obtained for the VCA test code
item after fifty iterations of the Ran and ET controlled simulated an-
2The acronyms ET NS and Ran NS are used to denote the two initial fitness
functions. The acronym NS stands for No State and is examined further in Section
3.4.4.
3Each box and whisker plot throughout this thesis displays the 25th to 75th per-
centile as the limits of the box, with the 50th percentile (the median) marked with
a bold line. The plot also shows the 5th and 95th percentiles as whiskers above and
below the box, with any further outliers being shown with circle marks.
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Table 3.2: The Number of Tests That Achieved Greater than 90% iPoint
Coverage.
Item MCC Ran NS ET NS
Qsort 21 50 50
Qurt 19 46 48
Select 20 50 50
InsertSort 5 50 50
F 154 50 50
ACDF 9 0 0
ACDN 14 0 0
ACDT 55 0 0
ACDP 27 0 0
VCA 68 0 0
VCP 94 0 0
VCS 21 0 0
nealing algorithms. The iPoint coverage is shown as a percentage of the
total coverage possible from the top level of the function, and so offers a
perceived target for each fitness function to hit.
As is shown by Figure 3.2 the ET fitness function is not too dissimilar
to the Ran fitness function for the VCA test code item. Furthermore,
these initial results suggest a relation between the iPoint coverage ob-
tained and the resulting WCET calculated by the RapiTime tool. This
is mirrored by the results outlined in Figure 3.3 which shows a box and
whisker plot comparing the WCET obtained by each test execution.
Figure 3.4 shows the full Control Flow Graph (CFG) for the VCA test
code item. The graph shows the structure of the VCA function using a


















































Figure 3.3: WCET Calculated for the VCA Test Code Item.
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Figure 3.4: Condensed VCA Control Flow Graph.
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indicates a iPoint with the arrowed-edges showing the possible routes in
and out of each iPoint. This graph has been compressed as sequential
non-decision iPoints have been condensed into their preceding iPoint,
denoted using a rectangular node. A sequential non-decision iPoint se-
quence essentially refers to a sequence of iPoints that will all be executed
if the first iPoint is executed, in other words there is no decision to alter
the iPoint path. Each node is shaded to indicate the coverage obtained
as the ET fitness function executed. A fully green node indicates that
this iPoint was executed in all fifty tests, a red node indicates this iPoint
was never executed. Finally, yellow/green nodes indicate a node where
some, but not all, tests executed this node; with the percentage of tests
and the level of green shading used to denote how many tests successfully
executed this iPoint.
It is important to remember with all CFG plots shown throughout
this chapter, that these graphs reflect the structure of the code, and not
the execution time of the code. That is, one iPoint to iPoint transition
cannot be expected to have the same execution time as another.
Inspection of these graphs illustrates why Figures 3.2 and 3.3 suggests
there is a relationship between high block coverage and a sound WCET.
The graph shows how one decision in particular leads to the execution of
an additional 46 iPoints; adding a significant contribution to the WCET.
This specific decision and path are shown in Figure 3.5, which shows that
only 47% of the fifty tests traversed this path.
The code that introduces this hard to reach path is shown in Listing
3.1. The decision on line 18 represents entry into a set of fault handling
code, which is executed if condition is evaluated false. This evaluation is
based on the setting of thirteen input variables and two state variables.
Essentially this decision represents a very hard path to reach, as entry
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Figure 3.5: Error Handling Code Structure Found Within the VCA Con-
trol Flow Graph.
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to the path requires the correct configuration of fifteen variables. Two
of these variables (state boolean1 and state boolean2) are controlled by
previous iterations of the test, and so prove even more difficult for the
search algorithm to control. This is because state variables are both
inputs to the function, but also outputs. As the function is able to
change their value accordingly. These values for instance may record an
element of feedback in a tight control loop.
1 l c l b o o l e a n 1 := boolean1 or boolean2
2 l c l b o o l e a n 2 := ( boolean3 and
3 ( not boolean4 ) and l c l b o o l e a n 1 )
4 l c l b o o l e a n 3 := ( s t a t e b o o l e a n 1 and
5 ( not boolean5 or boolean6 )








14 l c l b o o l e a n 2 or
15 l c l b o o l e a n 3
16 ) ;
17 iPo in t (21007) ;
18 i f c ond i t i on then
19 iPo in t (21008) ;
20 e l s e
21 iPo in t (21009) ;
Listing 3.1: VCA Hard to Reach Path
Inspection of the code reveals that this path controls entry to a sec-
tion of error handling code. Not only is entry into this section of code
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reliant on a specific set of inputs, but furthermore these inputs, some of
which indicate different data faults, actually inhibit execution of different
operations elsewhere in the code. This means that in order to reach and
execute this branch, a shorter execution time path must be followed to
reach the branch.
In the case of the Ran fitness function, as the fitness function accepts
all solutions, the algorithm is actually able to exercise a relatively large
part of the search space; therefore stumbling across the long hard to
reach path regularly. However, the ET fitness function is disadvantaged
because in order to execute the hard to reach branch, the current solution
must be allowed to ‘degrade’ substantially, that is, several lower execution
time solutions must be accepted. This means the fitness function is
essentially reliant on the random decision to accept a degraded solution
and the function is not able to direct the search towards these harder to
reach paths.
A similar issue was discovered on the VCP and ACDT fitness func-
tions, and in fact can be said to be a common occurrence throughout
the control system. In the case of VCA, entry to the hard to reach path
is guarded by error control logic. This same logic has the effect of lim-
iting execution of other parts of the function, i.e., one error may stop
the function from performing one operation and a second may stop it
from performing another operation. However, only when both are seen
together does the result lead the function to take the hard to reach path.
As well as error handling code, it was also found that different system pa-
rameters, such as whether the engine was idling, or whether the aircraft
was on the ground, can lead to significantly different execution paths.
In addition to highlighting this hard to reach path, the CFG plots also
show that the fitness functions were unable to reliably execute a large
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number of iPoints. As previously noted, the execution time between two
iPoints cannot be assumed to be related in any way to the execution time
between a different pair of iPoints. This means that we can only have
confidence in the WCET produced when we have sufficient coverage of
the system.
Finally, the analysis performed so far has concentrated on code cov-
erage, however a valid WCET also relies on a thorough exploration of
the loops found within the code, which can have a significant effect on
the WCET. Figure 3.6 shows a boxplot of the maximum number of loop
iterations observed across each test. This is calculated as follows: the
maximum number of iterations observed for each loop is recorded as
each test progresses, and after completion the mean across all loops is


































Figure 3.6: Maximum Loop Counts Observed for the VCA Test Code
Item (Mean Across All Tests).
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The plot shows how the ET fitness function was able to drive each
loop through the VCA test code item to a significantly higher number of
iterations than that of the Ran fitness function. This is understandable
because higher loop counts will directly lead to higher WCET results
when compared to the same execution path with a lower execution time.
This suggests the ET fitness function is perhaps better suited to exploring
maximum loop counts than it is higher block coverage.
This initial analysis has highlighted a number of issues with the cur-
rent process as detailed below:
• The system under test contains a large amount of system state,
which is carried forwards through iterations of the test. The current
state of the art algorithm is not designed to, nor proves able to,
handle this state appropriately to allow sufficient exploration of the
system.
• Both fitness functions have difficulties reliably executing hard to
reach paths.
• The use of a single fitness function focused purely on obtaining
larger execution times results in poor coverage of iPoints, affecting
confidence in the resulting WCET.
3.4.4 Assessing the Importance of System State
The analysis in the previous section highlighted that the initial current
state algorithm proves unable to obtain coverage that provides sufficient
confidence in a WCET estimation, and in half of cases, produces results
that do not approach the WCET of the function under test. One of the
issues identified was that the algorithm was not able to handle system
state.
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State variables are commonly found across Control System architec-
tures, which use previous outputs for feedback to create stable control
algorithms. In the initial search algorithm these state variables made it
more difficult to execute hard to reach paths because the search algorithm
had no direct control over them.
Two methods were investigated for handling state variables as fol-
lows. Initially, state variables were treated as other input variables and
were randomly initialised and altered in exactly the same way. This im-
proved the obtained results, however it was found that a more efficient
method was to randomly choose whether to alter a state variable or to
carry forward the previous iterations state variable setting. This allows
the function under test to influence the state variables in a more rep-
resentative way, essentially allowing the function under test to perform
some of the hard work.
To analyse the results at the system level, the set of test code items
were repeated fifty times. The iPoint coverage obtained, and the WCET
calculated, for the VCA test code item is shown in Figures 3.74, 3.8 and
3.9. As the figures imply, the coverage as a whole increased significantly.
This was because the search algorithm was better able to traverse state
controlled decisions. Two examples of these improvements are shown in
Figures 3.10 and 3.11, which compare the CFG coverage obtained during
the initial analysis (on the left of each plot) to the coverage obtained by
this state-handling improvement (on the right).
Secondly, the maximum number of loop iterations also increased sig-
nificantly, with all variable loops seeing a notable increase in their max-
imum observed number of iterations.































Figure 3.7: iPoint Coverage Obtained for the VCA Test Code Item,



























Figure 3.8: WCET Results for the VCA Test Code Item Following the






































Figure 3.9: Average Loop Counts Obtained for the VCA Test Code Item
Following the Addition of State Variable Control.
It is worth noting that one issue with treating state variables as inputs
is that the input space that must be manipulated increases accordingly.
For test targets that have a number of state variables that strongly con-
trol the execution of the function this is a necessary requirement. How-
ever, a risk is that state variables that have little or no control over the
execution of the function may actually lead to a poorer exploration of
the search space.
While taking control of state variables significantly increased cover-
age, the large range of results in the boxplots illustrate that there is still
a lot of variability in the produced results. This is shown on inspection of
the CFG in that the particular hard to reach path around iPoint 21007
(labelled in each CFG figure as I 21007), discussed in the previous sec-
tion, is executed more often (now greater that 50% of tests), but still
proves difficult to execute.
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Figure 3.10: CFG Coverage Improvement Examples Following the Addi-
tion of State Variable Control.
Figure 3.11: CFG Coverage Improvement Examples Following the Addi-
tion of State Variable Control.
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3.4.5 Improving Coverage
Analysis of the results produced so far show that the search algorithm,
with ET and Ran fitness functions, has so far proved unreliable at ob-
taining sufficient iPoint coverage across each test code item. Essentially,
the algorithms do not adequately target improving poor coverage.
Analysis of the control system functions being tested have revealed a
number of key properties:
• At times it may be necessary to accept significantly lower execution
times, over several iterations, to identify new paths and branches.
• ET’s focus on execution time results means it quickly loses focus
when set against difficult to reach paths. This has been shown by
the fact that a random fitness function is able to produce compa-
rable results.
• Neither fitness functions focus on achieving full coverage. For in-
stance they show little focus on individual blocks or branches, such
as those shown in Figure 3.11. As already stated, it is not safe to
assume that the number of iPoints in a block is proportional to its
execution time - as a lack of coverage, leads to a lack of WCET
confidence.
In order to attempt to focus on obtaining greater iPoint coverage,
two new fitness functions were defined - Unique Execution Times (UET)
which aims to focus on identifying new unseen paths, and Branch Cov-
erage (BC), which aims to maximise code structural coverage.
UET aims to return a high fitness when a new path has been tra-
versed. Paths themselves are not monitored, as maintaining a list of
which paths have been executed and then checking against this list was
deemed to lead to unnecessary complexity. Instead, the fitness function
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keeps a record of each solution’s execution time, and counts how many
times each unique time has been observed. The fewer times the execution
time of the current solution has been observed, the better the fitness of
the solution. This is defined by Equation (3.2) where TimeCounter is
an array that stores a counter for each execution time value, so a newly





The algorithm is designed as a simple path coverage metric which is
designed to provide a wide execution of the solution space. As the same
previously observed execution time is seen again, the fitness calculated
will steadily decrease. This ensures that the space around previously
observed execution times is still explored. This fitness function assumes
that different paths will always have different execution times. In prac-
tise, even when executing on a deterministic processor different source
code paths should lead to different object code constructs, and therefore
different execution times. However, it is possible that two paths could
have the same execution time, which represents a risk with this fitness
function.
BC assesses the fitness at every branch through the current path.
Each branch’s fitness is calculated as the normalised sum of the number
of edges out of the branch. The solution fitness is then calculated as
the average fitness of all branches on the current path. For example,
referring to Figure 3.12, if the current solution’s path includes block C,
(or the previously unseen blocks) B or E then the fitness calculated will
be significantly higher than if the path traverses through blocks D, F, G,
H or I. Thus the algorithm is weighted more towards the full execution of










Figure 3.12: Example Control Flow Graph.
Bünte et al. [52] proposed the use of Modified Condition/Decision
Coverage (MCDC) to provide WCET coverage. However, it is argued
here that MCDC is not necessary in this context as it would not offer
further refinement of the results over branch coverage. Ultimately this
would lead to a harder search, without necessarily providing better re-
sults. For example, referring to Figure 3.12, it is not of importance how
the decision was made at block D, only that both blocks E and F were
executed. If the decision at D is based on a large number of variables
(N), then the search space would increase from 2, to 2N .
Equations (3.3 and 3.4) show how the fitness for the current solution
is calculated; where unseen is an array which records each edge which
has not been executed, Eb denotes edges from this node and Bp denotes
branches on the current path. The division by Bp ensures the result is
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normalised before being input into Line 5 of Algorithm 1. This means
that the fitness is weighted more towards hitting new branches, and not















1, if e has never been traversed0, if e has been traversed (3.4)
For the BC fitness function, as a new path is discovered the fitness will
increase significantly. To balance this the fitness used by the simulated
annealing algorithm is taken to be the average of the previous fifty results.
A moving average is used in order to ensure that the algorithm continues
to investigate newly discovered areas of the search space, by spreading
out the fitness spikes seen at this point over the next set of iterations.
Figures 3.13 and 3.14 show the iPoint coverage and WCET results
obtained with the new fitness functions targeting coverage.
The results indicate that the UET fitness function performed poorly
compared to the latest state-controlling updates of the previous section.
This was found on review to be because the search space for the UET
fitness function is significantly larger, leading to a more difficult search.
This is further exemplified by the fact that in order to hit some of the
hardest to reach paths, the algorithm must repeatedly focus its attention
on one area. However, this produces ever degrading solutions for the
UET fitness function, leading the algorithm to drift away from these
hard to reach paths and decisions.
The BC algorithm did not uncover new branches or iPoints that had
not been executed before, but it was able to achieve greater coverage



































Figure 3.13: iPoint Coverage Obtained for the VCA Test Code Item
































Figure 3.14: WCET Results for the VCA Test Code Item Following
Addition of the BC Fitness Function.
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executed more reliably. Interestingly though, the hard to reach branch
introduced in Figure 3.5, while being executed in the majority of cases,
was not executed in a higher percentage of tests than the ET fitness
function with state control.
The results have indicated that a focus on code coverage is able to
produce more reliable results than a focus on execution time, or on path
coverage. However, the fitness function is still unable to reliably target
hard to reach paths.
3.4.6 Targeting Hard to Reach Paths
The results so far show how difficult it is to reliably execute hard to reach
paths. Therefore, an addition to the BC fitness function was introduced
in order to focus the algorithm on executing partially-covered decisions.
Branch Coverage History (BCH) uses the same basic fitness calcula-
tion as BC (Equation 3.3). However, as each branch through the current
solution’s path is analysed, the input vector used to drive the current
solution is stored against that branch. If after fifty iterations the solu-
tion has been rejected continuously, then the set of outgoing edges that
have not been fully executed is examined, and one is chosen at random.
The input vector stored against this branch is then adopted as the new
input vector. This is designed to attempt to lift the algorithm from poor
solutions and focus it on the area around branches that have only been
partially executed.





if Reject <= 50
Solution Array[rand(BNFE)]
if Reject > 50
(3.6)
Equations (3.5) and (3.6) describe how the algorithm operates. On
each iteration the current solution (CurrSolution) is recorded against
each branch found upon the current path, as denoted by Bp. Equation
(3.6) replaces line 3 of Algorithm 1. On each iteration if the previous
fifty solutions have been rejected then the next solution (NewSolution)
is set to equal a solution taken from the Solution Array. The array value
chosen is selected from the set of solutions that drive branches that have
not been fully executed (BNFE).
Figures 3.15 and 3.16 update the VCA results with the new fitness
function. The coverage obtained overall matched BC, however the num-
ber of tests which executed the hard to reach path increased to 65%,
compared to the original 50% for the ET fitness function.
3.4.7 Increasing Confidence
The focus of the fitness functions so far has been on improving branch
coverage. However, the second element that must be considered is the
number of iterations of each loop through the system. If loops are not
executed to their maximum number of iterations; then this may have
an optimistic effect on the resultant WCET. Therefore, an expansion







































Figure 3.15: iPoint Coverage Obtained for the VCA Test Code Item



































Figure 3.16: WCET for the VCA Test Code Item Following Addition of
the BCH Fitness Function.
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Loops (Lo) calculates the average number of iterations of each loop
on the current path. The result is then normalised using the maximum
observed number of iterations. The algorithm is based on previous work
by Khan [53]. Using the CFG in Figure 3.12; block H will be identified as
a loop back edge, the fitness for the solution in this case will be calculated
as the number of times block H has executed on the current path. In
cases where there is more than one loop then the average number of
iterations for all loops in the test item will be calculated as the fitness.
As a final step the fitness is normalised by dividing the fitness by the
highest fitness ever observed. Equation (3.7) shows the operation of the
fitness function, where LP represents the number of iterations for each










Finally, Branch Coverage Loops (BCHLr) combines a search for high
branch coverage, with one for high loop counts. The function combines
the result produced using BCH, with the result using Lo to produce
a fitness function that begins by trying to identify unseen blocks, but
evolves as the search progresses to concentrate on identifying higher loop
counts. Equation (3.8) illustrates how the fitness is calculated. WL
is used to weight the effect of the loop fitness calculation (Lo) and is
initialised to zero.
CurrF itnessBCHLr =
(WL ∗ CurrF itnessLo) + CurrF itnessBCH
1 +WL
(3.8)
As the test progresses, and the branch coverage obtained increases, then
WL, the loop fitness weighting, is increased. This changes the priority
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of the fitness function as the test progresses from initially focusing on
branch coverage, towards a focus on maximising loop counts.
Figure 3.17 shows the iPoint coverage obtained for the additional
fitness functions. As can be noted, the iPoint coverage obtained for the
Lo function is on a par with the coverage obtained for the branch coverage
fitness functions, including the fitness function with history. It can also
be observed that the BCHLr fitness function was able to outperform
the branch coverage fitness functions, even though the addition of loop
counts into the fitness function equation does not have an impact on
branch coverage fitness. The reason for this increase was caused by the
design of the VCA test code item being studied. The function includes
a number of loops, including one around the hard to reach path which
proved elusive to other fitness functions. This means the BCHLr and Lo
are unfairly weighted towards this path. This anomaly is addressed in
the following section which discusses a wider fitness function evaluation.
Figure 3.18 shows a box and whisker plot reviewing the maximum
loop counts observed across the set of tests for the VCA test code item.
The results indicate that the fitness functions focusing on loop counts
were able to obtain the highest average number of iterations for each
loop, with the branch coverage and ET fitness functions closely behind.
As shown by Figure 3.19 the iPoint coverage and loop counts observed
are mirrored by the WCET results. The figure shows the fitness functions
taking into account loop counts, and crucially the combination of branch
coverage and loop counts, as producing the best results.
This section has discussed the design of a series of fitness functions
aiming to obtain sound and reliable measurements to support timing
analysis. It has presented a logical design flow based on the properties
of the code under test. The next section now explores how these fitness











































Figure 3.17: iPoint Coverage Obtained for the VCA Test Code Item


















































Figure 3.18: Maximum Loop Iterations Observed for the VCA Test Code











































Figure 3.19: Average Maximum Loop Counts Observed for the VCA Test
Code Item Following Addition of the Lo and BCHLr Fitness Functions.
3.4.8 Fitness Function Evaluation
In order to assess the effectiveness of the set of developed fitness func-
tions; each algorithm was executed against the set of test code items
introduced in Section 3.2 fifty times. In all cases each fitness function
was executed for significantly longer than perceived necessary, as intro-
duced by Section 3.3.3. Crucially, all tests across all fitness functions and
code items used the same search algorithm configuration, with only the
fitness function changing.
All results analysed throughout this section were produced from tests
which are able to control state variables, as introduced by Section 3.4.4.
It has already been stated that an industrial WCET tool should be
expected to provide sound results efficiently that can be produced and
reproduced as part of an affordable process that ultimately provides a
76
system designer with confidence in the result. The fitness functions de-
veloped as part of this section are now assessed against this criteria based
on three key areas - efficiency, confidence and sound WCETs.
Efficiency
A typical Rolls-Royce Aircraft Engine Control System consists of sev-
eral thousand functions that must all be evaluated to identify the WCET
of the system as a whole. Therefore, even though it could be argued that
a simple search algorithm left to execute indefinitely could eventually
stumble upon perfect results, in an industrial setting this approach is not
practical or cost effective. An industrial grade WCET must be trusted
to analyse results efficiently and reliably.
To assess the efficiency of each fitness function, the HWM for each
test iteration was collected during execution. The mean HWM for each
fitness function at each iteration was then calculated across all fifty test
runs, and plotted for analysis. For the majority of the test code items the
test results for each fitness function varied by less than 10% as each test
progressed. However, in the cases of ACDT, VCP and VCA the difference
was more profound. The results for ACDT and VCA are shown in Figures
3.20 and 3.21.
Firstly, all individual tests for every fitness function on all test code
items completed in less than 20,000 trial iterations. This took approx-
imately twelve hours to execute. In the case of the simple test code
items each trial completed in approximately 2000 iterations, which took
on average one hour to execute.
In an industrial context if each trial takes one hour, provided there
is enough server power to allow multiple concurrent tests, this could be
deemed acceptable. However, for the more complex functions the fact
that each individual trial takes twelve hours illustrates the importance
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Figure 3.20: ACDT Mean HWM Observed as the Test Progresses.
Figure 3.21: VCA Mean HWM Observed as the Test Progresses.
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of identifying a test result efficiently. It also illustrates the importance
of the algorithm identifying when no more progress is being made, and
to stop searching. This is particularly pertinent for the small functions
which may not see a significant improvement across their test run.
Figure 3.20 shows the mean HWM for the ACDT test item over time,
for each fitness function, which provides a representation of test progres-
sion. The graph shows how as each test progresses all the fitness functions
were able to obtain results similar to each other, with the exception of
UET. One possible reason for this is the size of the input space and
number of complex paths through this function, which the UET fitness
function was not able to manipulate as effectively.
VCA, shown in Figure 3.21, on the other hand presented a much
larger difference in mean HWM figures. In this case BCHLr was able
to produce the best observed HWMs throughout the test. By 10,000
iterations all the fitness functions had stopped improving.
Both Figures 3.20 and 3.21 illustrate the difficulty of identifying an
appropriate stopping criterion. The same criteria, as introduced by Sec-
tion 3.3.3 was used for all fitness functions to ensure a fair test, however
in the case of the Ran and UET fitness functions because the tests quickly
cease to improve on their results the fitness functions quickly stop search-
ing. Arguably, the Ran and UET fitness functions could use a different
stopping criteria to force them to execute for longer, however, this ap-
proach was not taken during this analysis due to a desire to avoid giving
one fitness function a further advantage over another.
In summary, the progression of each fitness function’s progression over
time illustrated that all the algorithms were capable of producing results
efficiently for the simple code functions. For the more complex functions
BCHLr performed well over all functions; with Lo, ET and BCH able to
79
produce good results in most of the test code items.
Confidence
Industry cannot rely on just reliably achieving a high predicted WCET
because for certification it is important we are able to argue about con-
fidence in the degree of system coverage. It is not appropriate, or possi-
ble, to argue that the WCET is understood without illustrating sufficient
coverage has been obtained. The objective of this section is to evaluate
the relative branch coverage and loop iteration counts achieved by the
different approaches by reviewing the iPoint coverage during each test.
Table 3.3 shows the number of test runs for each fitness function that
obtained iPoint coverage within 90% of the maximum possible.
Table 3.3: Objective 2 - The Number of Tests That Achieved Greater
than 90% iPoint Coverage.
Item MCC Ran ET BC BCH Lo BCHLr UET
Qsort 21 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
Qurt 19 46 48 49 43 48 48 49
Select 20 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
InsertSort 5 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
F 154 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
ACDF 9 47 48 50 49 49 50 38
ACDN 14 50 48 45 46 48 49 34
ACDT 55 50 50 49 50 50 50 42
ACDP 27 19 25 45 43 40 45 14
VCA 68 17 25 28 30 32 42 24
VCP 94 10 25 28 25 32 35 30
VCS 21 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
Mean 40 43 45 45 46 47 40
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For all of the simpler test code items (those with McCabe complexity
of 21 or less) the iPoint coverage for all fitness functions was 100% in
most cases. The other tests showed lower iPoint coverage for some of the
fitness functions. Again this indicated for simple code items all of the
fitness functions were able to obtain reliable results.
For the more complex functions the variance between fitness functions
was more profound. A number of the functions, such as ACDP and VCP,
contain a number of hard to reach paths. For ACDP for instance the
branch coverage fitness functions were able to narrow in on these paths



































Figure 3.22: iPoint Coverage Obtained for the VCP Code Item.
In the case of VCP, illustrated in Figure 3.22; again ET and BC failed
to obtain consistent branch coverage. One contributing factor to this was
the size of the input space for VCP, which is considerably larger than a
number of the other test code items and results in a much larger search
space.
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The second requirement for providing confidence in the produced
WCET results is sufficient exploration of loops; the aim being to max-
imise loop iteration counts. Figure 3.23 shows the mean maximum loop
counts obtained for each test run of the VCP test code item. The BCHLr
and Lo fitness functions were able to obtain the highest median loop
counts; however there were a significant number of outliers sitting high
above the median, with UET obtaining the highest single outlier. As
with the coverage results presented in Figure 3.22 this was attributed
to the size of the VCP search space, making the search difficult for all








































Figure 3.23: Maximum Loop Counts Obtained for the VCP Code Item.
Finally, Figure 3.24 shows the maximum loop counts obtained for the
Insert Sort test code item. The results indicated the highest range in
maximum loop counts observed across all test code items, which was at-
tributed to the fact the source code item contains a nested loop structure,













































Figure 3.24: Maximum Loop Counts Obtained for the Insert Sort Code
Item.
ness functions instantly obtained full block coverage through this fitness
function, and so the ET and Lo fitness functions, whose focus included
increasing loop counts straight away, were then better able to focus on
increasing the double nested loop’s number of iterations. The BCH and
BCHLr’s searches however were affected because the fitness function’s
initial focus on obtaining large block counts had no purpose and saw no
improvement, which appeared to negatively affect the search.
In summary, BCHLr has again been shown to provide reliable results
across all test code items. Other fitness functions, such as BCH or Lo,
were able to obtain similar results for some test code items, but also
produced poorer results in other test code items, such as VCA and VCP.
This was shown to be because BCHLr was able to execute specific hard
to reach paths. Without a focus on reaching these paths; other fitness
functions like ET were unable to reliably achieve high iPoint coverage.
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Sound WCETs
The final objective to assess the set of fitness functions against is in
the production of sound WCET figures. This objective is analysed by
reviewing the results produced by the RapiTime tool after parsing each
test’s measurements. As the Actual-WCET is not known each individ-
ual test was executed for significantly longer than necessary, with the
results from all tests being compared against each other. This allows an
assessment to be performed into the reliability of each individual fitness
function, with particular attention paid to the results when compared
to the ET fitness function. A comparison between the maximum HWM
obtained and the WCET calculated is performed to assess how the data
input guides the result. The median is used throughout this evaluation
as it best reflects where the majority of the results lie. This follows the
aim of this analysis - to produce good approximations the majority of
the time, rather than a better result only once.
Finally, a statistical analysis was used to assess whether any of the
WCET distributions from each fitness function was significantly different
from any other. This was used in order to confirm the results represented
a large enough sample to show significance [65]. The data analysed is
non-parametric (does not follow a normal distribution) and only one
data source was used therefore a Friedman test with an alpha level of
0.05 was chosen for the analysis. This revealed that there was a signifi-
cant difference between the fitness functions for all tests, this is denoted
in this section as the Friedman chi-squared result (χ2r), the degrees free-
dom and the p value. Following the Friedman test a Wilcoxon-Nemenyi-
McDonald-Thompson [66] was used to reveal which fitness functions pro-
duced significantly different distributions.
For the smaller code items, with McCabe complexities of 21 or less,
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the variance between each fitness function was very low. All fitness func-
tions obtained WCET figures within 10% of each other, with ET generally
performing best. For the InsertSort test code item the overall Friedman
test result was χ2r(6) = 67.8, p < 0.01
5 which indicated an overall sig-
nificance. Figure 3.25 illustrates the results of the Wilcoxon-Nemenyi-
McDonald-Thompson test; each fitness function was compared against
each of the other fitness functions. The bar for each result indicates
which fitness function in the comparison performed best by showing the
result of total difference between each fitness function. A shaded boxplot
indicates a significant result (p <0.05). For instance, the first bar on the
left indicates that BC performed slightly better than BCH, as the result
of ‘subtracting’ BC from BCH provides a negative result. However, the
result is not significant and so should be disregarded.
The figure shows how the Lo, ET and BCHLr fitness functions were
able to achieve consistently better results than the fitness functions that
just focused on iPoint coverage alone. This was most likely because
the InsertSort test code item only contains five iPoints, which are fully
executed very early in the search, and so the branch coverage functions
quickly moved to an unguided search.
For the Mälardalen WCET benchmark functions in general there was
a large difference between the HWM and estimated WCET. Qsort for in-
stance observed a HWM for each fitness function of between 8% and 15%
of the calculated WCET. In a similar vein the difference between fitness
functions was marginal for the Select code item; however the HWM ob-
served was less than 1% of the WCET calculated. This was because of the
effect of an infeasible path which spans over a triple depth nested loop.
5χ2 results throughout this thesis are denoted using the following terminology -


















































































































































Figure 3.25: Comparison of the distribution differences for each fitness
function combination, for InsertSort. Shaded bars indicate statistically
significant results.
These results indicate the benefit of building a hybrid measurement-based
tool on top of an automatic software execution mechanism rather than
just relying on the latter to produce reliable results.
The largest difference between the different fitness function’s WCET
results was produced by the VCA, ACDP and VCP code items.
The VCP code item, shown in Figures 3.27 and 3.28, exhibited a sig-
nificant variance of up to 30% between WCET figures (χ2r(6) = 84.9, p <
0.01). This was found to be due to the size of the input space which
led to a significantly larger search space and a lower resultant iPoint
coverage. As well as this the function contains a number of loops whose



































Figure 3.26: WCET Results Calculated for the ACDP Test Item.
one flaw with the BCH/BC fitness functions, in that they were unable to
focus the algorithm on increasing the number of iterations of the loops
found in the test code. The loop coverage fitness functions, in particular
BCHLr, were able to exploit this type of code construct, and produced
the highest, most consistent result.
The VCA function, as discussed earlier, showed a strong correlation
between iPoint coverage and estimated WCET. For VCA the variance be-
tween the maximum and minimum estimated WCET results approached
50%, as shown by Figure 3.29 (χ2r(6) = 91.5, p < 0.01).
3.5 Summary
This chapter studied how reliable, automated, timing analysis can be
performed in order to identify the timing properties of a system. The


































Figure 3.27: WCET Results Calculated for the VCP Test Item.
processors, is lacking when it comes to the definition of approaches to
generate data to support measurement-based timing analysis, with most
techniques relying on data already being available. The chapter has
aimed to identify the applicability of optimisation algorithms to the gen-
eration of such data.
The chapter identified the requirements for the generation of timing
data to support measurement-based timing analysis, before identifying
appropriate techniques for obtaining the right data, reliably. The ap-
proaches were assessed incorporating both open source benchmarks, and
closed source real industrial examples, to analyse their abilities.
The ultimate achievement of this chapter has been to produce a set of
fitness functions aimed to drive the efficient, and automated, definition of
task timing properties. The results provide indications of maximum loop
counts as well as HWMs and WCETs for each task. Furthermore, the











































































































































Figure 3.28: Comparison of the distribution differences for each fitness
function combination, for VCP. Shaded bars indicate statistically signif-
icant results.
with representative inputs, these profiles provide indications for how each
task may execute in operation.
Since the work performed in this chapter was published in [37], Lesage
[67] has demonstrated that the approach can be scaled to a full aircraft
engine control system. Given the scale of the analysis performed by
Lesage, the work focused on the BCHLr, Ran and ET fitness functions
only. The work, which included an extensive amount of tooling infras-
tructure development, targeted a live project that was certifying a sister
system to the control system introduced in Chapter 2.
One area not examined during this Chapter, and is left to future work,
is an evaluation to identify whether combinations of the developed fitness
































































































































































Figure 3.29: Comparison of the distribution differences for each fitness
function combination, for VCA.
for instance is a combination of branch coverage and loop counts. Future
work could examine whether the fitness function would also benefit from
the addition of execution time measurements, or even a measure of more
advance processor feature consequences, such as cache misses.
Chapter 4 now steps away from WCET analysis to discuss the devel-
opment of a mixed criticality system. The system proof of which relies




Systems for Real Platforms
Real time embedded software tasks developed for safety critical systems,
such as civil aircraft engine controls, are typically developed according to
a specific Development Assurance Level (DAL) [6]. The DAL indicates a
criticality level for a component and is assigned based on the consequence
to the system’s safety that a failure of this component could cause. This
thesis considers the model presented in DO-178C [6] with the criticality
level of the task denoted by Li where Li ∈ {A,B,C,D,E}. Level A
indicates the highest level, E indicates the lowest level such that A ≥
B ≥ C ≥ D ≥ E. It is typically assumed that the amount of effort
assigned to producing enough evidence to prove the correct operation of
a software component monotonically increases with its DAL [24]1.
In accordance with DO-178C [6], where two components developed
against different DALs are integrated in the same system; it is neces-
1Although Vestal [24] cited DO-178B, and therefore only contained criticality levels
A, B, C and D, the work in this thesis assumes a simple extension to incorporate DAL
E
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sary to guarantee that high criticality components are protected from
‘unproven’ low criticality components. In other words, as defined by
Rushby [68]; partitioning should be implemented with the aim of en-
suring the behaviour and performance of software in one partition is
unaffected by the software in other partitions. This is required because
the lower DAL component does not have the same level of evidence of
lack of error as the higher DAL component, and so partitioning must
be used to isolate higher DAL components from any failure in lower
DAL components. There are two forms of partitioning that must be em-
ployed [68]: temporal partitioning, which is concerned with the response
time of a component; and spatial partitioning, which is concerned with
the hardware and memory space of a component.
From an industrial point of view; approaches in the past have required
all software components that execute on a processor be verified to the
same DAL. This means a system that employs software of multiple crit-
icality levels maintains physical partitioning across multiple processors
to separate different software components with differing DALs. Alterna-
tively, where system requirements make it desirable for lower-criticality
software to share the same processor as a high-criticality piece of soft-
ware, then they are both developed to the same highest criticality level.
This approach leads to higher development and production costs, as well
as increased overall size, weight, and power use.
A further advantage to the use of Mixed Criticality System (MCS)
schedulers is in their ability to help system developers cope with WCET
pessimism. It is known that WCET analysis techniques induce significant
pessimism. From reviewing the current system introduced in Chapter 2
it was identified that there are three principal reasons for this. Firstly,
the use of defensive programming which introduces error handling logic;
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secondly through the introduction of infeasible worst case paths; and
finally through the use of pessimistic loop bounds.
Arguably the WCET and associated schedulability analysis should
incorporate error handling logic, with its addition not being considered
pessimistic. However, the logic may indicate entry into a reactive system
state, such as system shutdown or system reset, which means that in-
corporation of this handling logic into the schedulability analysis of the
system could be argued as pessimistic. Whereas infeasible paths are fre-
quently inadvertently introduced into complex control systems as soft-
ware components are designed to handle different system level events.
For example, an aircraft engine control system cannot be expected to
respond to an engine overspeed on the same cycle that it responds to
an engine underspeed. However, the system level schedulability analysis
may assume this to be the case. Finally, pessimistic loop bounds are
induced when the control system is viewed at the system level. As, for
instance, communication interface WCET analysis assumes messages are
sent at the highest possible rate, when in practise actual transmission
rates nay be significantly lower.
When viewed at the macro level it is easy to identify that such anal-
ysis consequences are pessimistic. However, when viewed at the system
level encompassing the analysis of thousands of software functions, iden-
tifying and combating such pessimism quickly becomes infeasible in a
cost effective timeframe.
One way that forms of pessimism can be identified at the system
level is by comparing analysed WCETs to system test observed HWMs.
A safety critical system can be expected to be subjected to an exhaustive
test campaign, which should test the system extensively. This provides a
test setup well suited to providing tight, but potentially optimistic, HWM
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times which can be used in comparison to estimated WCET times to
identify areas of particular pessimism. The generation of such metrics, for
example, was explored in Chapter 3. However, the risk with attempting
to use HWMs for analysis improvement, or to reduce pessimism across
a system, is that the times may introduce optimism - therefore their use
must be carefully controlled with necessary system protections put in
place. One of the focuses of this chapter is on the development of such
controls.
This chapter explores two avenues. The first is how an appropri-
ate mixed criticality partitioned system can be developed according to
certification standards. The second is how an existing single criticality
system can be ported to this new mixed criticality architecture, with the
aim of supporting both low criticality components, robust high criticality
components and standard high criticality components; and how such a
system can be utilised to combat the introduction of WCET pessimism.
4.1 Literature Survey
In the literature an MCS is a system which combines software of mul-
tiple DALs on the same processor. The technical objective of which is
to provide sufficient evidence that a low criticality component cannot
jeopardise any high criticality component’s temporal or functional re-
quirements, while still providing a level of service to the low criticality
component. One approach to MCS development is to deploy the parti-
tioned architecture defined by the ARINC 653 standard [22]. This stan-
dard defines a partitioned model principally aimed at the development of
Integrated Modular Avionics (IMA), but capable of supporting partitions
developed against different DALs. The issue with the ARINC 653 ap-
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proach is that the solution defined for temporal partitioning, essentially
a two-level scheduler with time division, makes the approach difficult to
apply to a complex control system [23]. This is because it can lead to
the introduction of higher completion jitter, longer end-to-end transac-
tion response times and in general it can be difficult to accommodate a
complex task schedule into fixed time partitions [23].
The advantage of an ARINC-653 system is that it provides an inte-
grated whole system design, encompassing scheduling theory alongside
wider system design, designed against certification guidelines. As ex-
plored further in this literature, this is to a certain extent missing from
the existing literature on wider MCS papers.
This literature survey now considers three key areas of MCS design,
firstly Scheduling Theory, where arguably the largest body of research has
been conducted. Secondly, Schedulability Analysis, focusing in particular
on two seminal papers, and finally wider System Design, where it is
argued that further refinements to the existing literature is required.
4.1.1 Scheduling Theory
Vestal [24] was one of the first publications to consider the schedulability
of a MCS. The work draws the comparison that the reliability of the
WCET figure used for each task is commensurate to its criticality. This
is based on the observation that lower DAL tasks are not developed, or
verified, to the same rigour that higher DAL tasks are; and therefore the
output WCET figures cannot be expected to be as reliable.
Vestal essentially introduces a model where a task can be considered
to have multiple WCETs which individually provide a different degree
of assurance that true execution times for a task will not exceed the
analysed value. Where each assurance level is taken from the set L ∈
95
{A,B,C,D,E}, it can be assumed that the WCET for task τi follows
the rule CAi ≥ CBi ≥ CCi ≥ CDi ≥ CEi .
In practice each task will only be analysed to the level of assurance
required for that task, with the aim being to only expend the amount
of WCET analysis effort that is proportional to the required assurance.
Assuming a dual criticality system - each high criticality task would
be required to have two WCET figures - CHIi and C
LO
i , whereas a low
criticality task has one WCET figure2 - CLOi .
Building off Vestal’s work, Baruah et al. [25] introduced three models
for Mixed Criticality Scheduling - partitioned criticality, Static Mixed
Criticality (SMC) and Adaptive Mixed Criticality (AMC).
Partitioned criticality [25] (also referred to as Criticality Monotonic
Priority Ordering) is the simplest form of mixed criticality scheduling,
where priorities are assigned according to each task’s criticality. Ac-
cordingly a task with a higher criticality will always be scheduled with
a higher priority than another task of lower criticality. This approach
should ensure a timing error in a low criticality task cannot affect the
temporal requirements of a high criticality task, therefore requiring no
run time monitoring. However, there is no consideration in the paper as
to whether this approach is sufficient, and because the scheduler will al-
ways execute a high criticality task if one is ready, it makes it significantly
more difficult to meet low criticality task deadlines. One advantage of-
fered by the approach is that run-time monitoring may not be required,
however as Baruah et al. [25] point out, many safety critical systems
already incorporate this for the purpose of error detection.
SMC and AMC [25] on the other hand assign task priorities according
2Vestal’s original model noted that a low criticality task would also have a CHIi ,
however in practise this may not be known.
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to their temporal requirements, regardless of criticality. SMC allows low
or high criticality tasks to execute up to their CLOi or C
HI
i respectively;
but they are then prevented from executing further [26]. This offers a stop
dead point where any task must cease executing and provides adequate
protection for high criticality tasks from low criticality tasks.
The AMC protocol builds off this; however, whereas SMC de-schedules
one task if it executes for longer than CLi , AMC de-schedules all low crit-
icality tasks if any high criticality task executes for longer than its CLOi .
While the original paper did not explicitly define a recovery point, an ob-
vious route back to re-enabling low criticality tasks is to use the Idle Task
or state of the system. This is referred to in this paper as AMC+ and is
based around the simple mode change protocol in [69]. The AMC+ pro-
tocol is achieved through a scheduler mode change which is summarised
in Figure 4.1.
The AMC protocol therefore offers the potential for exploiting as-
sumed pessimism between a task’s CLOi and C
HI
i because the system
schedulability is assessed in the ‘normal’ mode using each task’s CLOi .
This supersedes SMC which uses high criticality tasks CHIi . However, the
approach places an assumption that each task’s CLOi is credible, which
in practise cannot be proven. Execution of a task beyond its CLOi is as-
sumed to be an extremely rare event. Were this not to be the case then
the service offered to low criticality tasks would reduce significantly.
Bate et al. [70] explored AMC and offer a further improvement by
taking account of slack and gain time provided by tasks that finish before
their Ci in order to delay the switch to high mode. Their Bailout pro-
tocol aims to provide better service for low criticality tasks by providing
levels of degradation as well as a faster route back to normal service.
The Bailout protocol uses the AMC response time analysis method, and
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Figure 4.1: AMC+ State Flow Diagram.
therefore does not provide greater static schedulability over AMC. How-
ever, during dynamic analysis the Bailout protocol is shown to provide
greater service for low criticality tasks.
The resilient model [34] utilises graceful degradation to improve low
criticality task performance. The model employs resilience at the system
level towards a certain number of timing faults, and robustness at the
task level where certain ‘robust’ tasks are capable of skipping individual
jobs when requested. Importantly, a task’s robustness is independent
from its criticality. Together these two techniques ensure the system
does not resort to a state where low criticality tasks are denied service
until absolutely necessary.
Burns et al. [34] introduced the following definitions for a robust
mixed criticality system:
Definition 4.1. A robust task is one that can safely drop one non-started
job in any extended time interval.
Definition 4.2. The robustness of a complete system is measured by
its F count (how many job overruns can it tolerate without jobs being
dropped or deadlines missed) and its M count (the number of job overruns
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Figure 4.2: Resilient State Flow Diagram.
the system can tolerate once each robust task has dropped one job).
Definition 4.3. A resilient system is one that aims to achieve graceful
degradation to adequately cope with more than M overruns.
Definition 4.4. A fault is measured when one task overruns its CLO.
Definition 4.5. An error is the manifestation of one or many faults and
represents the point where a task fails to adhere to its timing require-
ments.
In short, in this context a resilient system employs robustness to cope
with one or many faults, while avoiding errors.
The resilient scheduling model introduced in [34] is capable of coping
with F faults, before reverting to the ‘Resilient Mode’ where robust tasks
skip their jobs. At this point the system is capable of coping with further
faults up to a total of M faults, where F < M . Once the fault count
increases above M , the system reverts to the ‘High Criticality’ mode,
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as with the AMC model. Once the system reaches the idle state, the
fault count is reset and, if required, the system reverts to the ‘Normal
Mode’. This is illustrated in Figure 4.2, where JF provides a count of
the number of job faults.
The schedulability analysis presented in the paper provides a proof
that high criticality, robust tasks, comply with their schedulability re-
quirements. The analysis also provides a bound on the number of jobs a
robust task may skip between idle points. However, the analysis provides
no guarantees on the service given to low criticality tasks, or indeed the
time between individual robust task skip bursts. This is a problem that
is explored in Chapter 5 of this thesis.
Finally, as opposed to the fixed priority techniques explored so far
in this literature survey, a large body of work has also been produced
focusing on dynamic priority algorithms, such as Earliest Deadline First
based methodologies [71]–[73]. This thesis focuses on the development of
a MCS to support a safety critical aerospace domain. While the debate
about the most optimal approach rages, the principal requirement for a
safety critical application is the development and proof of a safe system.
Therefore, as fixed priority systems offer the simplest route to system
verification and proof, they form the focus of this work.
4.1.2 Static Schedulability Analysis
The static schedulability analysis used for the AMC+ implementation
was introduced by Baruah et al. [25]. The schedulability analysis is
performed in three stages. The response time of each task is assessed in
the high and then low modes. Finally, the response times of the high
criticality tasks are assessed during a mode change from low to high.
As long as all tasks execute for less than their CLO then the system
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remains in the low, or normal, mode. The low-criticality mode WCRT,
RLOi , is calculated using Equation 4.1, where hp(i) is the set of higher
priority tasks than task τi. The equation should be recursively solved















Should any task execute for longer than its CLO then the system will
revert to the high mode, where only high criticality tasks are permitted
to execute. The response time calculation for the high-criticality mode
WCRT, RHIi , is shown in Equation 4.2; where hpH(i) is the set of high














Low criticality tasks are not considered when in the high-criticality
mode as they are de-scheduled by the system. The sufficient mode change
analysis [25] then defines the response time analysis for a high criticality
task during a low-to-high mode change as shown in Equation 4.3. In this






















This ensures the interference from low criticality tasks is capped as
R∗i must be greater than R
LO
i .
The focus of the MCS literature studied so far in this literature survey
has been towards scheduling theory, this research has offered significant
advances on the understanding on how such systems could be developed.
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However, as highlighted by Ekberg and Yi [74], and by Altmeyer et al.
[31] development of a MCS cannot be assumed to be restricted to devel-
opment of the scheduler. MCS development must also take account of
the wider scheduler and RTOS design and analysis, as well as examining
what assumptions MCS operation places on the tasks within a system,
particularly low criticality tasks. This is vital as development of a system
employing components of differing criticalities cannot simply be viewed
as a scheduling problem. The following section now explores existing pa-
pers that have focused on the development of MCS at the system level.
4.1.3 System Definition
This section now explores wider system issues that must be addressed
to support MCS development, and identifies where the existing liter-
ature has tried to address these. Altmeyer et al. [31] examine what
assumptions MCS development places upon WCET and highlight the is-
sues which currently exist within WCET analysis techniques. It outlines
how MCS developers currently lack the necessary information, or in some
cases, confidence required to produce sound MCS systems. The paper es-
sentially highlights how development of MCS scheduling techniques must
not be considered in isolation, but instead must be considered as part of a
wider system. The paper highlights one of the many holes that currently
exist within the literature surrounding MCS development, in that MCS
development places a greater emphasis on assessing WCET confidence.
One of the general issues with a number of the refinements made to
the Vestal model is that the papers lacked details of how the implemen-
tation would ensure the properties needed for certification. The analyses
for instance does not consider overheads as part of the analysis, and the
papers do not consider how overheads could be reduced. Furthermore,
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an analysis of what requirements each scheduling method places on the
hardware and RTOS, in the way of required facilities, has not been ex-
plored. It is simply assumed these features are already present and that
their overheads can be neglected. Finally, there has been very little
work actually looking at the implementation of a MCS into a real sys-
tem. Therefore, the existing literature leaves many unanswered questions
about how effective a MCS can be in practice.
Looking at wider system development; Sousa et al. [75] identify the
overheads induced by a multi-core task-split system. The work assesses
each overhead source, and incorporates the overheads into the schedu-
lability analysis for a slot-based system. However, this work does not
progress far enough to allow full end to end system development. For
instance, a method for measuring the identified overheads, or indeed
minimising them, is not presented.
Freitag et al. [76] divides tasks of different criticalities across differ-
ent cores on a multi-core processor, in order to simplify system proof.
The system supervisor analyses the interference induced by low criti-
cality cores on high criticality cores, disabling the low criticality core if
required. Herman et al. [77] perform an analysis of the development of a
mixed criticality multi-core system. However, the initial analysis does not
progress far enough to support actual development, for instance through
proof of the effect of overheads on the schedulability of the system. Fi-
nally, Paolillo et al. [78] examines the benefits of porting an industrial
case study to a mixed criticality system; finding that the potential low
criticality task utilisation is high, but also identifying how the identifica-
tion of sound task WCETs had a significant effect on the service afforded
to low criticality tasks. The paper however did not progress far enough
to explore how such a system could be implemented and certified.
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Several papers have looked at reducing the cost of system overheads
in schedulable systems principally following two main approaches: firstly
making the analysis less pessimistic and secondly reducing the actual
overheads.
In terms of the analysis pessimism, a number of papers have focused
on the area of Cache-Related Preemption Delays (CRPD) where an un-
derstanding is derived of the impact of on-the-cache contents and which
parts of the software cannot preempt each other [79]. Alternatively, Davis
et al. [80] consider how MCS schedulers can be modified to attempt to
avoid extended context switching times thanks to the cost of changing
processor mode. The paper is one of the first papers to consider temporal
partitioning in the context of the additional overheads induced by spa-
tial partitioning processor features. Additionally, Burns and Davis [81]
explore how tasks in a MCS can invoke final pre-emption-blocking points
in order to defer being preempted at a point when a task job is about
to complete. The method is shown to produce a greater proportion of
schedulable systems. However, what is unclear is how such a task set can
be developed in practice, whether each task would need to be manually
analysed and altered, or whether RTOS features are required to avoid
preempting a task when it reaches a certain point in its execution.
Focusing on the reduction of RTOS overheads; overlooking the obvi-
ous aim that any RTOS or scheduler must be designed to be as efficient as
possible; two main areas of research have been performed on reducing the
occurrences of overheads. Firstly, a number of researchers have looked
at minimising the number of priority levels, for example in the work by
Audsley et al. [82], which has demonstrated that this process can lead
to a reduction in the number of task context switches. The second ap-
proach is grouping a number of software components (tasks in the original
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Rolls-Royce control software) into larger schedulable tasks (referred to
here as SuperTasks). This approach is the same philosophy as adopted in
AUTOSAR systems where runnables are grouped to form tasks as part
of reducing overheads [83]–[85]. However, the approaches either ignore
inter-task dependencies (transactions) [83], or require the possibility to
duplicate tasks shared between transactions [85]. This means, for in-
stance, the approach would not be suitable for the system introduced in
Chapter 2.
4.1.4 Summary
A review of the available literature reveals that while there has been a
large field of work completed on identifying appropriate, efficient schedul-
ing methodologies; there has been less work focused on MCS design. This
leaves a gap between what is possible and what is usable as the techniques
presented fail to take account of real system effects such as inter-task re-
lationships, or system overheads. The work that has been completed
on MCS design, or on handling overheads, has either focused on reduc-
ing overheads through efficient system design, or at improving WCET
processes. However, neither have necessarily tried to apply these tech-
niques in an industrial project, or indeed, alongside the MCS scheduling
methodologies discussed elsewhere.
In summary, the available literature has yet to study, and extend,
MCS research towards a full end-to-end system integration, incorporating
real system overheads, analysis techniques, and criticality requirements.
The following section now aims to do this by examining how a system to
allow mixed criticality integration can be designed, to fulfil certification
requirements, to support a real industrial system. This includes how
requirements for appropriate task partitioning can be fulfilled, and how
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a system may be developed and analysed. The chapter then continues
to explore how a legacy system can be automatically ported to this new
MCS design.
4.2 Mixed Criticality System Design
This section discusses the development of a two-level MCS. Initially the
certification requirements for a MCS, as guided by DO-178C [40], are
introduced. The section then progresses to examine the features of a
MCS designed to comply with these requirements.
In this thesis ‘high criticality’ refers to the highest criticality com-
ponent permitted to execute upon the processor (nominally DAL A);
whereas low criticality components refer to any components that have a
lower criticality than the highest processor component (DALs B, C, D
and E).
4.2.1 Certification Requirements
This section examines the certification requirements surrounding the de-
velopment of a Mixed Criticality Scheduler; the target system studied
being an aircraft engine control system. Accordingly, only the guidelines
detailed in DO-178C [40] are explored in this section. However the guide-
lines are considered similar to those detailed in other software domains
such as ISO26262 [86] and IEC61508 [21].
DO-178C Section 2.4 defines five requirements for partitioning as fol-
lows:
1. A partitioned software component should not be allowed to contam-
inate another partitioned software component’s code, input/output
(I/O), or data storage areas.
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2. A partitioned software component should be allowed to consume
shared processor resources only during its scheduled period of exe-
cution.
3. Failures of hardware unique to a partitioned software component
should not cause adverse effects on other partitioned software com-
ponents.
4. Any software providing partitioning should have the same or higher
software level as the highest level assigned to any of the partitioned
software components.
5. Any hardware providing partitioning should be assessed by the sys-
tem safety assessment process to ensure that it does not adversely
affect safety.
In essence DO-178C expects that in the absence of evidence to prove
that a low criticality component may execute outside of its design defined
boundaries, it is essential that protection is put in place to prove that
promiscuous components cannot affect the wider system. This ensures
that the evidence provided for high criticality components to show com-
pliance against their requirements is still valid when co-located with low
criticality components.
4.2.2 Partitioning
This section explores the design of a partitioned scheduler to support
a Mixed Criticality System. One potential option would be to use the
scheduling methodology defined by ARINC 653. However, this model is
based on a strict time slicing model which is considered too restrictive
for the implementation of a control system with extensive hardware in-
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teraction, which relies on adherence to strict periodic execution against
strict jitter requirements [23].
The assumption that should be made for a low criticality task is that
the task may execute, if allowed, for longer than its observed HWM; its
CLOi is assumed to be optimistic. However, due to the rigorous testing
regime the software undergoes and the extensive in-test and in-flight
monitoring, it is known that it is rarely exceeded.
From a certification point of view as the evidence to prove other-
wise may not have been produced to the same level as a high criticality
component, then a certification authority must assume a low critical-
ity component is more likely to contain an error. Thus, as guided by
the requirements noted in Section 4.2.1, partitioning must be employed
to prove that any errors that occur in a low criticality partition cannot
propagate to a high criticality partition.
The scheduler proposed in this work implements two key protection
mechanisms to implement a DO-178C partitioned architecture: the use
of timer driven interrupts, and the use of processor memory protection.
Figure 4.3 shows the statechart for the interrupt-driven scheduler. This
is explored in more detail in the following subsections.
4.2.2.1 Temporal Partitioning
A timer-driven interrupt is employed both to control the release of new
tasks by invoking a scheduler tick, and to interrupt low criticality com-
ponents when they reach their CLOi . As the interrupt handler prepares to
switch in a task, one of the final operations is to set the interrupt timer
to the lowest of either 1) the time to the next task release, or 2) in the
case of a low criticality task, the allowed execution time remaining.
High criticality tasks are not regulated in the same way. If a high
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Figure 4.3: Partitioned Scheduler Statechart.
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criticality task executes beyond its CLOi then it is permitted to continue.
However, the next time the scheduler executes it will identify the need
to move into the high criticality mode. This is controlled by the ‘Handle
Overrun’ block within Figure 4.3. The operation of the ‘Handle Overrun’
block is dependent on the scheduling methodology chosen. For instance,
in the case of the AMC+ algorithm [69], the block will transition the
system into the high criticality mode. When in high criticality mode,
any low criticality tasks that are ready to execute will be suspended.
The ‘Identify Highest Priority Task’ block is then responsible for
choosing which task should run next. The process simply chooses the
highest priority task that is currently ready to execute.
Return to the normal mode is controlled by the idle task, which is de-
veloped to the highest criticality of the system. Crucially, low criticality
tasks that have been suspended while the system executed in the high
criticality mode are not released again until their next scheduled periodic
execution. This is illustrated in Figure 4.4, which shows a simple exam-
ple task set. At point A the highest priority high criticality task overruns
its CLOi . Being a high criticality task it is permitted to continue, however
when the task completes its job at point B the interrupt handler identi-
fies the overrun and moves the system to the high criticality mode. This
mode change blocks the release and execution of the low criticality task.
Then at point C as the system enters the Idle task, the system mode is
reverted back to the Normal mode. However, the low criticality task is
not released again until point D, the next scheduled periodic execution
point. This controlled execution resumption is important as it avoids in-
ducing offsets which could affect the validity of the static schedulability
analysis.
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Figure 4.4: Example Partitioned Scheduler Operation.
4.2.2.2 Spatial Partitioning
Processor memory protection is employed in a User/Supervisor arrange-
ment. All tasks execute in a design-defined protected area of memory,
with access to different hardware features or memory regions either per-
mitted or restricted as necessary. Should any task execute outside these
fixed boundaries, then an interrupt is raised and the interrupt handler
handles the data error. This is enforced by the scheduler setting the
proper User Mode when returning to a task, as illustrated in Figure 4.3.
The memory protection employed ensures that each component ex-
ecuting on the processor cannot execute outside its design time defined
boundaries, thus providing protection for high criticality tasks from low
criticality task promiscuous memory or hardware interactions.
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4.2.2.3 System Partition Assignment
Each software partition executes within its own area of memory, has a de-
fined set of permitted hardware accesses, and has its own defined tempo-
ral requirements; which in the case of low criticality components, restrict
the component’s execution. In order to support this type of execution
the following design constraints must be placed upon each partition:
• Each partition represents a thread-safe self contained execution
unit.
• Each partition contains software developed to the same criticality
level.
• No partition can arbitrarily enter a critical section, or block an
interrupt from occurring.
Arguably the final constraint is a significant restriction. Partitions
may need to use critical sections or block interrupts from occurring, for
example for performing writes to hardware, but these must be performed
through top level system calls, where the application of such operations
can be controlled and analysed.
Where a partition needs to send a message or communicate with an-
other task, this communication is handled through a defined memory
interface which is both developed to the highest DAL and contains pro-
tections to constrain any task blocking or priority inheritance. The worst
case blocking time must then be analysed and incorporated into the sys-
tem schedulability analysis.
The approach for critical operations used in this application relies on
a simple critical section entry and exit approach, where the RTOS pro-
vides mechanisms to temporarily disable interrupts. This allows simple
112
analysis to be performed to provide a bounded blocking time, which can
be confirmed will not inhibit key system utilities such as watchdog servic-
ing. This approach is pessimistic from a timing point of view, however in
the system targeted, where inter-partition and inter-task dependencies
are already minimised, the approach is sufficient. Were a more com-
plex system with significant inter-dependencies need to be ported to this
architecture, then a more complex, less pessimistic, approach may be
required.
4.2.3 Derivation of Task Timing Parameters
The derivation of appropriate CLOi and C
HI
i figures for each task is vital
to ensure the schedulability of the system can be properly assessed [31].
This section explores both the assumptions placed on CLOi and C
HI
i , as
well as how each parameter can be defined.
A number of mixed criticality scheduling methodologies, such as those
defined from the AMC model [25], have the same underlying assumption
- that all tasks will complete by the CLOi , and that any task exceeding
CLOi can be treated as a one off fault. The AMC protocol itself for
instance will stop all low criticality tasks if any high criticality exceeds
its CLOi . Therefore an optimistic C
LO
i will lead to little or no service for
low criticality tasks.
For high criticality tasks the analysed CHIi represents an absolutely
sound WCET figure. The schedulability analysis, and partitioning scheme,
assume this time is never exceeded.
Chapter 3 established a process for the early automated identifica-
tion of system timing parameters producing two timing parameters for
each analysed task. In the context of a mixed criticality system - the
raw HWM times derived directly from execution of the search algorithm
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would be used for a task’s CLOi . Whereas the analysed results once in-
put into the hybrid measurement based WCET analysis tooling would
be used for the task’s CHIi .
Furthermore, the development of safety critical aircraft engine control
systems for certification requires an extensive test regime to be followed.
This includes considerable integration testing, which provides as an out-
put system level HWM times and measurements for WCET analysis.
These HWMs are used at Rolls-Royce to build further confidence that,
throughout an entire test campaign covering thousands of flight cycles,
no larger task execution time has been observed. This HWM is therefore
well suited to supplement a task’s CLOi , with the analysed WCET able to
supplement each task’s CHIi as an engine development programme ma-
tures. The CLOi figure can be said to be sound, but has not been proven
not to be optimistic. While the CHIi is assumed to be pessimistic, but
sound. The advantage of this approach is that the figures used for each
task’s CLOi and C
HI
i improve throughout the software design life-cycle;
from initial results provided through the work in Chapter 3, up to a
certifiable result as a project approaches certification deadline.
4.2.4 RTOS and Target Hardware Requirements
In order to provide a system that enables partitioned operation and is
capable of being certified, the RTOS and target hardware must provide
a defined set of features. From the point of view of the target hardware,
the processor must provide hardware support for invoking and controlling
timer driven interrupts, as well as a controllable memory protection unit
(MPU) to provide the required spatial partitioning.
This work is designed to be RTOS agnostic, with the RTOS sim-
ply invoking the scheduler, and providing the required utilities, such as
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mechanisms to suspend the release of tasks, or force the completion of
already executing jobs - both required to control the execution of low
criticality tasks. However, it is important that the RTOS overheads are
not only easily calculated, but that they are also linearly proportional
to the number of tasks in the system. This ensures the overheads of the
RTOS and scheduler can be easily incorporated into the schedulability
analysis of the system at design time.
Finally, the target hardware, RTOS and all protections that they
provide, must be developed according to the highest DAL of the system.
4.2.5 Schedulability Analysis Extensions
One of the shortfalls identified in the existing literature surrounding MCS
schedulability analysis was the inclusion of the RTOS and scheduler over-
heads. This section now explores how the overheads of such a system can
be broken down, and how the AMC schedulability analysis equations
need to be expanded to support inclusion of the identified overheads.
In order to include the execution time of the scheduler shown in Fig-
ure 4.5 into the response time analysis for the system, the overheads were
broken down into three constituent parts as described below:
1. Tick Overhead - δT (Figure 4.5 - dot/dash line, red). It includes:
• The pre-emption of the executing task.
• The handling of system services, e.g. the watchdog.
• The context switch and calling of the highest priority task.
• The release of any tasks into the ready state. Measured sepa-
rately as δR. (Figure 4.5 - solid line, green).
2. Start Task Time - δS (Figure 4.5 - dashed line, blue). It includes:
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Figure 4.5: Partitioned Scheduler Statechart with Overheads.
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• The initial time taken to context switch each task into the
executing state. Except for the highest priority task, which is
accounted for in the tick overhead.
3. Stop Task Time - δE (Figure 4.5 - dotted line, yellow).
• The end time taken when a task finishes executing and returns
to the scheduler.
Task releases were fixed to only occur on a scheduler tick, and the
scheduler tick is the only component that can interrupt another task.
The execution time of each overhead was measured during normal sys-
tem operation, which included at certain points, the schedule’s critical
instance. This ensured the maximum execution time for each overhead
was captured by ensuring observation of the instance where the maximum
number of tasks are moved into the released state.
The release overhead was measured and recorded against the number
of tasks being released. This allowed the release overhead of each task
to be assessed, which supported the design principle that the system
overheads should either be linear, or less than linear, against the number
of tasks being released.
The credibility of this maximum observed overhead is based on the
following implementation details:
• The use of a time deterministic target processor. As introduced in
Chapter 2.
• Tasks are only released on the system tick. The system tick period
is equal to the greatest common divisor of the tasks’ period. All
other task periods in the system are a harmonic of the tick period.
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• Each overhead is measured while the system executes a full system
test campaign on a full simulation rig.
• The RTOS is carefully designed to ensure the task release overhead
is linearly proportional to the number of tasks in the system.
Finally, each overhead was factored into the analysis through syn-
thetic tasks, in the same way originally introduced by Burns et al. [87],
which was discussed further in Section 4.1.2. This method of essentially
viewing certain overheads as tasks provides a safe and suitable method
for taking account of the periodicity of the overheads. It allows the over-
heads to be placed at the appropriate place in the schedule to ensure
correct analysis of interference.
The target for this assessment is on the AMC algorithm, originally
presented by Baruah et al. [25]. In order to aid the following discussion
the equations for the response time analysis of each task in the low crit-
icality mode, high criticality mode and during a mode change are shown














































The effect that the tick overhead has on the response time of a task

















In Equation 4.4, as in the following Equations 4.5 and 4.6 the value of






i depending on whether the
low mode, high mode or mode change response time is being calculated.
Secondly, the set of higher priority tasks used in each equation (de-
noted as j ∈MODE(i) or j ∈ hpMODE(i)) should be limited to those
tasks permitted to execute in order to avoid undue pessimism. The
scheduler tick occurs in all scheduler modes, as well as during a mode
change. However the release overhead for low criticality tasks will only
occur in the low mode, or during a mode change from low criticality to
high. This low criticality task release overhead cannot be ignored dur-
ing a mode change because the release of these tasks occurs before the
highest criticality task begins to execute.





















Equations 4.1 and 4.2 can therefore be extended as follows:
RLOi = C
LO
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This overhead model is built on two key assumptions. Firstly, that
the overheads of the system are understood; and secondly, that a switch
from a one criticality task to a different criticality task, and the asso-
ciated context switch, takes the same time as switching between tasks
of the same criticality. The first requirement is key for any safety crit-
ical system and is therefore deemed an acceptable restriction. If the
second assumption cannot be fulfilled, or if the system must support a
more complex context or thread switching mechanism then the overhead
model, and the associated priority assignment mechanism may need to
be adapted in a similar way to the work presented by Davis et al. [80].
Finally, based on the partition assignment requirements introduced
in Section 4.2.2.3, no task is able to arbitrarily block an interrupt from
occurring. Therefore, no blocking term is included in these equations.
Should this be required, then the equations could simply be extended
by adding the worst case system blocking time (B) to the start of each
equation.
4.2.6 Review Against Certification Requirements
The system design notes highlighted so far are now discussed against
the certification requirements identified from DO-178C. The system de-
sign is discussed in the context of executing within the Current System
introduced in Chapter 2.
1. A partitioned software component should not be allowed to contam-
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inate another partitioned software component’s code, input/output
(I/O), or data storage areas.
• The control system software is developed and tested against
appropriate standards which for business-critical as well as
safety-critical reasons can be expected to comply with its re-
quirements.
• The memory and hardware areas that are permitted for each
partition are defined at design time, and passed to the RTOS
at initialisation.
• The RTOS controls the target processor’s user/supervisor mode
configuration in order to regulate the operation of each par-
tition; ensuring any memory transgressions are stopped and
handled appropriately.
2. A partitioned software component should be allowed to consume
shared processor resources only during its scheduled period of exe-
cution.
• All low criticality tasks are bounded by the target hardware’s
scheduler controlled timing interrupt, which when calling a low
criticality task will be set to interrupt the task when it reaches
its CLO.
• High criticality tasks are not interrupted except by a sched-
uler tick. This is based on the trusted WCET analysis process
followed for high criticality tasks. That is, a high criticality
task’s CHI is trusted.
3. Failures of hardware unique to a partitioned software component
should not cause adverse effects on other partitioned software com-
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ponents.
• If a failure prevents the software timing interrupt providing the
expected protection then the hardware timing watchdog, which
is accepted and proven in use, combined with an independent
two-lane (duplex) architecture, will ensure acceptable safety.
• The spatial partitioning employed shall ensure a task cannot
interact with address regions outside of its permitted bounds
• A high criticality component cannot rely on data from a lower
DAL component for its safe operation.
• Hardware components are certified to at least the same stan-
dard as that of their software driver equivalents.
4. Any software providing partitioning should have the same or higher
software level as the highest level assigned to any of the partitioned
software components.
• The RTOS, interrupt handler, scheduler and software timing
watchdog should all be developed to the highest DAL and are
executed as protected ‘supervisor’ mode components.
5. Any hardware providing partitioning should be assessed by the sys-
tem safety assessment process to ensure that it does not adversely
affect safety.
• The processor, including the timing and memory supervision
components, have been verified to DO-254 DAL-A and have
been used on multiple certified systems.
This section aimed to discuss the design of a partitioned scheduler to
support a mixed criticality system. The scheduler aims to comply with
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the certification guidelines presented in DO-178C. The next section now
progresses to discuss how an existing system can be ported to the MCS
discussed in this section.
4.3 Current Rolls-Royce Approach to
Scheduling
This section builds off the Current System definition already provided in
Chapter 2; and provides system information and background relevant to
the partitioned system design discussed throughout this chapter.
‘Visual Fixed Priority Scheduler’ (VisualFPS) is a task attribute as-
signment and scheduling analysis tool framework developed initially by
Bate and Burns [39] and then used by Rolls-Royce on all their FADECs
since 2002 [15].
The current FADEC approach features a non-preemptive scheduler
where all tasks are released by a clock tick which has a period equal to
the greatest common divisor of the tasks’ periods [39]. Timing protection
is provided by a hardware timing watchdog that counts down from the
clock tick period. If the counter is not reset before it reaches zero then
the processor is reset, re-initialising the system. When combined with a
dual lane architecture each with independent power supplies, sensors and
actuators, the use of a hardware timing watchdog ensures the likelihood
of a processor or software fault leading to a hazardous safety event is
acceptably low.
From an industrial perspective, an aim of this work is to change the
processing platform, scheduling mechanisms and tooling by only the min-
imum amount necessary; as the tooling is well understood and accepted
by engineers and certification authorities respectively.
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The example used for this analysis has already been certified as a
DAL-A system. The system consists of a large number of tasks, each of
which has a measured HWM and an analysed WCET, obtained using a
hybrid-measurement based approach [13][37][67]. The HWM and WCET
were used for the CLOi and C
HI
i respectively.
The timing requirements for the task set include independent task
requirements of period Ti (taken from the set [2.5, 5, 10, 12.5, 25, 50,
100, 200, 500]ms), deadline Di and in approximately 5% of cases; com-
pletion jitter Ji. Approximately 50% of tasks form part of a transaction,
which may consist of between two and eleven tasks. The transaction
requirements are further complicated by two factors. Firstly, some tasks
appear in more than one transaction; and secondly, within a transaction
it may be the case that some tasks have different periods. For example,
a transaction may run a sequence of tasks with periods of 25, 50, 50,
25, 100 and then 25 respectively. An important decision taken is to use
a repeatable algorithm (i.e. one that always produces the same results)
that takes all the requirements and uses them to calculate the dead-
line for each task. Task priorities are then assigned using the Deadline
Monotonic Priority Ordering (DMPO) algorithm where the task with the
shortest deadline is given the highest priority. If all deadlines are met,
all the timing requirements are met. The method ensures the schedule
is correct by construction. This approach has a further advantage, key
to industry, that by incorporating the timing requirements for each task
into its design-time calculated deadline; the system can be easily proved,
reviewed and understood by engineers and system integrators [39].
Finally, with respect to inter-task data transactions; each task is de-
signed to communicate with a common interface, and follows a format of
input-process-output. Furthermore, tasks are designed to execute upon
124
the data that is currently available and will not wait until fresh data is
available. Where fresh data is required to move between tasks this is
generally controlled by a transaction. This approach has the advantage
of simplifying access to shared resources between tasks, and is therefore
not considered further as part of this work.
In order to produce a set of mixed criticality tasks to integrate into
the new MCS, a number of low criticality tasks were added to the task
set. These tasks were chosen to mimic lower criticality monitoring func-
tionality, which at present is distributed across different processing nodes
in the control system. These additional monitoring functions took the
total number of tasks in the system to 228.
4.3.1 Open Source Industrial Example
The control system design discussed so far throughout this section is
taken from a commercially sensitive aircraft engine control system, and
therefore cannot be discussed in detail in an open document. Hence,
while the larger system introduced so far represents the end target sys-
tem, this subsection introduces an open source industrial example which
provides some of the same features as the commercially sensitive control
system, but which can be discussed in more detail.
The initial work on the VisualFPS scheduling scheme, as discussed in
Bate’s thesis [38], provided an example control system task set. The task
set is introduced in Table A.1 in Appendix A. The intertask transaction
set is shown in Figure 4.6. The task set is used as originally presented
with two modifications. Firstly, in order to provide a task set with mul-
tiple independent transactions sets, the three transactions highlighted in
red were deleted. Secondly, four low criticality tasks were added to the
schedule as denoted at the end of Table A.1 (Tasks P72 lo, P73 lo, P74 lo
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Figure 4.6: Example Control System Transaction Set [38].
and P75 lo). The addition of these four tasks (overlooking their different
criticality) makes the task set un-schedulable when analysed using the
existing VisualFPS process.
The process introduced by Bate [38] (which has since been further
developed and used by Rolls-Royce) statically calculates the deadline for
each task taking into account Period, Jitter and Transaction require-
ments. By then prioritising using the DMPO technique this offers a
system which can be easily proven by design. Table A.1 shows the calcu-
lated deadlines for each task, with each deadline being calculated using
Algorithm 3.
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ALGORITHM 3: Calculating Each Task’s Deadline.
1: /* Initially set each task’s deadline to equal its period */
2: for i ∈ τi do
3: Di = Ti
4: end for
5:
6: /* If a task has a jitter requirement, then set the deadline to the lower of the
deadline, or the jitter plus WCET */
7: for i ∈ τi do
8: if Di > Ji + Ci then




13: /* Iterate over each transaction, in reverse order, to ensure that each task
preceding another in a transaction has a lower deadline */
14: while TaskSetChanging do
15: TaskSetChanging = FALSE
16: for j ∈ TransactionSet do
17: for i ∈ reverse(Transactionj) do
18: if i == Transaction′jLAST then
19: k = i
20: else if Di ≥ Dk then
21: Di = Dk − 1
22: TaskSetChanging = TRUE






The algorithm first sets each task’s Deadline to its Period. It then
iterates over each task that has a Jitter requirement and calculates a new
Deadline for the task based on the task’s Jitter requirement and WCET.
Finally, the algorithm iterates over each Transaction and ensures that
each task in a Transaction has a lower Deadline than each task that
succeeds it in the same Transaction.
4.4 Porting Existing System to the MCS
Architecture
The development costs involved in producing safety critical software are
so great that any update, whether to tooling infrastructure or to the
architecture of the system itself, must support legacy software as a pre-
requisite. It is therefore important to understand how a legacy, non
pre-emptive system such as the current Rolls-Royce control system can
be ported to the new scheduler. Porting such a system also allows a
study of the benefits of a real MCS industrial example to be analysed.
From an architectural requirements point of view there are a number
of key differences between a non pre-emptive and a pre-emptive system.
In particular, from a timing perspective, a non pre-emptive system is
susceptible to blocking from large tasks; whereas a pre-emptive system,
if not designed carefully, can suffer from larger overheads.
The current Rolls-Royce control system architecture consists of a large
number of tasks, carefully designed to reduce the effects of task blocking
in the current non pre-emptive scheduler (Section 4.3). The overhead
assessment and implementation rules defined in Section 4.2.5 illustrated
how the approach of using a large number of individual scheduled tasks
is less desirable for a pre-emptive model. This is because firstly the
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RTOS overheads of the pre-emptive RTOS are significantly higher than
the overheads of the non-pre-emptive system due to the introduction of
context switching and MCS task monitoring; but also because the over-
heads increase with the number of tasks, and their associated releases
in the system. By reducing the number of tasks called from the RTOS,
the number of tasks MODE(i) is reduced to MODESUPER TASK(i) (re-
ferring to Equation 4.4 where MODESUPER TASK(i) << MODE(i)),
reducing the overhead induced by task releases. Furthermore, the num-
ber of higher priority tasks hpMODE(i) is reduced in Equations 4.5 and
4.6, reducing the start and stop task induced overheads.
The aim of this process is therefore to take a set of control system
tasks and to efficiently and appropriately port them over to a set of RTOS
SuperTasks.
Definition 4.6. A SuperTask is an RTOS called function, constructed
using one or many tasks.
There are two aspects that must be considered when porting compo-
nents from one architecture to another. The first is the correct handling
and protection of data transfers that are conducted across the system.
The second is in the correct allocation of tasks to fulfil the temporal re-
quirements of the compiled system. This thesis is concerned principally
with the latter. The former, which primarily revolves around utilising a
strict input-process-output architecture, is considered in parallel work.
4.4.1 Porting Tasks Without Clustering
In order to provide an initial state for comparison and potential improve-
ment, the existing Rolls-Royce and open-source systems were ported di-
rectly over to the new pre-emptive MCS. Firstly, each task was directly
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ported over to create an RTOS SuperTask. This set of RTOS SuperTasks
were then prioritised using the DMPO scheme. Finally, the overheads
for the system were calculated using the methodology set out in Section
4.2.5.
The maximum computation time for the RTOS and MCS run time
monitoring system was analysed as the following:
• CTICK = 35µs
• CREL = 7µs
• CSTART = 25µs
• CSTOP = 30µs
These figures were measured using the Rolls-Royce qualified process
as defined by [13]. These overheads were used for the Rolls-Royce and
Open source example systems discussed in the following sections. How-
ever, in Section 4.4.8 it is shown that the trends in the results and the
contributions of the chapter are still applicable for varying overheads.
4.4.1.1 Open Source System
The results of applying the schedulability analysis introduced in Section
4.2.5 to the open source system are shown in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. The
results show how the system suffers from over 10% overheads which leads
to a significant number (30%) of tasks failing their schedulability analysis.
4.4.1.2 Rolls-Royce System
The results from porting the Rolls-Royce control system to the new MCS
are shown in Tables 4.3 and 4.4. In this case the RTOS overheads mea-
sured 45% of total system utilisation, creating a system where in excess
of 75% of tasks failed their schedulability analysis.
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#SuperTasks Schedulable Tasks Transaction Pass?
NoClustering 75 70.7% Yes
Table 4.1: Clustering Results When Applied to an Open Source Engine
Control Case Study.
δS δE δT δSUM
NoClustering 3.8% 4.6% 2.5% 10.9%
Table 4.2: Clustering Results When Applied to an Open Source Engine
Control Case Study.
It is clear that porting the existing control systems to a MCS pre-
emptive system produces a system no longer able to comply with its
requirements. Therefore, the following sections now examine how this
system can be ported in such a way that allows it to still maintain its
temporal correctness.
4.4.2 Clustering to Support System Design
The principal aim of clustering the set of control system tasks is to create
a system that complies with its temporal requirements following execu-
tion of response time analysis. Based on the temporal requirement set,
and on the design objectives of the MCS discussed in Section 4.2, the
following success factors can be identified to confirm a system is schedu-
#SuperTasks Schedulable Tasks Transaction Pass?
NoClustering 228 24.1% Yes
Table 4.3: Clustering Results When Applied to the Rolls-Royce Aircraft
Engine Control System.
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δS δE δT δSUM
NoClustering 17.6% 21.1% 6.3% 45.0%
Table 4.4: Clustering Results When Applied to the Rolls-Royce Aircraft
Engine Control System.
lable:
• No SuperTask can contain two or more tasks of different criticali-
ties. Thus ensuring the MCS rules surrounding partitioning can be
maintained at the RTOS level.
• The response time of each individual task must be less than the
task’s calculated deadline. The deadline is calculated using Algo-
rithm 3.
• For each transaction, any task preceding another task should have
a higher priority than the succeeding task.
The basic algorithm for clustering a set of tasks is shown in Algo-
rithm 4. The first part of the algorithm to Line 4 creates an ordered set
of tasks from highest priority to lowest priority. The method for creat-
ing this ordered set on Line 4 is explored and analysed in the following
subsections.
Once the ordered set of tasks have been identified the algorithm steps
through the task set in priority order and divides tasks into SuperTasks,
this process is shown in Algorithm 5. The first task is automatically
placed in the first SuperTask. This SuperTask takes on the period, dead-
line and criticality of the task. All successive tasks are placed in the same
SuperTask if the following rules apply:
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ALGORITHM 4: Task Clustering Algorithm.
1: /* Calculate task deadlines using Algorithm 3 */
2: UnOrderedTasks = CalculateTaskDeadlines(Period, Jitter, Transactions)
3: /* Create OrderedTaskSet according to the defined clustering method */
4: OrderedTaskSet = OrderTaskSet(ClusteringMethod)
5:
6: Move OrderedTaskSet[0] into SuperTask[0]
7: SuperTask[0].Period = OrderedTaskSet[0].Period
8: SuperTask[0].Criticality = OrderedTaskSet[0].Criticality
9: SuperTask[0].WCET = OrderedTaskSet[0].WCET
10:
11: j = 0
12: for i in 1..OrderedTaskSet.Length do
13: if AddToSuperTask(j, i) then





17: SuperTask[j].WCET = OrderedTaskSet[i].WCET + SuperTask[j].WCET
18: else
19: j++
20: Move OrderedTaskSet[i] into SuperTask[j]
21: SuperTask[j].Period = OrderedTaskSet[i].Period
22: SuperTask[j].Deadline = OrderedTaskSet[i].Deadline
23: SuperTask[j].Criticality = OrderedTaskSet[i].Criticality




28: Apply DMPO to SuperTask set
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ALGORITHM 5: AddToSuperTask(SuperTask j, Task i).
1: /* Identify Whether Task(i) can Join SuperTask(j) */
2: if OrderedTaskSet[i].Period is harmonic of OrderedTaskSet[i-1].Period
and OrderedTaskSet[i].Criticality == SuperTask[j].Criticality





• The task’s period is a harmonic of the SuperTask period, or the
SuperTask’s period is a harmonic of the task’s period.
• The task’s criticality is the same as the SuperTask’s criticality.
• The addition of a task into the SuperTask will not increase the
SuperTasks total execution time to more than its period.
If any of these rules fail, then the task is placed into a new SuperTask.
The SuperTask then assumes the lowest period and deadline of the tasks
inside the SuperTask. Any task with a greater period than its SuperTask
period is placed inside a static counter controlled conditional statement
which ensures the task is only executed on its period. For instance a
50ms task inside a 25ms SuperTask will execute every other invocation
of the SuperTask.
Once this allocation of tasks to SuperTasks has completed, the set of
SuperTasks is prioritised using the DMPO scheme.
The following sections identify and investigate different methods for
ordering the task set (OrderTaskSet(ClusteringMethod) from Algo-
rithm 4). These methods focus on the temporal requirements of the task
set. Parameters such as the task’s criticality were not used for ordering
the task set in order to comply with the requirements of the MCS design.
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4.4.3 Porting Tasks By Period
The first method of task prioritising uses the Rate Monotonic Priority
Ordering scheme [88] by setting the Deadline of each task to its Period.
The algorithm for performing this operation is shown in Algorithm 6. As
indicated, all tasks are ordered and that ordered set is broken down into
SuperTasks based purely on their period.
ALGORITHM 6: OrderTaskSet(Period).
1: /* Order tasks by Period */
2: OrderTaskSet = UnOrderTaskSet
3: while TaskSetChanging do
4: TaskSetChanging = FALSE
5: for i ∈ OrderTaskSet do
6: for j ∈ (i...τj) do
7: if Tj < Ti then
8: OrderTaskSet = SwapTasks(i, j)






Figure 4.7 shows the result of the task clustering by period algorithm
on the open source industrial example. The figure focuses on the trans-
actions present in the system, all tasks not listed (and not part of a
transaction) are ordered according to their period in the same way.
The figure shows how the algorithm risks breaking transactional re-
quirements, as for instance SuperTask 1 executes before SuperTask 2 and
4; despite SuperTasks 2 and 4 containing preceding transactional tasks
to SuperTask 1’s in the transaction shown at the top of the figure.
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Figure 4.7: Clustering Results From Applying Algorithm 6 to the Open
Source Control System Example.
#SuperTasks Schedulable Tasks Transaction Pass?
NoClustering 75 70.7% Yes
Period 7 62.7% No
Table 4.5: Clustering Results When Applied to an Aircraft Engine Con-
trol Case Study.
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δS δE δT δSUM
NoClustering 3.8% 4.6% 2.5% 10.9%
Period 0.4% 0.4% 1.5% 2.3%
Table 4.6: Clustering Results When Applied to an Aircraft Engine Con-
trol Case Study.
The results when performing schedulability analysis on the newly
clustered SuperTask set based on the open source example is shown is
Tables 4.5 and 4.6. The results show that the SuperTask set produces
a system with significantly lower overheads, reduced by a factor of five.
However, the clustering algorithm fails to fulfill transactional require-
ments because of a lack of focus on ensuring the correct ordering of
transactions. Secondly, the number of tests failing their response time
analysis actually increases. This was identified to be down to the failure
of tasks with jitter requirements to comply with their temporal require-
ments as they were prioritised lower down the system schedule.
4.4.4 Porting Tasks By Transaction
Clustering tasks by period identified issues where task transactions, or
jitter requirements, were not taken into account. Therefore the second
approach investigated focused principally on transactional requirements.
Additionally, as most tasks with a jitter requirement also form part of a
transaction, this method also aimed to capture jitter requirements. The
algorithm for the transaction clustering method is shown in Algorithm
7. In this case the tasks in transactions were first broken out into Super-
Tasks, before the remaining task set was ordered into SuperTasks based




1: /* Iterate over each transaction, in reverse order, to ensure that each task
preceding another in a transaction has a lower deadline */
2: while TaskSetChanging do
3: TaskSetChanging = FALSE
4: for j ∈ TransactionSet do
5: for i ∈ Transactionj do
6: Add i to OrderTaskSet
7: if i == Transaction′jFIRST then
8: k = i
9: else if OrderTaskSet[k] follows OrderTaskSet[i] then
10: OrderTaskSet = SwapTask(i, k)
11: TaskSetChanging = TRUE






18: /* Iterate over the tasks not yet ordered and order based on Period */
19: while Any Task 6∈ OrderTaskSet do
20: MinPeriod = MAX
21: for j 6∈ OrderTaskSet do
22: if Tj < MinPeriod then
23: k = j
24: MinPeriod = Tj
25: end if
26: end for




Figure 4.8: Clustering Results From Applying Algorithm 7 to the Open
Source Control System Example.
#SuperTasks Schedulable Tasks Transaction Pass?
NoClustering 75 70.7% Yes
Period 7 62.7% No
Transaction 4 49.3% Yes
Table 4.7: Clustering Results When Applied to the Open Source Engine
Control Case Study.
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δS δE δT δSUM
NoClustering 3.8% 4.6% 2.5% 10.9%
Period 0.4% 0.4% 1.5% 2.3%
Transaction 2.3% 2.7% 2.0% 7.0%
Table 4.8: Clustering Results When Applied to the Open Source Engine
Control Case Study.
Figure 4.8 shows the SuperTask breakdown for the open source con-
trol system. As opposed to the Period clustering method this algorithm
ensures that all transactions are maintained inside individual SuperTasks.
All tasks that do not form part of a transaction are then broken down into
SuperTasks based on their period, before each SuperTask is prioritised
using the DMPO.
Tables 4.7 and 4.8 show the results from applying this clustering
algorithm to the open source control system. The results confirm that
all transactional requirements have been complied with, and again the
overhead for the RTOS has been reduced. Interestingly the number of
SuperTasks, when compared to the Period clustering technique, is lower;
however, the RTOS overhead is higher. This is because while there were
only four tasks in the system, these four tasks had very low periods and
therefore much higher overheads over a given timeframe.
4.4.5 Porting Tasks By Jitter
A second iteration from the Period clustering method was developed
to focus on tasks with jitter requirements. This algorithm, denoted in
Algorithm 8, prioritises tasks with jitter requirements. Secondly, tasks
that form part of a transaction are moved into SuperTasks, in a similar
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way to the clustering by transaction algorithm; before all remaining tasks
are broken down based on their period.
ALGORITHM 8: OrderTaskSet(Jitter).
1: /* Add tasks with jitter requirements into OrderTaskSet in period order */
2: while TaskSetChanging do
3: TaskSetChanging = FALSE
4: for i 6∈ OrderTaskSet do
5: if Ji 6= 0 then
6: Add i to OrderTaskSet
7: for j ∈ OrderTaskSet do
8: if j == OrderTaskSet[0] then
9: k = j
10: else if Tk > Tj then
11: OrderTaskSet = SwapTask(j, k)
12: TaskSetChanging = TRUE







20: /* Use the cluster by Transaction algorithm to sort the remaining tasks. */
21: OrderTaskSet = OrderTaskSet(Transaction)
22: return OrderTaskSet
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Figure 4.9: Clustering Results From Applying Algorithm 8 to the Open
Source Control System Example.
#SuperTasks Schedulable Tasks Transaction Pass?
NoClustering 75 70.7% Yes
Period 7 62.7% No
Transaction 4 49.3% Yes
Jitter 14 33.3% No
Table 4.9: Clustering Results When Applied to the Open Source Engine
Control Case Study.
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δS δE δT δSUM
NoClustering 3.8% 4.6% 2.5% 10.9%
Period 0.4% 0.4% 1.5% 2.3%
Transaction 2.3% 2.7% 2.0% 7.0%
Jitter 4.6% 5.5% 2.7% 12.7%
Table 4.10: Clustering Results When Applied to the Open Source Engine
Control Case Study.
Figure 4.9 shows the breakdown of SuperTasks following execution of
the cluster by jitter algorithm. Tables 4.9 and 4.10 show the schedula-
bility analysis results obtained from analysing the jitter clustered task
set for the open source control system example. Again, the results show
a further degradation in the number of schedulable tasks. In this case
partly down to the increased number of SuperTasks, with its resultant
increase in scheduler overheads.
4.4.6 Porting Tasks By Deadline
Clustering tasks by Period, Transaction or Jitter has proved unreliable as
focusing on one of these requirements and neglecting others has proved
an ineffective way of clustering tasks. This was perceived to be because
it is not possible to prioritise one temporal parameter over another, with-
out producing an un-schedulable system. Therefore, the final algorithm
focuses on clustering tasks by Deadline. As the Deadline is calculated us-
ing the period and any transactional or jitter requirements, this approach
should ensure all temporal requirements receive equal weight. The tech-
nique is shown in Algorithm 9.
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ALGORITHM 9: OrderTaskSet(Deadline).
1: /* Order tasks by Deadline */
2: OrderTaskSet = UnOrderTaskSet
3: while TaskSetChanging do
4: TaskSetChanging = FALSE
5: for i ∈ OrderTaskSet do
6: for j ∈ (i...τj) do
7: if Dj < Di then
8: OrderTaskSet = SwapTasks(i, j)






There are two variants to this algorithm as follows:
• Deadline D - The algorithm does not allow tasks to co-exist in the
same SuperTask if they have different deadlines. This aims to en-
sure that tasks with tight deadlines can be prioritised accordingly.
• Deadline P - The algorithm does allow tasks with dissimilar dead-
line to co-exist within a SuperTask, provided the rules set out in
the original rules within Algorithm 4 are maintained.
Figure 4.10 shows the SuperTask breakdown for the Deadline D clus-
tering algorithm. The Deadline P equivalent diagram is not shown as
all tasks in this set of transactions would be placed within the same
SuperTask.
The results from applying the two additional clustering algorithms
to the open source control system are shown in Tables 4.11 and 4.12.
The results show how the use of each task’s deadline as a clustering
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Figure 4.10: Clustering Results From Applying Algorithm 9 to the Open
Source Control System Example.
technique produces improved results. In both cases all task transactional
requirements are complied with. However, the Deadline D algorithm
produces a system with a larger number of SuperTasks, which produces
RTOS overheads so high that the response time analysis of tasks lower
down the system schedule fails.
Comparing the results produced across all of the clustering algorithms
the results appear to indicate that clustering by deadline is the most ap-
propriate technique. Furthermore, the results show how the Deadline P
algorithm does not produce the system with the lowest number of Super-
Tasks, or the lowest RTOS overhead. This confirms that using optimisa-
tion targets such as lowest number of SuperTask or minimum overheads
are not the only objectives for this process.
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#SuperTasks Schedulable Tasks Transaction Pass?
NoClustering 75 70.7% Yes
Period 7 62.7% No
Transaction 4 49.3% Yes
Jitter 14 33.3% No
Deadline D 43 90.7% Yes
Deadline P 10 100.0% Yes
Table 4.11: Clustering Results When Applied to an Aircraft Engine Con-
trol Case Study.
δS δE δT δSUM
NoClustering 3.8% 4.6% 2.5% 10.9%
Period 0.4% 0.4% 1.5% 2.3%
Transaction 2.3% 2.7% 2.0% 7.0%
Jitter 4.6% 5.5% 2.7% 12.7%
Deadline D 1.7% 2.0% 1.9% 5.6%
Deadline P 0.4% 0.5% 1.5% 2.5%
Table 4.12: Clustering Results When Applied to an Aircraft Engine Con-
trol Case Study.
This study has identified a potential clustering method that works
well with the industrial case study obtained from Bate [38]. The fol-
lowing sections now perform a wider study of the clustering techniques
to investigate whether the method is still the most appropriate when
conducted against a large number of different systems.
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4.4.7 Results from Applying the Clustering Tech-
niques to the Rolls-Royce Control System
The clustering algorithms were first applied to the Rolls-Royce control
system introduced in Section 4.3. The results are shown in Tables 4.13
and 4.14.
#SuperTasks Schedulable Tasks Transaction Pass?
NoClustering 228 24.1% Yes
Period 17 85.5% No
Transaction 10 9.2% Yes
Jitter 53 38.2% No
Deadline D 167 40.4% Yes
Deadline P 15 100.0% Yes
Table 4.13: Clustering Results When Applied to the Rolls-Royce Aircraft
Engine Control System.
δS δE δT δSUM
NoClustering 17.6% 21.1% 6.3% 45.0%
Period 2.5% 3.0% 2.1% 7.6%
Transaction 4.0% 4.8% 2.5% 11.4%
Jitter 13.1% 15.7% 5.1% 33.9%
Deadline D 11.7% 14.1% 4.7% 30.5%
Deadline P 0.8% 0.9% 1.6% 3.3%
Table 4.14: Clustering Results When Applied to the Rolls-Royce Aircraft
Engine Control System.
The results show that the Deadline P clustering method was the only
algorithm able to generate a schedulable system. This was despite the
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fact that it was not the algorithm that produced the task set with the
smallest number of Super Tasks. The Period and Transaction clustering
algorithms failed to prioritise tasks with jitter requirements, and so those
tasks presented worst case response times that would have failed to meet
their tight timing requirements. Whereas the Jitter clustering algorithm
failed to correctly order transactions, and created a system with a larger
number of high rate SuperTasks, leading to a higher RTOS utilisation
which left the system unschedulable. The Deadline D method correctly
ordered transactional tasks and prioritised tasks with jitter requirements.
However, as it did not group together tasks with different deadlines, it
created a system with a prohibitively large RTOS overhead.
In comparison to the original system, this partitioned approach al-
lowed low criticality tasks totalling 44% utilisation to be added into the
system without compromising schedulability across all clustering algo-
rithms. This would not have been possible in the existing legacy system
and was only made feasible as the analysis was able to capitalise on the
difference between each high criticality task’s CLOi and C
HI
i .
4.4.8 Large Scale Evaluation
The previous sections have tested the clustering algorithms against two
real control systems. However, it is important to ensure that these results
are reflected when applied to a large range of different systems to ensure
that the algorithms are not biased towards the two control systems tested
so far. To ensure the avoidance of bias a number of system parameters
were varied through the analysis, these included overhead rates, size and
length of transactions and the number of tasks with jitter requirements.
In order to perform this analysis a large number of task sets were ran-
domly generated, with the clustering algorithms being applied to each
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set. The random task set generator used is based on a version of the
UUniFast algorithm [89], and was extended, as detailed below, to feature
jitter requirements and transaction requirements. The random task set
generation assessment was performed at varying target utilisations from
30% to 100% (at an interval of every 5%), with a varying number of tasks
(10, 50, 100). Each clustering technique was then applied to each gener-
ated task set. Finally, the result was statically analysed to confirm every
task’s response time was less than its deadline and that each transaction
was correctly ordered. One thousand tests were then performed for each
test configuration. Finally, to provide an ideal case for comparison, a
zero overhead test was also performed across each generated task set.
Key characteristics of the real engine control software were identified
(and simplified) to constrain the generated tasksets as follows:
• Harmonic periods from the set (2.5, 5, 10, 12.5, 25, 50, 100, 200,
500)ms, inline with the real system introduced in section 4.3.
• 5% of tasks randomly chosen to contain a jitter requirement. If
part of a transaction only a task at the beginning or end of the
transaction was given a jitter requirement.
• Transactions consisting of three tasks, randomly chosen from the
existing set. The number of transactions in the system was set to
one fifth of the number of tasks, and transactions could include
tasks with different periods.
• The CLOi for each task was randomly defined based on the system
level target utilisation. Each task’s CHIi was randomly selected
from the range CLOi ≤ CHIi ≤ 2CLOi .
• The criticality of each task was randomly selected to produce a
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system with between 60% and 80% high DAL tasks, with the re-
maining tasks set to be low DAL tasks.






































































Figure 4.11: Schedulability of a 10, 50 and 100 Task System at Varying
Target Utilisations.
This follows principles similar to the approach defined by Kramer et
al. [90] where key characteristics are extracted from a real application
and fed into a generator to derive representative benchmarks. However,
the tasksets used by Kramer et al. [90] follow the AUTOSAR runnable
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Figure 4.12: RTOS Overheads Calculated for each Clustered System.
model and do not include transactions which have a profound effect on
the scheduling approach.
One break from the real engine control system is in the number of
tasks defined for each system. In the large scale evaluation task sets
of size 10, 50 and 100 tasks are used, whereas the Rolls-Royce system
contains more than 200 tasks. Smaller task sets are used because it did
not prove possible to define (without bias) a task set containing hundreds
of tasks that were schedulable even without system overheads.
Figure 4.11 shows the number of schedulable tests out of the one thou-
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Figure 4.13: Schedulability of a 10, 50 and 100 Task System With No
Transactions.
sand executed for each clustering algorithm at varying target utilisation
configurations. The experiments showed that for a small task system
there was not a great difference across the different methods, with the
exception of the Transaction method. From the inspection of the results
this was largely because the Transaction method failed to take account
of tasks with tight jitter requirements, which consequently receive lower
priorities and failure against their response time analysis.
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Figure 4.14: Maximum WCET Scaling Factor to Provide a Schedulable
System.
For a system with 50 tasks, as shown in the second plot of Figure 4.11,
the difference between the clustering methods is more profound. Neither
the Transactions nor the Period methods are able to generate reliably
schedulable systems, failing to take account of jitter requirements. The
Jitter algorithm fares better, but a general failure to preserve transac-
tions causes the schedulability of the solutions to suffer as the task set
utilisation grows. The only algorithms able to track near the No Over-
head ideal are the Deadline algorithms, with the Deadline P faring best
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Figure 4.15: Number of Schedulable Tasks with Varying Transaction
Rates [10%, 25% and 50%].
as it is able to minimise RTOS overheads by producing systems with less
SuperTasks. This hypothesis is further supported in Figure 4.12. This
shows the RTOS overhead produced by each clustering method.
These results are amplified as the task set size grows to 100 tasks,
where again the only algorithm following a similar trend to the No Over-
head ideal is the Deadline P algorithm. One irregularity with the results
is the fact that for 50 and 100 task systems no clustering algorithms are
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Figure 4.16: Number of Schedulable Tasks with Varying Jitter Rates of
[0%, 5% and 10%].
able to achieve a 100% set of schedulable tests. This is because of the
effect of transactions as shown by Figure 4.13 which shows the same test
as shown by Figure 4.11, however without Transactions.
Figure 4.14 shows the analysed maximum possible WCET inflation
factor, or sensitivity, for a 100 task system at varying target utilisation
(50%,70%,90%). That is, the maximum figure that every CLOi and C
HI
i
can be multiplied by before the system is no longer schedulable. There-
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Figure 4.17: Number of Schedulable Tasks with Low, Medium and High
RTOS Overheads.
fore, a value above or below one would indicate an increase or decrease
(for an initially unschedulable system) in task times respectively. The re-
sults showed the Deadline P clustering method maintaining the highest
inflation factor across all three target utilisations with other algorithms,
in particular Period and Transaction, tracking inflation factors close to
zero. The results further indicate that even No Clustering is frequently
better than Jitter, Period and Transaction.
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Comparing Figure 4.12 to Figures 4.11 and 4.14; even though Period
tended to have the lowest overhead, it tended to produce less schedulable
solutions. This is because the algorithm frequently produces a system
with the lowest number of RTOS tasks. However, these tasks do not
take account of jitter or temporal requirements, and so is in general not
schedulable. Either because tasks with jitter requirements have high re-
sponse times, or because transaction orders are not maintained. This
further supports the assertion that this clustering operation is not nec-
essarily aiming to simply minimise RTOS overheads.
In order to further review the effectiveness of the different clustering
algorithms the analysis was extended through application to different
systems with varying transactions rates (Figure 4.15), varying jitter rates
(Figure 4.16) and varying overheads (Figure 4.17). This analysis shows
how the clustering algorithms performed when presented with different
system configurations which moved beyond the assumptions introduced
by the avionic control system.
Again, the results showed that the Deadline P was reliably the best
clustering method. It was shown to be reliable while other clustering
algorithms’ performance varied significantly across the different system
parameters.
4.5 Resilient System Design
The previous sections of this chapter have aimed to show how an MCS
can be developed based on the AMC protocol. This chapter now explores
how this work can be extended to the Resilient model as proposed by
Burns et al. [34]. The resilient model aims to apply principles of graceful
degradation to the MCS problem by introducing the notion of robust
tasks.
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This model aligns well to an industrial use case as the model promises
to delay moving into the high criticality mode to a later point than
potentially offered by the AMC model without dynamic reconfiguration
of the system. Furthermore, the concept of a robust task is well aligned to
the design of a control system. A robust task is a task that is able to drop
one job without affecting its system level requirements [34]; where said
task’s robustness is independent from its criticality. In the Rolls-Royce
control system there exists a number of tasks, or operations, that can be
considered as robust. These include for instance, tasks that communicate
with monitoring equipment or write tracing data to non volatile memory
devices. Both operations could feasibly be paused for a short period of
time without having system level safety consequences, provided they are
able to restart their operations and execute their operations for a period
of time after the pause in service.
So, while the focus of the resilient model is within the field of MCS,
it also offers the potential to increase the system utilisation of single
criticality systems, provided one or many tasks can be treated as robust.
Studying the scheduler design discussed in Section 4.2; the resilient
model can be easily inserted into the model with the only changes made
being inside the scheduler around the Handle Overrun operation and
with the static schedulability analysis process. These required changes
are discussed in the following sections.
4.5.1 Handling Overruns
The system state model for the resilient algorithm is shown in Figure
4.18. The operation of the scheduler in each mode is discussed below:
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• Normal Mode
– All tasks are released and executed when defined by their tem-
poral requirements.
– All low criticality tasks are prevented from executing further
than their CLO.
– Should any high criticality task execute for longer than its
CLO then the Job Failure (JF) is incremented.
– If the JF counter increases above the Fail Operational (F)
threshold, then the system reverts to the Resilient mode.
– Each time the system reaches the idle task, the JF counter is
reset to zero.
• Resilient Mode
– Each robust task skips a number of jobs equal to the task’s
design time determined skip factor - Sj.
– All other tasks are released, and executed as with the Normal
Mode, with the JF count continuing to record high criticality
CLO overruns.
– If the JF counter increases above the Fail Robust (M) thresh-
old, then the system reverts to the High Criticality mode.
– Should the system reach the idle task, the JF counter is reset
to zero and the system reverts back to the Normal mode.
• High Criticality Mode
– Only high criticality tasks are permitted to execute.
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– If a robust task has not yet dropped Sj jobs since the original
move into the Resilient Mode, then it may continue to do so
until Sj is reached.
– Should the system reach the idle task, the JF counter is reset
to zero, and the system reverts back to the Normal mode.
Figure 4.18: Resilient State Flow Diagram.
From this task model it can be assumed that F < M , and finally that
the same assumptions surrounding the credibility of CLO and CHI , as set
out in Section 4.2.3, still apply.
This section has explored the operation of the resilient scheduler in
each system mode. The following section explores the updates required to
the static schedulability analysis of a resilient system to support scheduler
overheads.
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4.5.2 Resilient Schedulability Analysis Updates for
Overheads
This section explores the updates required to the static schedulability
analysis model presented in [34] in order to support RTOS overheads.
This analysis builds off the equations originally defined in Section 4.2.5.
Normal Mode - As long as JF < F then all tasks are permitted
to execute. However, an additional load must be taken into account to
reflect the fact that a number of high criticality tasks (up to JF ) may
execute up to their CHI . The original equation as presented in [34] is
shown in Equation 4.10.
RFi = LD(R
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Where LD is a multiset which equals the F largest CDF [CHI − CLO]






In order to incorporate the overheads identified in Section 4.2.5, this
equation must be updated accordingly:
RFi = LD(R
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Resilient Mode - While F ≤ JF < M then all tasks are released,
however robust tasks will drop up to Sj jobs. The original schedulability
analysis equation for the Resilient mode is shown in Equation 4.12. This
equation is updated to include overheads in Equation 4.13. In this case δS
and δE must be broken down to ensure that the start and stop overheads






































(CLOj + CSTART + CSTOP )
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(4.13)











High Criticality Mode - Once JF exceeds M , the system reverts
to the high criticality mode, where only high criticality tasks execute.
























































This section has explored how the industrial MCS architecture de-
signed in Section 4.2 can be extended to support a resilient system de-
sign. The following section explores whether the process of clustering
tasks to support efficient system design is still appropriate for this new
scheduler design.
4.5.3 Porting an Existing System to the Resilient
Model
Section 4.4.2 defined the following rules for breaking a task set down into
SuperTasks:
• No SuperTask can contain two tasks of different criticalities. Thus
ensuring the MCS rules surrounding partitioning can be maintained
at the RTOS level.
• The response time of each individual task must be less than the
task’s calculated deadline. The deadline being calculated as defined
in Algorithm 3.
• For each transaction, any task preceding another task should have
a higher priority than the succeeding task.
In order to support a resilient task model the following rule must also
be defined:
• No SuperTask can contain two tasks with different robustness skip
factors (Sj). The SuperTask takes on the robustness skip factor
value of its set of tasks.
This rule ensures that the RTOS and scheduler is able to correctly
control the release of robust tasks.
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The following sections now explore the ability of the clustering algo-
rithms defined in Section 4.4 to porting the existing systems defined in
Section 4.3 to a resilient system. The section then continues to explore
the clustering algorithm’s applicability to a resilient system by using the
same random task set generation technique defined in Section 4.4.8.
As with the previous analysis the overhead figures were measured
using the qualified Rolls-Royce process, and were defined as follows:
• CTICK = 37µs
• CREL = 8µs
• CSTART = 28µs
• CSTOP = 31µs
Throughout this section the number of high criticality overruns the
system must tolerate (F) is set to 10, and the number of high criticality
overruns that must be tolerated while robust tasks skip a job (M) is set to
16. In practice such figures should be chosen to maximise the efficiency
and schedulability of the system under development. However, for the
purpose of providing a level playing field for the analysis that follows
these values were fixed.
4.5.4 Open Source Control System
The open source control system taskset was adopted directly from the
system introduced in Table A.1, however all low criticality tasks were
also treated as robust tasks.
The results from applying the different clustering algorithms to the
open source control system are shown in Tables 4.15 and 4.16. The results
show that for the resilient system the Deadline P clustering technique is
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#SuperTasks Schedulable Tasks Transaction Pass?
NoClustering 75 66.7% Yes
Period 7 62.7% No
Transaction 4 49.3% Yes
Jitter 14 33.3% No
Deadline D 43 88.0% Yes
Deadline P 10 100.0% Yes
Table 4.15: Clustering Results When Applied to the Open Aircraft En-
gine Control Resilient Case Study.
δS δE δT δSUM
NoClustering 4.3% 4.8% 2.7% 11.8%
Period 0.4% 0.4% 1.6% 2.5%
Transaction 2.5% 2.8% 2.2% 7.6%
Jitter 5.1% 5.6% 2.9% 13.7%
Deadline D 1.9% 2.1% 2.0% 6.0%
Deadline P 0.5% 0.5% 1.6% 2.7%
Table 4.16: Clustered Overheads When Applied to the Open Aircraft
Engine Control Resilient Case Study.
again the most appropriate, being the only algorithm able to produce a
schedulable system. In comparison to the same system results obtained
for the AMC system, it can be noted that the overheads increased by
a small amount, which can be directly attributed to the higher RTOS
execution time (CTICK , CREL, CSTART and CSTOP ). This increased over-
head is induced due to the small additional task release and supervision
time that is required to be performed by the RTOS.
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The results reflect the fact that the same clustered task set is produced
for both the AMC and for the resilient scheduling models. This is because
under the AMC model low criticality tasks were broken out into separate
tasks. Now as these same tasks are treated as robust they are still moved
into their own super tasks in the same way. That is, the addition of the
new clustering rule has no effect on this system.
4.5.5 Rolls-Royce Control System
#SuperTasks Schedulable Tasks Transaction Pass?
NoClustering 228 14.5% Yes
Period 17 79.4% No
Transaction 10 7.9% Yes
Jitter 53 31.6% No
Deadline D 171 33.3% Yes
Deadline P 15 100.0% Yes
Table 4.17: Clustering Results When Applied to the Rolls-Royce Re-
silient Case Study - Experiment 1.
For the Rolls-Royce control system; two approaches were followed.
For the first experiment the whole set of low criticality tasks were treated
as robust. The second was a more ambitious approach where as well as
low criticality tasks, a number of high criticality tasks which could be
identified as providing monitoring output, communication, or non volatile
memory accesses were all marked as robust. This produced a system with
approximately 10% of tasks being treated as robust.
As with the open source control system example in the previous sec-
tion; Experiment 1 (results shown in Table 4.17) produced identical re-
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δS δE δT δSUM
NoClustering 19.7% 21.8% 7.1% 48.6%
Period 2.8% 3.1% 2.3% 8.2%
Transaction 4.5% 5.0% 2.8% 12.3%
Jitter 14.7% 16.3% 5.7% 36.6%
Deadline D 13.4% 14.8% 5.3% 33.4%
Deadline P 0.9% 1.0% 1.7% 3.6%
Table 4.18: Clustered Overheads When Applied to the Rolls-Royce Re-
silient Case Study - Experiment 1.
sults to the same system when ported to the AMC model. Once again
this is because robust tasks are treated by the clustering algorithm in the
same way as low DAL tasks. When reviewing the schedulability of the
system it can be seen that the Deadline P algorithm is the only clustering
algorithm able to produce a schedulable system. Given the clustered sys-
tem properties for the resilient system, match those of the AMC system,
these results are as expected.
Table 4.18 shows the RTOS overheads measured for the robust system
once ported to the resilient model. Again in comparison to the AMC
model the overheads have increased slightly. This is to be expected given
the small increase in required RTOS compute time.
The results for the second experimental Rolls-Royce system are shown
in Table 4.19. Before porting this system to the resilient scheduling model
a number of tasks were tagged as robust tasks. These tasks were identified
as robust based on the effect on their operation and the wider system, if
they were to skip a job. This includes, for instance, long-delay memory
accessing tasks or communications tasks.
The clustering results indicate that the number of SuperTasks in each
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clustered system increased for each clustering method, except for the
Transaction based method. This is mirrored with an equivalent increase
in RTOS overheads as shown in Table 4.20. The increase in the num-
ber of clustered tasks can be attributed to the additional robust tasks
which were broken out into new SuperTasks. In the case of the Transac-
tion clustering method - as each transaction exists to regulate and prove
data interactions (according to strict timing requirements), no tasks that
form part of a transaction could be considered as robust. This means
the Transaction clustering method for the resilient system mirrors the
operation of the AMC system.
#SuperTasks Schedulable Tasks Transaction Pass?
NoClustering 228 15.8% Yes
Period 26 82.0% No
Transaction 10 7.9% Yes
Jitter 61 31.1% No
Deadline D 172 33.3% Yes
Deadline P 25 100.0% Yes
Table 4.19: Clustering Results When Applied to the Rolls-Royce Re-
silient Case Study - Experiment 2.
As with the AMC clustered results, the results for the clustered Re-
silient model indicated that only the Deadline P clustering algorithm was
able to produce a schedulable system. These results, combined with the
results from the open source aircraft engine control system example in
Section 4.5.4, indicate that the developed clustering algorithms are also
applicable to the resilient system scheduler. Section 4.5.6 now reapplies
the large scale evaluation to the resilient scheduling model to identify
whether the clustering approaches are still applicable.
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δS δE δT δSUM
NoClustering 19.7% 21.8% 7.1% 48.6%
Period 3.3% 3.7% 2.4% 9.4%
Transaction 4.5% 5.0% 2.8% 12.3%
Jitter 15.2% 16.8% 5.8% 37.8%
Deadline D 13.4% 14.8% 5.3% 33.6%
Deadline P 1.5% 1.7% 1.9% 5.1%
Table 4.20: Clustered Overheads When Applied to the Rolls-Royce Re-
silient Case Study - Experiment 2.
4.5.6 Large Scale Evaluation
In order to further study the applicability of the clustering algorithms in-
troduced throughout this section, the large scale evaluation originally in-
troduced in Section 4.4.8 was reapplied to the resilient scheduling model.
The task set generator was configured using the same process followed
in Section 4.4.8, with the additional step that between 10% and 30% of
tasks were randomly identified as robust tasks. Each task’s robustness
and criticality were treated as independent task parameters.
Figure 4.19 shows the number of schedulable task sets produced for
each clustering algorithm when trying to define a 10, 50 and 100 task
system. The results correlate with the AMC system results, and again
show the Deadline clustering algorithms (in particular the Deadline P al-
gorithm) to be the clustering technique able to obtain the highest number
of schedulable task sets reliably. Overall it can also be noted that the
number of schedulable task sets has reduced compared to the AMC algo-
rithm, as indicated by the real system application in the previous section,
this can be attributed to the addition of extra SuperTasks to support ro-
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Figure 4.19: Schedulability of a 10, 50 and
100 Task System at Varying Target Utilisations.
bust tasks. The result of which leads to higher RTOS overheads in the
produced system.
The results also indicate that the Transaction, Jitter the Period clus-
tering algorithms are further disadvantaged by the introduction of robust
tasks, in all cases the algorithms fare worse than a system without clus-
tering at all.
This section has reapplied the clustering algorithms (designed to port
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an existing non-preemptive system to the AMC pre-emptive system) to
the resilient scheduling model. The aim of the analysis was to provide
confidence that the developed techniques are not unique to, or influenced
by, the AMC system. The results indicate that the approach is also
applicable to the resilient scheduling model, with comparative results
between the two systems being obtained.
4.5.7 Summary
This chapter has aimed to present the development of a MCS to sup-
port industrial applications. The section has discussed the certification
requirements for a MCS system and presented a system design aimed at
complying with such requirements. The developed system utilises tem-
poral and spatial partitioning to achieve separation between different
criticality tasks.
The chapter progressed to discuss how the suggested system could be
developed, including the appropriate assessment of task timing proper-
ties (using the work discussed in Chapter 3) and the analysis of RTOS
overheads. These RTOS overheads are incorporated into an updated set
of static schedulability algorithms. The chapter progressed to assess the
developed system against the certification requirements defined; this re-
view identifies assumptions and key requirements placed on the system
that allows an initial certification safety case to be developed.
Following this system definition the chapter advances to analyse how
an existing system may be ported to the new MCS system. This analysis,
when faced with unacceptable system overheads, identifies an approach
for reducing system overheads through task clustering. Different cluster-
ing techniques are identified according to various task timing properties,
and a comprehensive assessment is presented which identifies the most
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appropriate method. Finally, the system is advanced and extended to
support a resilient scheduling model, in order to assess the approaches
wider applicability.
Ultimately this chapter has presented a mixed criticality system def-
inition, together with an initial approach to support certification. The
newly developed system allows expansion of a Rolls-Royce example sys-
tem to support additional tasks totalling 40% extra utilisation, which
would not have been possible previously.
The approach, which utilises the timing analysis techniques discussed
in Chapter 3, provides a method for developing a system, and for proving
compliance of high criticality tasks against their requirements. However,
the approach lacks the ability to demonstrate adherence of low critical-
ity, or robust, tasks against their temporal requirements. This is because
both scheduling methodologies discussed (the AMC+ and Resilient mod-
els) rely on the ability to deny service to low DAL, or robust tasks, at
certain times. There is currently no process for identifying the length or
frequency of such denied service, and therefore no ability to certify, or
prove, the system as a whole.
Chapter 5 now expands on this shortfall and discusses an approach





Chapter 3 developed a process for identifying the timing properties of a
software task and Chapter 4 built on this work by focusing on the devel-
opment processes for a Mixed Criticality System (MCS). Together these
two chapters provided a process for developing and statically proving the
operation of high DAL tasks within an MCS. This provides the mecha-
nisms required for proving compliance of high DAL tasks against their
timing requirements. However, this work currently does not provide any
process for defining the service provided to low DAL tasks. This chapter
now seeks to fill this gap by exploring how a system integrator may assess
such service.
Regardless of the scheduling methodology employed, the general as-
sumption in the literature is that low DAL components can be denied
service at times of heightened system utilisation. In practice, in a well
designed system this should only occur in extreme cases, if ever. Un-
fortunately, however, this potential lack of service cannot be quantified
without analysing the performance of the integrated system in operation.
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This is because it is not known how many tasks, if any, may execute be-
yond their timing bound within a certain time window without executing
the system in a representative environment. This means it is difficult to
obtain concrete proof that a low DAL component will receive a good
enough level of service to fulfil its mission requirements.
One strategy to combat this in an MCS may be to increase CLO timing
budgets across the system in order to ensure that low DAL components
are ‘never’ denied service. However, the more a task’s CLO increases
towards its CHI ; the less the system is able to benefit from utilising
the CHI pessimism. Furthermore, (unless CLO == CHI) then even this
approach cannot be guaranteed to provide the necessary service in all
cases. The key question to be answered is; how often do tasks exceed
their CLO timing budget? In essence, it is difficult to understand the
performance afforded to low DAL tasks in an MCS without performing
a dynamic assessment in a representative environment.
Several papers have explored approaches aiming to improve low DAL
task support. For example, Jan et al. [28] and Su & Zu [32], looked at
applying the elastic task model, originally proposed by Buttazzo et al.
[29], to an MCS. Rather than de-scheduling all tasks, this model instead
extends the period of low DAL tasks to reduce the utilisation on the sys-
tem, this has also been extended to support graceful degradation by Gill
et al. [33]. In contrast, the so-called imprecise mixed criticality model
[30] reduces low DAL execution budgets in order to improve wider system
performance. This was advanced by Huang et al. [91] with extensions to
support graceful degradation. Additionally, Burns & Baruah [92] reduce
the priority of low DAL tasks as required, effectively executing low DAL
tasks during periods of high system utilisation in system slack time only.
The overriding assumption with all of these approaches is that the
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temporal properties of low DAL tasks can be altered, be it by reducing
service, or execution time, without affecting its overall requirements. In
some cases this may be acceptable. However, this is wholly dependant
on the requirements of the low DAL task, which may require real time
operation.
Chapter 4 introduced the AMC [25] and resilient models [34], as well
as other variants derived from the original Vestal [24] model such as the
Bailout model [27]. All three techniques aim to delay a move to the
high criticality mode until necessary. However, even though the move to
the high DAL mode may be delayed, it still may occur at some point.
The proposed protocols do not offer a way to understand when a move
may occur, or what impact (by way of duration and frequency of loss of
service) this may have on the low DAL, and/or robust, task.
In single criticality systems a number of approaches applicable to en-
suring soft real time task service could also be applied to an MCS. Sys-
tems exploring tasks with m-k (or m-n) firm deadlines [93], [94] provide a
way of formalising the requirements for soft real time (or low criticality)
tasks. The methods suggest ways of prioritising tasks that are approach-
ing a failure in their m-k requirement, either through dynamic methods
[93] or static methods [94]. However, the techniques still represent a best
effort approach, even once tasks approaching m-k requirement errors are
offered greater service, an indication of the quality of service that may
be achieved is not provided.
Weakly hard systems [95] build on similar principals to m-k-firm sys-
tems and offer methods where soft real time tasks can be disabled for
defined periods of time. This type of system has already been extended
to support an MCS based on the AMC model [96]. In this instance, low
criticality tasks are still executed when in the high criticality mode, but
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with reduced service as the tasks are forced to skip a statically defined
number of jobs. This provides a system integrator with the ability to
bound the minimum quality of service afforded to low criticality tasks.
The disadvantage with this approach is that the schedulability analysis
in the high criticality mode must account for a number of low critical-
ity jobs executing, thereby reducing the potential of an MCS to harness
WCET pessimism through exploitation of the difference between CLO
and CHI .
One paper that has attempted to quantify low DAL service is Medina
et al. [97] which defines a probabilistic process for assessing the perfor-
mance of low criticality tasks. This work offers a good example of how
low DAL service could be quantified. However, the paper assumes that
task timing error rates are already known, and does not provide guidance
on how they could be assessed.
In summary, the predominant MCS models available in the literature
concentrate on high DAL task requirements, with the static analysis
showing that in the worst case low DAL tasks will receive no service.
Methods such as expanding low DAL task execution parameters aimed
to improve low DAL task overall service; and the resilient model’s use
of graceful degradation aimed to provide some control on reducing low
DAL task service. However, ultimately, although the previous work of-
fers many ways to help improve low-DAL task performance, it does not
address how to assess this performance and service in a meaningful way
that could be used to support certification.
From an industrial point of view this represents a significant barrier
to the adoption of MCS models in a safety critical context. Should the
low DAL components being integrated still carry some safety related
consequence of failure, for example DAL C components, then the task’s
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compliance to its requirements will still need to be assessed. Even if the
component’s failure cannot affect the safety of the aircraft, in the case
of a DAL E component, then it cannot be assumed the component can
simply be denied service permanently. The component’s operation must
have some useful, mission critical, operation; otherwise it would not have
been developed in the first place. Therefore, it is essential that system
integrators have a process for quantifying the service afforded to low
DAL components. If not for safety, then for business or mission critical
reasons.
This chapter examines how a system integrator may assess the service
afforded to a low DAL task. The aim is to describe a strategy that could
be employed to assess the performance given to a low DAL component in
order to allow an informed decision on system performance to be made.
The process developed, as well as the processes and tooling developed
through Chapters 3 and 4 are then applied to a use case taken from a
Rolls-Royce aircraft engine control system.
5.1 Assessing the Service Afforded to a Low
DAL Task
Regardless of the method chosen to control low DAL or robust tasks the
performance of said tasks is wholly dependant on the actual performance
of the system. Therefore, the process conducted here is based on a statis-
tical assessment of a set of execution results extracted from either a test
rig execution during a system-level test campaign, or from a scheduler
simulation of the system in question. This chapter predominately follows
the results obtained from simulation; the use of which allows a signifi-
cantly larger data set to be compiled. However, ultimately these results
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would be supplemented and improved by results obtained from a full end
to end test campaign when the system is available and integrated. The
statistical assessment would then be repeated on this new results base.
The simulator is designed to be initialised using execution profiles
extracted from the system during task-level testing designed to mimic
system behaviour while in operation [37]. This is in line with the pro-
cess introduced in Chapter 3. This ensures that the execution profiles
provide a realistic representation of the task’s actual performance when
in operation. As an added benefit, the simulation and system provides
the facilities required to perform a ‘what-if’ analysis based on changing
error rates.
The results are then input into a statistical assessment that provides
a measure of confidence in compliance to low DAL component require-
ments, as well as providing an understanding of the probability of failing
to comply. Together these results should allow a system integrator to
make a guided decision on whether the low DAL component’s perfor-
mance is acceptable or not.
The following section introduces a Goal Structuring Notation (GSN)
[35] argument for the approach, as well as providing results from applying
the analysis to an industrial case study integrated into the AMC+ and
resilient models.
5.1.1 Goal Structuring Notation
Within this and the following sections, the process is defined using GSN
[35]. GSN is chosen to present the process introduced in this section as
it represents a widely used and accepted procedure for presenting certi-
fication cases. The principal purpose of a goal structure is to show how
goals (claims about the system) are successively broken down into sub-
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goals until a point is reached where claims can be supported by direct
reference to available evidence (solutions). As part of this decomposition,
using the GSN it is also possible to make clear the argument strategies
adopted (e.g. adopting a quantitative or qualitative approach), the ra-
tionale for the approach (assumptions, justifications) and the context in
which goals are stated (e.g. the system scope or the assumed operational
role). The GSN arguments in this section use Goals (G), Assumptions
(A), Statements (St) and Solutions (S) [35].
Figure 5.1 shows the principal GSN argument for the approach. The
principal goal (G0) that the service provided to each low DAL task is
sufficient, is analysed using a statistical analysis of results obtained by a
simulation of the system.
The strategy for the analysis is broken down into four key sub goals,
as follows:
• G1 - Specification - The requirement for the low DAL task can be
expressed in a form that allows assessment.
• G2 - Evaluation - The simulation output provides an understanding
of the likelihood of an error.
• G3 - Confidence - The simulation has obtained sufficient coverage
of the system.
• G4 - Validation - The simulation is a valid representation of a real
system.
Ultimately these goals are designed to form a circular argument.
Should the service afforded to each low criticality task prove to be unac-
ceptable, when assessed against G1, then steps G2 and G3 are designed
to be easily repeatable to allow efficient system update. Given that the
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Figure 5.1: Goal Structured Notation Argument for the Overall Low
DAL Requirement.
process is built around a representative simulation of the system (as as-
sessed by G4), this repetitive process can be performed at an early, cost
effective point in the design life-cycle.
To support this process the following assumptions have been made
about the wider system:
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• The occurrence of an individual task overrun is very rare. Ratio-
nale: The defined CLO for each task, representing the computation
time beyond which a task would register a fault, has been generated
from an extensive testing regime and carries with it a high level
of confidence. However, being derived from a simple measurement
technique it should still be assumed to be optimistic. Very rare as-
sumes to be less than 1 in 10,000 task invocations
• Individual task overruns are independent and are not reliant on the
current operation of the control system. Rationale: an overrun is
an event unique to each task, and not a systematic event caused
by an operation at the system level. For example, response to an
engine fault condition.
• Task overruns can be assumed to be independent of hardware oper-
ation. Rationale: The system is designed to be resilient to external
hardware failures. Secondly, the target processor design is compli-
ant with DO-254 recommendations as a high criticality device, and
has been designed to be resilient against sources of error, such as
Single Event Upset.
The following sections now describe each of these goals in more detail.
5.1.2 Specification
In order to assess the service required for a low DAL, or robust, task to
execute against its requirements, it is important to specify the problem
appropriately. The first requirement for a task to be considered as low
DAL is that the task must be able to skip one, or even all, of its jobs
without affecting the safety of the overall system.
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For a task to be considered robust, but high DAL, in the resilient
model; it is necessary for the task to be able to miss S jobs, with S being
the task’s job skip parameter.
The process proposed in this thesis uses a scheduler simulator. The
simulator takes as input a set of timing profiles for each task, generated
through the process identified in Chapter 3. The simulator acts as the
scheduler, randomly selecting an execution for the highest priority ready
task from the task’s timing profile. The simulator then advances a record
of the current time to the lower of either the next task release time, or
to the completion time of the highest priority task.
Using this simulator (which executes approximately 10 times faster
than real processor time) repeated combinations of task execution times
can be examined to measure the service received by each low DAL task.
The simulator outputs the time measured between each individual job
skip burst. A job skip burst is defined as a successive set of job skips,
that does not stretch over the idle task.
Each low DAL, or robust task, requirement should then define two
parameters to allow requirement testing:
• The maximum permissible length of a job skip burst. In other
words, the maximum allowed number of jobs that can be skipped
consecutively.
• The minimum time between each job skip burst.
Crucially, the definition of the required job skip intervals should be
accompanied by a safety assessment which identifies a chance or fre-
quency, of failure that may be deemed acceptable. A failure being when
the task fails to comply with its requirements. This level of failure can
then be used throughout the Evaluation (discussed in the following sec-
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tion) to support an engineering judgement on what may or may not be
acceptable.
5.1.3 Evaluation
Once the specification to be assessed has been properly defined, the next
step in the process is to analyse the results obtained by the scheduler
simulator to understand the probability of failing to comply with the low
DAL task’s requirements. This aims to provide a real measure that can
be used to make a decision on whether the service given to the low DAL
task is acceptable or not.
Figure 5.2 shows the process for understanding the probability of the
low DAL task suffering a timing requirement error. Goal G2 is split
into two parts. The first is an assessment based on the observed perfor-
mance of the system (G5, G6), and the second is a statistical inference
to understand the exceedance probability of the sample (G7).
Are we confident the requirement will be complied with?
Goals G5 and G6 examine the full range of results obtained from the
simulator. The target is to review whether the spread of job skip interval
times provide confidence that requirement will be complied with in a
significant majority of cases.
Goal G5 advocates the use of box plot diagrams to allow a visual
assessment of the median and inter-quartile range of job skip times. To
provide confidence it should be confirmed that any times close to the
requirement are outliers, and do not represent a substantial percentage
of the results obtained from the simulator.
Secondly, Goal G6 uses a percentile test to provide a statistical mea-
sure indicating where the majority of results reside. Again any times
close to the requirement should be confirmed as in the minority.
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Figure 5.2: Goal Structured Notation Argument Exploring the Probabil-
ity Assessment of the Requirement.
Ultimately, the aim of this assessment is to identify whether periods
of time when the low DAL tasks are disabled are acceptably infrequent
according to the Specification.
How frequently will we fail to comply with the requirement?
In line with Goal G7; once an evaluation has been performed to pro-
vide confidence that breaches of the requirement are rare, the next step
is to attempt to quantify the actual probability of breaking the require-
ment.
Understanding the probability of breaking the requirement is assessed
in one of two ways. If the requirement has been broken during testing,
then the probability of this exceedance is estimated using an Empirical
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Cumulative Distribution Function (ECDF), in line with Goal G8. How-
ever, if the requirement has not been broken then the exceedance proba-
bility is estimated using an extreme value theory on a fitted distribution
of job skips, in line with Goal G9.
Goal G8 assumes that enough information (i.e. enough requirement
compliance failures) has been provided by the simulation to fit a dis-
tribution and to read a result directly from the fitted distribution. If
the simulation does not provide enough information to perform this as-
sessment (i.e. there are insufficient failures to provide confidence in a
directly read result), then G9 performs a statistical inference using the
fitted distribution that aims to assess the tail of the distribution to un-
derstand the potential exceedance. This is read by assessing the job skip
frequency.
5.1.4 Confidence
An evaluation of the results, as discussed in the previous section, can
only be trusted if we can have confidence that the statistical analysis
is performed across a significantly large sample that represents the real
performance of the system. Goal G3 seeks to confirm this is the case and
aims to understand whether enough testing has taken place.
Figure 5.3 shows the extension to Goal G3. This goal is fulfilled by
ensuring the simulation executes for long enough to indicate that most
execution time variations have been observed (G10), and that further
exploration of the search space does not reveal new results (G11).
Has the simulation executed for long enough?
Goal G10 is concerned with understanding whether a single simula-
tion executes for long enough, and is supported by an assessment that
reviews whether continued simulation reveals any additional differences
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Figure 5.3: Goal Structured Notation Argument Exploring the Confi-
dence of the Analysis.
or significant differences in the distribution. This is important to un-
derstand as it helps build the argument that the statistical analysis is
performed across a fully representative set of execution profiles. This is
tested by reviewing the minimum time between job skips (G16, S6), as
well as the confidence interval (G17, S7) and the mean (G18, S8). In all
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cases the aim of the assessment is to review whether, as the simulation
continues, the results have converged.
Does a large scale evaluation reveal different results?
Goal G11 is concerned with understanding whether a large scale eval-
uation over a large number of simulations produces a similar result to
that of a single simulation. This aims to provide further confidence that
the search space has been explored sufficiently. The goal confirms firstly
whether the analysis is repeatable when a large scale simulation is per-
formed, and secondly that the results from multiple short simulations
create a combined result equivalent to one long simulation.
Goal G11 is supported by an equivalence test of the job skip dis-
tributions over 100 (independently seeded) executions of the simulator
using both a χ2 distribution test (G13) and an Earth Movers Distribu-
tion (EMD) test (G14). In both cases the simulation from the first test
is used for comparison against the other 99. Secondly, G15 claims that
when two short simulations are appended together they provide equiv-
alent results to one long simulation. This analysis also uses the χ2 and
EMD equivalence tests.
The χ2 distribution equivalence test provides an assessment of whether
the two simulation distributions have been formed from the same master
distribution. That is, are the two distributions independent, or equiv-
alent to one another. The use in this context allows the assessment to
confirm that a repeat of the simulation yields the same or equivalent re-
sults. The EMD test is so called based on an analogy of how it operates.
The question posed by the test is given two mounds of earth, or soil, how
much soil needs to be moved from one mound to the other before the two
mounds are equivalent. Used alongside the χ2 test, the statistic provides




The process so far has focused on a simulation of the system. This is
advantageous as the simulation can provide a much larger data set to
analyse than is possible from execution on a real system test rig. Sec-
ondly, the results can be generated much faster than possible on real
hardware. However, it is important to review the results, and the simu-
lator, to ensure they reflect a valid representation of the real system.
Figure 5.4: Goal Structured Notation Argument Exploring the Correct-
ness of the Analysis.
Figure 5.4 extends the GSN argument and examines how the analysis
provides representative results of the actual system performance. The
goal has two steps. Firstly, it confirms that the initial simulation is con-
figured with representative timing profiles. Secondly, the goal is verified
using real results obtained from test rig operation (G22).
Is the simulation configured correctly?
Goal G21 concerns the input timing profiles used to generate the
simulator results. As noted in the introduction to this section, the initial
simulation should be set up using a set of task timing profiles generated
through task-level execution in a representative environment, as detailed
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further in Chapter 3. These timing profiles provide a representative set
of results for the scheduler simulation to randomly iterate over.
Once a full system test rig campaign has been completed, the results
from the real system should be used to both improve the simulator and to
compliment the simulation produced results in order to improve accuracy.
This full system test campaign is expected to provide a significantly larger
set of results to boost confidence in the statistical analysis, arguably
approaching a point where the simulation may not be required. However,
these results would be expected to take significantly longer to generate,
and would be provided at a time in the software design life-cycle too late
to allow for cost effective improvement.
One risk with this approach is that the test rig campaign may indicate
the simulation is flawed. This is a significant risk with any approach
utilising a simulator and is in this case unavoidable. Nevertheless, the
risks are mitigated by the fact that, as is frequently the case, the software
project contains a number of legacy components for whom timing data
should exist. The risk is further mitigated by an assumption that the
simulation can be refined as soon as software testing begins rather than
waiting for its completion. The key is that the simulation provides an
easy environment for fast and efficient whole system (repeated) analysis.
Does real world execution match the simulation?
The second step to understanding if the results represent the real sys-
tem is to compare a set of the produced simulation results against results
obtained from the real system to ensure that they are both sufficiently
similar. To do this, a subset of test rig results should be used to repeat
the distribution analysis conducted to confirm Goal G11 in Figure 5.3.
This is in order to verify that the sub-set of test rig results produce a
similar distribution to the super-set of simulation results.
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5.1.6 Summary
This section has presented a process for assessing the service provided to a
low DAL task within an MCS. The process utilises a scheduler simulator,
seeded with real system parameters, to perform an extensive statistical
analysis of potential system execution profiles. The next section now
applies the process to an industrial case study to examine how the process
performs against both the AMC+ and resilient scheduling models.
5.2 Industrial System Use Case Applica-
tion
This section now presents the results from applying the process for assess-
ing low DAL service introduced in the previous section to a Rolls-Royce
use case taken from the existing system introduced in Section 2.
5.2.1 Simulator Configuration
To facilitate this assessment the following process was followed for defin-
ing execution profiles:
• The Rolls-Royce aircraft engine control system task set introduced
in Chapter 2, and ported to a mixed criticality system in Chapter
4, was imported into the scheduler simulator introduced in this
chapter. Both the AMC+ and resilient models were implemented.
• The RTOS overheads for each scheduler implemented were mea-
sured using the process defined in Chapter 4. The overheads were
measured as the system executed on the Rolls-Royce in-house pro-
cessor.
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• The system test High Water Marks (HWM) and analysed WCETs
were used for CLO and CHI respectively.
• The timing profiles provided from Chapter 3 were used to generate
a ‘rate of timing fault’ as follows: for the BCHLr fitness function
the 95% measured execution time was treated as CLO, with the
number of times the fitness function obtained a time greater than
95% of the maximum measured execution time treated as a fault.
This counter was then used to produce the ‘rate of timing fault’ for
each task.
• On each release of a task the ‘rate of timing fault’ was used by
the pseudo-random simulator to choose the job’s execution time.
If no fault was selected for this invocation, then a random number
between the tasks Best Case Execution Time (BCET) and CLO
was chosen. Otherwise, if a fault was selected a random number
between the task’s CLO and CHI was used.
• In order to ensure these execution profiles did not adversely skew
the obtained results, or process; a high ‘rate of timing fault’ profile
and low ‘rate of timing fault’ profile were also created. These were
calculated as 10*[rate of fault] and 0.1*[rate of fault] respectively.
The simulator was executed on a high performance server in order
to build up a comprehensive set of results. The execution time of each
task was output by the simulator, as was information on whether a task
executes, or is blocked. This data was analysed to measure the time
between low criticality, or robust task job skips. A single execution sim-
ulates thirty minutes of scheduler time.
This section now progresses to examine the use case in detail. The
Specification for the use case is defined, before an Evaluation of its
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low DAL task service and an argument surrounding Confidence in the
simulation is built. At this time as system level test results and timing
profiles are not available, Validation of the digital twinning simulation
approach is left to future work.
5.2.2 Non-Volatile Memory Access
In order to provide a secure record of engine performance, the control
system regularly writes system parameters to flash memory. While non-
volatile and secure, the time taken to write to this flash memory is con-
siderable, with the task’s execution time being directly proportional to
the amount of data being written. Therefore, the amount of data written
to the data store is minimised as far as possible; essentially its WCET is
restricted. However, in order to support future design and maintenance
goals, it is desirable to reduce this limitation.
The control system contains a periodic task responsible for writing
data to flash memory. This task reads from a memory buffer written
to by other tasks, before copying the buffer to the flash memory. At
present the task is developed as a high DAL component and treated as
a hard real time task. However, the task could more easily be designed
to execute for longer, with an assumption that it may periodically drop
jobs. Secondly, as the flash memory records are not used during flight,
but instead for maintenance, the task could be developed against lower
criticality processes. This assumes the necessary protection mechanisms
are put in place, as defined in Chapter 4, to protect the wider system.
The flash memory task has been ported into the Rolls-Royce system
discussed in Chapter 4, where it is treated as a robust low DAL task.
The schedulability analysis for the control system was updated, while
the period of the flash memory task was decreased, and the execution
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time increased. Overall this increased the permissible utilisation of the
task by a factor of 60. This increase was only permitted thanks to the
MCS’s exploitation of the difference between the analysed (sound, safe
and pessimistic) WCET used for the CHI and the (test measured, robust
but potentially optimistic) system test measured high water mark time
used for each task’s CLO.
The system was implemented using both the AMC+ and the re-
silient models. In both cases the task set was clustered using the Dead-
line P clustering technique. The AMC modelled system was shown to be
schedulable in the low DAL mode, high DAL mode and during a mode
change from the low to high modes. The resilient model was shown to be
schedulable in the low DAL, fail robust (F-mode), fail resilient (M-mode)
and high DAL modes; as well as the transitions between each mode, as
defined by the robust model [34].
The following subsections now explore the service provided to the
Non-Volatile Memory (NVM) task, following the process defined in Sec-
tion 5.1.
5.2.2.1 Specification
The newly configured flash memory task is designed to continuously write
data when called to do so. If the task misses an execution then it will
simply resume writing to memory from the next entry in the memory
buffer. The principal requirement is that the memory buffer does not
overflow; and so the task is designed to write more data than necessary
on each invocation. This means that following a period of reduced service
the task is able to progress back to normal operation provided it has time
to recover.
The following assumptions surrounding the task have been defined
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for this analysis:
• Due to the task’s increased execution time, if given full service the
task is capable of writing data to flash memory at a faster rate than
the reporting tasks can write data to the shared memory buffer.
• The shared memory buffer is sufficiently large to allow the flash
memory task to skip up to four jobs.
• Once the flash memory task skips a burst of up to four jobs, the
task must execute the following four jobs for at least CLO, in order
to ensure no data is lost.
• Data loss is highly undesirable, but does not affect the safety of the
system.
Therefore, the overriding requirement for analysis is that each time
the flash memory task suffers a job skip burst, it should have a clear
period of at least four successful executions before it can skip a job again.
If the task skips a job in less time, the task is said to have suffered an
error. The task period itself is 12.5ms; therefore the basic requirements
for the task can be defined as follows:
Definition 5.1. A flash memory task error is recorded when the task
suffers two separate bursts of job skips within 50ms.
Definition 5.2. A flash memory task error is recorded when the task
suffers more than four consecutive job skips within a job skip burst.
The NVM task is treated as a robust low criticality task. So when
executed using the AMC model, the task will be instantly disabled when
the system moves to the high DAL mode. In the resilient model the task
will skip up to four jobs when in the Resilient Mode. The task is then
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disabled fully when in the high DAL mode. The static schedulability
for the system, using both models, was confirmed using the processes
discussed in Chapter 4.
5.2.2.2 Evaluation
The case study for the Non-Volatile memory access use case was config-
ured inside the scheduler simulator and tested against both the AMC+
and resilient models. The analysis was applied three times using the low,
medium and high fault rates as introduced in Section 5.1.
Are we confident the requirement will be complied with?
Figure 5.5 shows the range of results obtained during one simulation
of the NVM Case Study executing inside the AMC model with the high
fault rate timing profile set. The main aim of reviewing the figure is to
assess how far from the minimum requirement the majority of the inter-
quartile range lies. In particular, to provide confidence; the majority of
results should lie well above the requirement.
To further understand the extreme values in the simulation a per-
centile test is then applied to the full set of 100 simulation results ob-
tained in Section 5.3. The results provide an assessment of the extreme
minimum values obtained during simulation, as well as a measure of how
close to the minimum requirement the majority of results lie. For ex-
ample, the 0.1% percentile indicates how many results lie in the bottom
0.1% of the simulation results, showing a result expected at a frequency
of 1 in every 1000 results.
The percentile test results for the NVM case study are shown in Table
5.1. The results indicate that, for all task timing profiles, the AMC
scheduling method produced systems that would be expected to fail to
comply with its NVM temporal requirements at a rate of 1 in every 200
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Figure 5.5: Box Plot Diagrams Showing the Range of Job Skip Interval
Times, With a Zoomed-Plot on the Right Around the Minimum Require-
ment (AMC High Failure Rate).
times (based on the 0.5% outlier). The resilient scheduling model results
however indicate that with the high error profile, the minimum time
between job skips was measured as 150 seconds, well within the 50ms
requirement. For the medium and low error profiles executing within the
resilient scheduling model, no task job skips were observed.
How frequently will we fail to comply with the requirement?
To assess Goal G8 and Goal G9, the results of one simulation (for each
scheduler mode and timing profile) was fitted to an exponential distribu-
tion in order to produce a continuous distribution for analysis. Figure 5.6
shows a histogram summarising results randomly selected from this fitted
distribution, against a set of results randomly selected from the actual
distribution. This figure shows a profile taken from the AMC high fault
rate. This fitted distribution when compared to the original distribution
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%
Time Between Job Skips
AMC Resilient
High Med Low High Med Low
0.1% 10.2ms 10.9ms 17.5ms 150s - -
0.5% 10.6ms 12.0ms 33.6ms 154s - -
2.5% 11.6ms 24.5ms 124ms 168s - -
Table 5.1: Percentile Outlier Assessment for the NVM Case Study.
provided a significance result of χ2(12, n = 275) = 35.7, p < 0.011. It
therefore indicated that the fitted distribution and actual distribution
are both taken from the same population.
Reviewing the other simulation models and timing profiles; the results
for each simulation were fitted to an exponential distribution, which was
used to assess the probability of a requirement failure. These results are
shown in Table 5.2. Secondly, Table 5.3 indicates the rate of failure for
each distribution. This is based on the number of job skips observed
during 109 second timeframe, as obtained from a fitted distribution of
job skip intervals.
A number of observations can be made from these results. Firstly,
reviewing the analysis technique, the resilient model does not provide a
high job skip rate. This in turn means the fitted distributions are applied
using less data, reducing their validity. Conversely though, the fact the
resilient models observe less failures provides a positive indication that
the initial design provides sufficient service for the NVM task. At this
1χ2 results throughout this thesis are denoted using the following terminology -
χ2([degrees of freedom], n = [number of samples)] = [result ]), [statistical significance].
If the statistical significance (or p value) is less than 0.01, then the two compared dis-
tributions can be said to from the same population; that is they are not independent.
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Figure 5.6: Histogram Illustrating the Difference in Results Randomly
Selected From a Fitted Distribution and an Actual Distribution.
point in the design, as the simulation is based upon generated timing
profiles, continuation of the simulation in an attempt to obtain further
task failures would not necessarily offer further benefit. This question
is explored further in the next section as Confidence surrounding the
simulation search space is assessed. As the Validity of the approach is
explored, and the generated profiles are combined with actual profiles
obtained from a system test campaign, it is expected that the simulation
would be repeated and extended to aim to provide further confidence in
the design.
While the results generated should be considered in the context that






High Med Low High Med Low
50ms 53.4% 7.5% 0.69% 0% 0% 0%
60ms 61.4% 9.3% 0.87% 0% 0% 0%
70ms 68.1% 11% 1.04% 0% 0% 0%
80ms 73.5% 12.7% 1.2% 0% 0% 0%
90ms 78.1% 14.4% 1.4% 0% 0% 0%
100ms 81.9% 16% 1.6% 0% 0% 0%
1s 100% 85.3% 16% 0% 0% 0%
2s 100% 97.9% 29.7% 0% 0% 0%
Table 5.2: Exceedance Probability from a Fitted Distribution of Simula-
tion Results for the NVM Case Study.
High Med Low
AMC 15981 1901 175
Resilient 1.4 0 0
Table 5.3: Failure Rate Assessed from Extended Simulation. Number of
Failures per 109s for the NVM Case Study.
that the use of graceful degradation in the resilient model has a signifi-
cant effect on the rate of requirement failure. During simulation it was
observed that while it is frequently the case that one task may overrun, it
is rarely the case that multiple tasks overrun. This means that the AMC
model, that switches to the high criticality mode after a single task has
overrun, is severely disadvantaged.
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5.2.2.3 Confidence
Now an evaluation of the simulation results has been performed, the next
step is to confirm whether the simulation has performed a valid search of
the possible result space - in essence; will further testing reveal additional
results?
Has the simulation executed for long enough?
Confidence in the results is assessed by confirming convergence, and
secondly by reviewing multiple executions of each simulation to ensure
the results showed equivalence. Tables 5.4 and 5.5 show the Minimum
and Mean time observed during this assessment, and following conver-
gence, between job skips in each setup. In all cases the results converge
around these values, as is illustrated by Figures 5.7 and 5.8, which shows
the results from one execution of the simulator for the AMC high error
profile. The figure illustrates the variation in the confidence interval,
mean and minimum as the simulation progresses. The results show that
despite a significant amount of variability initially, the confidence interval
(the range within which there is 95% confidence that the mean resides
within) converges to less than 1ms. The mean and minimum converge
to 62.4ms and 9.5ms2 respectively. The key to analysing these plots is
to identify whether the simulation results are changing as the simulation
continues, or in essence do the results indicate that further exploration
does not reveal any new or different results.
Tables 5.4 and 5.5 show how the decreasing task fault rate affects
the AMC protocol, with the mean time between errors increasing signifi-
2This means the minimum time observed between job skips was actually less than
the task’s period. This was found to be due to task release and completion jitter
thanks to the variation in execution time of higher priority tasks, some of which have
longer periods.
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Figure 5.7: Changes in Mean (top) and Minimum (bottom) of the Time
Between Job Skip Bursts Over Simulation Time.
Figure 5.8: Changes in Confidence Interval of the Time Between Job
Skip Bursts Over Simulation Time.
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High Med Low
AMC 9.6ms 9.8ms 14.2ms
Resilient 32,012ms X X
Table 5.4: Minimum Time Between Requirement Errors For The Non-
Volatile Memory Access Case Study.
High Med Low
AMC 62.4ms 504.9ms 5,328.2ms
Resilient 250,392ms X X
Table 5.5: Mean Time Between Requirement Errors For The Non-Volatile
Memory Access Case Study.
cantly, reducing the probability of breaches of compliance of the require-
ment. However, even with a low error rate the AMC model still produces
a system where a time between job skip bursts of approximately 14.2ms
can be observed.
The resilient model however, when using the same task timing pro-
files, produces a system where the time between job skips is significantly
higher. In the case of the Medium and Low error profiles, the simula-
tor did not observe a requirement error; while the resilient model with a
high task fault rate observed Minimum and Mean times between require-
ment errors of approximately 4000 times lower than the same failure rate
observed with the AMC model.
Reviewing the technique used for assessing low DAL task service;
in order to identify whether the simulation of the resilient model ever
observes a requirement error, the simulation was repeated for a longer
period of time (equating to approximately 900 minutes of processor time).
Again the simulator did not observe a job skip at all during this time.
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Indeed, it was confirmed that for both the medium and low timing profiles
executing within the resilient model that the model did not enter the
resilient mode, let alone the high DAL mode.
Does a large scale evaluation reveal different results?
Figure 5.9: Comparison of EMD over 1000 Simulations.
Figure 5.9 shows the EMD result from executing 1000 simulations.
In each case each simulation’s distribution was randomly sampled using
different sample sizes of the set (1%, 5%, 10%, 20%, 40%, 60%, 80%,
100%) of the length of the distribution. This randomly sampled set was
then compared, using an EMD test, to a randomly selected distribution
of the same length taken from the first simulation. As can be seen from
Figure 5.9 the larger the chosen sample, the closer the two randomly
selected distributions. Secondly, the results are shown to converge as
more data is appended to the sample.
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Furthermore, the distribution of the first simulation was fitted to an
exponential distribution in order to produce an expected distribution to
test against (fitted with χ2(12, n = 275) = 34, p < 0.01). Each of the
other 999 distributions produced by the simulations were then compared
to this fitted distribution using a χ2 distribution equivalence test; which
showed each simulation was produced from the same population (mean
result - χ2(12, n = 275) = 32.5, p < 0.01).
5.2.2.4 Process Review
These results have indicated that the NVM task can be implemented
inside the Rolls-Royce system profiled in this thesis. The analysis con-
ducted allowed the task’s permissible execution time to be expanded by
a factor of 60, with the timing profiles and simulation providing an initial
indication of the failure rate to be expected for the task.
Reviewing the approach in general; one risk is that some of the statis-
tical methods used (for example extreme value theory) assume that the
input statistical profile is independent and identically distributed. It is
necessary to perform further work to assess that this is indeed the case
with the generated timing profiles. In the meantime to reduce the risk of
this approach the preferred option would be to infer results directly from
the generated simulation profile. Following on from Goal G7 (Figure
5.10) the preferred solutions would be S3 and S4, rather than solution
S5.
The next steps in the process for assessing this case study would be to
update the simulation based on results obtained from a real system test
campaign, as well as assessing the service received by the task directly
inside the integrated system. Whether the task receives appropriate ser-
vice would then have to be assessed from a safety, and mission critical
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Figure 5.10: Assessing the Probability of Failure.
point of view. This would require the probability of failure (the risk)
being played off against the consequence of failure.
5.3 Summary
This chapter has defined a process that may be applied to assess the
service afforded to a low criticality task in an MCS. The process uses a
scheduler simulator to feed a statistical analysis which aims to provide a
rate of failure for each low criticality task. This result can then be used
to assess compliance to requirements, and ultimately provide a level of
confidence that the task’s temporal requirements will be met. Crucially,
the process is designed to be performed early in a design lifecycle to allow
for fast and efficient redesign if necessary. As project maturity builds,
the statistical analysis can be seeded with execution time distributions
obtained from system test results to refine and build confidence in the
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produced results.
The process has been applied to the system developed in Chapter 4,
and is designed to use the results output from the analysis introduced in
Chapter 3. A use case, provided by the real industrial system discussed
in Chapter 2, was analysed against the approach to attempt to assess
its applicability. The analysis, applied across two different scheduling
models with three different timing profiles, was able to provide a failure
rate where task job skips has been observed. For the systems that ex-
hibited lower task job skip rates, the statistical analysis process provided
less indicative results. However, this in itself is a positive result for the
resilient scheduling system tested.
The next steps for this analysis would be to extend the process with
results obtained from a comprehensive system test programme, the aim
being to build confidence in the failure rates observed.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions and Future Work
The motivation for this work comes from a desire to reduce software cost
through the introduction of improved tools and processes to increase
software development efficiency. The key focus of this thesis centred on
the development and proof of mixed criticality systems to achieve this
aim.
Mixed criticality systems and mixed criticality scheduling techniques
offer the potential to better utilise processor hardware by capitalising
on WCET pessimism; and allow the use of cost effective appropriately
levelled software development processes. However, a number of open
problems exist which block the adoption of MCS technology. These in-
clude how to effectively analyse the timing performance of tasks within
such a system, how to develop and certify systems and how to prove the
service provided to low DAL tasks. This thesis has aimed to address these
issues. Crucially, the work has been tested on a real full scale industrial
system without simplification. The following sections now discuss the
work completed within this thesis.
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6.1 Review of Work Completed
Chapter 1 reviewed the issues currently faced by software developers and
set the scene for the improvements assessed in this thesis. In particular
it outlined that safety critical software applications are expensive to de-
velop, in some cases to such a point that innovation and advancement are
impacted. Current development methods rely on systems developed to
the same criticality. This increases development costs as some software
components are developed against stricter standards than necessary. Fur-
thermore, timing analysis processes can be expensive to perform, while
providing pessimistic results too late in the design lifecycle. These pes-
simistic results, while often necessary for safety, are not appropriately
accommodated by current scheduling techniques.
Chapter 2 introduced an example industrial system, used throughout
the following chapters for testing the developed research. This system
was taken from a live industrial project. The application of the real time
system research developed throughout this thesis to this real industrial
example forms one of the contributions of this work. Which represents,
to the best of the author’s knowledge, one of the first examples discussing
the application of this technology to a system of this scale.
Chapter 3 focused on the assessment of the timing properties of tasks
within a system. Reviewing the existing literature reveals that current
processes and practices for measurement, or hybrid based WCET analy-
sis, assume that test data to support analysis is already present. Whereas
existing methods of automatic test case generation, to a certain extent,
assume that the WCET will be stumbled upon. The work in this thesis
suggested that the combination of the two processes would produce a
sound method for analysis.
This led to one of the core contributions of the chapter; the develop-
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ment of a series of fitness functions based not on previous techniques for
automatic software execution, but on an understanding of the require-
ments for hybrid measurement based WCET analysis. The new fitness
functions focus on confidence (in the form of coverage), and not on ex-
ecution times observed. The algorithms were tested against a series of
industrial examples, as well as a set of academic benchmarks, and were
shown to provide superior results to the previously accepted methods.
The key output of the tooling in this section is a method for generating
timing properties and profiles for each task within a system, that allows
the system proof in later chapters to be performed.
Chapter 4 progresses to review MCS development. A review of the
current work in the field of MCSs reveals that while much work has been
performed on the development of scheduling methodologies, there has
been less work on the side of system configuration to support certification.
The chapter reviews the certification requirements for a MCS, before
presenting the design for an architecture aiming to provide the temporal
and spatial partitioning required to support timing efficient development
of a MCS for a high/low criticality avionics application. This, together
with appropriate processes for handling scheduler overheads, forms one
of the contributions of this chapter.
The chapter then examines how an existing system may be ported
into the new MCS architecture. The process reviews the temporal re-
quirements of the system in question, which includes a complex task set
interlaced with jitter, transactional and periodic requirements. This led
to the development of a legacy system porting process. The porting pro-
cess, which aims to define a schedulable system with minimal overheads,
takes each requirement into account automatically to help define the final
system. This forms the second contribution of the chapter. The process
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defined is assessed against two industrial examples before being applied
to a large scale randomised assessment.
Finally, Chapter 5 brings together the WCET assessment work in
Chapter 3 with the MCS design effort in Chapter 4 to present an ap-
proach for assessing the service provided to low criticality tasks. The
need for the work is identified from an assessment of the available litera-
ture, which found significant gaps around how to gain an understanding
of the performance of low criticality tasks within an MCS. The approach,
which forms the principal contribution of the chapter, relies on a statis-
tical assessment of the results produced by a scheduler simulator. The
simulator was fed with the analysis results from Chapter 3 and the sched-
uler configuration information obtained from Chapter 4. Ultimately, the
process defined is discussed in the context of a real industrial case study
taken from the system introduced in Chapter 2.
6.2 Future Work
The work discussed in this thesis has been targeted at application on an
industrial project, and has been tested as such. However, there remains
future work required before such a system could be used for certification
on a live project.
The analysis in Chapter 3 has at time of writing been advanced the
furthest towards application on an industrial project, and has provided
timing results to support certification. However, at present this work has
focused on deterministic architectures, using the processor introduced in
Chapter 2. Lesage et al. looked at whether the fitness functions devel-
oped in this thesis could be scaled to a whole system [67]. Lesage found
that the approach was scaleable, however future work on this subject
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would benefit from looking at more advanced architectures, or fitness
function combinations. In particular whether any advanced processor
features, such as caches, could be used to better target the generation of
measurement based timing analysis profiles.
This requirement to review the approaches applicability to more ad-
vanced architectures can also be extended to the work discussed in Chap-
ters 4 and 5. Focusing on a real industrial processor has allowed an in-
depth analysis of a real system to be conducted. However, this approach
does carry the risk that the work presented in this thesis is targeted, or
focused, on this one processing platform. While this is a real industrial
platform of the type used across industry, it is still important that future
work focuses on identifying whether any assumptions made through this
thesis need to be reexamined.
The system introduced in Chapter 4 has targeted development us-
ing fixed priority schedulers. Such schedulers were chosen based on the
requirement for ease of verification and understanding. The chapter hy-
pothesises that the clustering and partitioning designs introduced would
be applicable to dynamic priority systems, such as those utilising earli-
est deadline first schedulers. However, no work has been undertaken to
support this hypothesis; it is at present left to future work.
Additionally, the assessment of RTOS overheads assumes an easy
to verify RTOS, executing upon a deterministic processor. The first
assumption is perhaps valid given safety critical applications. However,
as software requirements grow, assessment of RTOS overheads on less
deterministic processors may need to be addressed. The work in chapter
4 is clear in its requirement that the overheads are either assessed or
bounded. So purely bounded overheads may help this future requirement;
however it could also be a source of pessimism in the approach.
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Chapter 5 presented an approach for validating low critically task
service using a system scheduler. One key point of future work identified
by the chapter is that the process of validating the scheduler simulator
itself is currently left to future work. The process requires a full set of
results produced by the work in Chapter 3 and the full set of results
produced by an end to end software test campaign. At time of writing
such results are not available for assessment.
Finally, the statistical assessment presented in Chapter 5 assumes
that task job failures, or overruns, are independent and identically dis-
tributed. In the system explored in this thesis this can be said to be the
case. However, for systems where this may not be the case the statistical
assessment may need to be expanded. This is at present left to future
work.
6.3 Final Remarks
The central proposition of this thesis is:
Automatic test case generation techniques can be extended to reli-
ably target hybrid measurement based timing analysis to produce sound
WCET profiles. These produced WCET profiles can then be used to aid
the development and validation of mixed criticality schedulers, provided
the certification objectives, overheads of the scheduler, and the service
provided to low criticality tasks are not neglected.
This thesis has shown that appropriately targeted search algorithms
can be used to guide measurement based WCET analysis. This assertion
is backed up by the analysis conducted in this thesis, but also by the
work conducted by Lesage [67] which used the approach to analyse a full
aircraft engine control system on a parallel project to the system used in
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this thesis.
A Mixed Criticality System design has been presented, developed to
comply with certification objectives to support full start to end system
development. An existing system has been ported to this new architec-
ture (without simplification or modification).
This scheduler design has since been ported into the new Rolls-Royce
software architecture. At this time, the scheduler will not be used to allow
development and integration of a mixed criticality system. However,
it will be used to control debug and test functionality to ensure their
operation does not impact the system they are analysing. This will allow
the approach to be further reviewed and refined in practise.
Finally, a process for reviewing the service afforded to low critical-
ity tasks has been presented. The process utilises the WCET profiles
obtained from Chapter 3 and provides a measure on the probability of
requirement failure for a set of low criticality components within the de-
veloped MCS. The approach is developed around a goal structured safety
case, constructed and supported using a series of statistical analyses.
Additionally, while not a key output from this thesis (as the timing
profiles used to support the analysis were derived), the results of applying
the approach discussed in this thesis to a real industrial system allowed
a substantial increase in available processor utilisation. The results in-
dicated that a MCS utilising a robust system architecture was able to
provide full service to a low criticality component, while allowing the
introduction of an extra 40% system utilisation over the original single
criticality system.
With these remarks in mind, it can be considered that the proposition




Open Source Control System
Example Taskset
This open source control system example taskset was taken from Bate
[38].
TaskID Jitter Period Deadline WCET
P1 0 25000 25000 300
P2 0 25000 25000 2088
P3 12500 25000 12961 461
P4 0 25000 25000 340
P5 0 25000 25000 7
P6 0 25000 25000 85
P7 0 25000 25000 1910
P8 0 25000 25000 1971
P9 0 25000 25000 640
P10 0 25000 25000 17
P11 12500 25000 13171 671
P12 0 25000 25000 103
P13 0 25000 25000 203
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TaskID Jitter Period Deadline WCET
P14 0 25000 25000 26
P15 0 25000 12960 14
P16 0 25000 25000 408
P17 0 25000 25000 278
P18 0 25000 25000 190
P19 0 25000 25000 32
P20 0 25000 25000 228
P21 12500 25000 13184 684
P22 0 25000 25000 273
P23 0 25000 25000 1265
P24 0 50000 12668 318
P25 0 100000 12957 1334
P26 0 50000 12669 52
P27 0 200000 12958 796
P28 0 50000 12958 336
P29 0 50000 12958 408
P30 0 50000 12670 798
P31 0 100000 13182 457
P32 0 50000 49999 351
P33 0 50000 12671 390
P34 0 50000 13181 201
P35 12500 50000 12673 173
P36 0 50000 50000 925
P37 0 50000 50000 321
P38 0 50000 12959 1801
P39 0 50000 50000 522
P40 0 50000 50000 256
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TaskID Jitter Period Deadline WCET
P41 0 100000 12960 196
P42 0 50000 50000 900
P43 0 50000 12959 1945
P44 0 100000 13183 528
P45 0 100000 12672 551
P46 0 100000 100000 272
P47 0 100000 100000 271
P48 0 100000 100000 378
P49 0 100000 100000 107
P50 0 100000 100000 217
P51 0 100000 100000 4698
P52 0 100000 100000 232
P53 0 100000 100000 30
P54 0 100000 100000 763
P55 0 100000 100000 62
P56 0 200000 200000 304
P57 0 200000 200000 336
P58 0 200000 200000 100
P59 0 200000 200000 8
P60 0 200000 200000 378
P61 0 200000 200000 38
P62 0 200000 200000 428
P63 0 200000 200000 2258
P64 0 200000 200000 328
P65 0 1000000 1000000 5040
P66 0 1000000 1000000 5040
P67 0 1000000 1000000 5040
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TaskID Jitter Period Deadline WCET
P68 0 1000000 1000000 5040
P69 0 1000000 1000000 5040
P70 0 1000000 1000000 5040
P71 0 1000000 1000000 5040
P72 low 0 25000 25000 100
P73 low 15000 50000 15010 10
P74 low 0 50000 50000 3000
P75 low 0 100000 100000 5000
Table A.1: Example Control System Task Set.
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